

A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of

MIDDLE EAST

**Special Studies,
1989–1991**

Supplement

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA

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1989–1991**

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**Project Coordinator
Paul Kesaris**

**Guide compiled by
Blair D. Hydrick**

**UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA
*An Imprint of CIS***

4520 East-West Highway • Bethesda, MD 20814-3389

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

**Middle East [microform] : special studies, 1989-1991 : supplement.
microfilm reels. -- (The Special studies series)**

**Accompanied by printed reel guide, compiled by Blair D. Hydrick.
Includes index.**

ISBN 1-55655-425-7 (microfilm)

**1. Middle East--Politics and government--1979- 2. Middle East--
Foreign relations--United States. 3. United States--Foreign
relations--Middle East. I. Hydrick, Blair D. II. University
Publications of America (Firm) III. Series: Special studies series
(University Publications of America (Firm))**

[DS63.1]

956--dc20

92-42057

CIP

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ISBN 1-55655-425-7.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The executive branch of the U.S. government requires a massive amount of information to make policy decisions. The many departments, agencies, and commissions of the government devote much of their energies to gathering and analyzing information. However, even the resources of the U.S. government are not adequate to gather all the information that is needed; therefore, the government contracts universities, colleges, corporations, think tanks, and individuals to provide data and analyses. Because the great majority of these studies are difficult to find and obtain, University Publications of America (UPA) publishes some of the most important ones in its Special Studies series. The *Middle East, 1989–1991 Supplement* collection consists of studies on the Middle East that became available during the period 1986–1991.

ACRONYMS/INITIALISMS

The following acronyms and initialisms are used frequently in this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the researcher.

AID	Agency for International Development
CSEs	Consumer Subsidy Equivalents
FY	Fiscal Year
DOD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
GATT	General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PSEs	Producer Subsidy Equivalents
UAE	United Arab Emirates
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic

REEL INDEX

Reel 1

Frame

General

1986

0001

Soil, Water and Crop/Livestock Management Systems for Rainfed Agriculture in the Near East Region. Proceedings of the Workshop at Amman, Jordan on January 18-23, 1986.

Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. C.E. Whitman (ed.). 1986. 359pp.

The dryland areas of the Near East Region are a major source of food and fiber for millions of people. However, current yields are very low compared to yields of the same crops in developed countries. The principal reasons for this are: (1) new and improved technologies that might increase crop production are not being readily adopted; (2) improved soil and water conservation methods are not being implemented; (3) there are severe economic constraints to the acceptance of new technologies; (4) the long-term and continued erosion of agricultural soils by both wind and water, and the subsequent loss of soil productivity; (5) limited and often erratic rainfall; (6) inadequate use of chemical fertilizers in the dryland areas; and (7) the low level of crop residue that is returned to the land because of its competitive use as feed for small ruminant animals, mainly sheep. Thus, with the creation of the USDA/USAID Dryland Agriculture Project, also referred to as Technology for Soil Moisture Management (TSMM), and with strong encouragement by a number of regional and international organizations, a workshop was organized to address the overall problem of declining yields and its multifaceted, complex components.

1988

0359

The PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and Israel in Central America: The Geopolitical Dimension.

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Bruce Hoffman. March 1988. 51pp.

In recent years, attention has been drawn to the close relations that exist between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The support, training, and arms furnished by the PLO to the Sandinistas and like-minded revolutionary movements in surrounding Central American countries have often been cited as proof that Nicaragua has been transformed into a base for international terrorism in the Western Hemisphere. This note assesses the relationship between the PLO and the Sandinistas. In particular, it examines the geopolitical dimension of this relationship, that is, the extension or transposition of the conflict between the PLO and Israel in the Middle East to Central America. In this respect, PLO support and assistance to the Sandinistas and other revolutionary movements in surrounding countries have served as a counterbalance to Israeli support and arms sales to Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America. This study should be of interest to U.S. policymakers concerned with Central American events and issues, and to the general public as well.

0408

Analysis of the Potential for Collaborative Commercial and Industrial Ventures in the Near East Region.

Policy Planning International, Inc., Washington, D.C. William T. Irelan, Douglas S. Land, and Delwin A. Roy. August 1988. 97pp.

This paper presents the results of a study of the potential for collaborative commercial and industrial ventures in the Near East region, in particular between Egypt and Israel. The principal findings and conclusions of the study are: The rapid privatization of the economies of the region has led to significant cross-border commercial and financial flows unimpeded by political constraints; no joint investment projects have developed to date; and the principal constraints to the further development and expansion of bilateral commercial and industrial relations are primarily economic and financial. To alleviate the principal existing constraints, the team suggests the creation of joint business groups, trade finance/promotion agencies, and a joint investment authority.

0502 **The Role of Agriculture in Employment Generation and Income Distribution in Asia and the Near East.**

Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge, Massachusetts. C. Peter Timmer. August 1988. 66pp.

The purposes of the paper are a review of some basic empirical trends and patterns with respect to agricultural employment and income distribution; a rough summary of the important elements that influence the demand for labor in the rural economy; an analysis of the instruments available to policymakers to manipulate those elements to influence income distribution, primarily through increases in real wages in rural labor markets; and a sketch of the analytical tools available for identifying key trade-offs and opportunities in the likely equilibrium between trends in labor supply and demand leading to real wage formation in rural labor markets. The most powerful lessons on the relationship between agricultural change and income distribution are the need to stimulate agricultural productivity and to foster the intersectoral links that contribute directly to agricultural development, employment, and rising real wages.

0566 **Agricultural Research and Technology In the 1990's in Asia and the Near East: Trends and Possible Strategies for AID (Agency for International Development).**

Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey. Carl E. Pray. August 1988. 60pp.

Agricultural research has paid off in the past. Recent studies of the major field crops indicate that research by Asian governments, by the International Centers of the CGIAR (Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research), and by the international and national research systems working together have consistently produced high rates of return to government investments. A few recent studies suggest that private research and development also produces high social rates of return. Public research on the basic grains has had a generally favorable impact on income distribution. Much of the benefits from modern varieties have been passed along to consumers in the form of lower prices. Since purchases of basic grains make up a large share of the income of the poor, they benefit much more than the rich who spend little on grain. Agricultural research will continue to be a productive investment in the 1990s.

0624 **Institutional Sustainability and Rural Development: Issues for Asia and the Near East in the 1990's.**

University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. Arthur A. Goldsmith. August 1988. 24pp.

The paper looks at some of the factors that affect institutional sustainability, making particular reference to Asia and the Near East. It focuses on two sets of institutions that are central to rural and agricultural development. The first set are colleges or universities that teach agricultural science and related subjects; the second set are public agencies responsible for integrated rural development projects (or what is often now called area or regional development). The focus on these two sets of institutions is in response to U.S. development strategy, which has given special attention to higher education and area development projects. Higher education, of course, is critical to the processes of technology transfer and agricultural diversification, while area development is central to better natural resource management and employment generation. The U.S. AID's experiences, in turn, have generated numerous insights as to how to bolster educational and regional development institutions, and have also stimulated demand from the field for guidance about nourishing the types of institutions in the future.

1989

0646 **OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) Trade with Middle East: A Reference Aid.**

Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. January 1989. 182pp.

The publication is one of a series of reference aids that provides the most recent detailed commodity statistics of OECD trade with different regions of the world. In the reference aid, data are provided on total OECD trade with the Middle East, trade of the five largest OECD countries with the region, and U.S. trade with several key Middle Eastern countries. (See also Reel 2, frame 0759.)

0826 **Geopolitical Dynamics of Southwest Asia: The Aftermath of Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq War.**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Muhammad Anwar Khan. March 23, 1989. 44pp.

In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Southwest Asian Region is passing through a period of intense readjustments. Having remained the arena of decade-long intraregional rivalries and the superpowers competition, the region is convulsive and unstable and will take time before cooling down to a stable mass. The three

countries on the Soviet Union's periphery, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, were affected by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in varying degree; whereas Iran was also engaged in a debilitating war of attrition with Iraq. Notwithstanding the nature of experiences and relationship of the three countries with the superpowers and their respective internal dynamics, the geopolitical factors point toward a cooperative regime in this war-torn region. The research focuses on the regional dynamics of the forestated countries and their effects on the superpowers, particularly on the U.S. strategy in the region. The research further concludes that if the United States is prepared and willing to consolidate its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by helping stabilization in the region, it could considerably draw down its military presence and in fact may fall back to the Nixon Doctrine.

0870 **Strategic Resources of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran and the Development of Kurdish Nationalism: The Domestic, Regional and International Context.**

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. K.M. Hawley. December 1989. 165pp.

This research examines the strategic resources of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran with particular emphasis on those assets as found in the Kurdish regions of these nations. Strategic resources, in the context of this discussion, are defined as oil and nonfuel mineral assets and agricultural potential, to include degree of soil productivity and availability of water supplies. To the extent applicable, industrial development is discussed as well. Kurdish history, language, and culture and the Kurdish nationalist movement in the three nations are also examined. Superpower and regional interests in the Kurdish nationalist movement and the government of the nations involved are also addressed.

1033 **Toward Armageddon: The Proliferation of Unconventional Weapons and Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East.**

Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. A.J. Miller. December 1989. 32pp.

The author concludes that it is probable that unconventional weapons and their associated delivery systems will form a permanent part of future political and strategic calculations in the Middle East. Some possible consequences of this situation can be divided into three classes: intra-regional, inter-regional, and extra-regional. There is no doubt that Israel, driven by the need for security, precipitated the proliferation of unconventional weapons and of surface-to-surface missiles in the Middle East. It will now be driven to secure itself from the new threat to its security posed by its regional opponents. The most significant extra-regional consequence of developments in the Middle East may be further complication of great power arms control negotiations.

To the re-discovery by the United States and the Soviet Union of their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to reduce the level of their nuclear weapons must now be added the desire to reduce, if not entirely eliminate, their chemical weapons stockpiles in advance of a global ban. It is possible that lesser powers will learn from the evidence of the great powers behavior, although that contradicts much of what we know of the psychology of decision making in international politics. What is necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, is that the U.S. and the USSR, as the two external powers with potentially the greatest leverage, work together toward the resolution of the underlying causes of conflict in a region marked by more than a generation of competition between them.

Reel 2

General cont.

1990

0001

The Horn of Africa and Arabia: Conference Papers.

The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C. Richard B. Remick, et al. January 16-17, 1990. 89pp.

Paper Titles: "The Strategic Importance of the Bab Al-Mandab and the Horn of Africa: A Global Perspective," "Ethiopia on the Verge of Disaster," "The Contours of Contemporary Somali Politics," "Domestic Political Dynamics in the Sudan," "Ethiopia and the Dynamics of Interstate Relations on the Horn of Africa," "The Other Side of the Red Sea and a Little More: The Horn of Africa and the Two Yemens," "Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa," and "Bibliography."

0093

Security and Defense of the Middle East.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Awwad Diab Maytah. March 1, 1990. 64pp.

Few regions of the world provoke more interest, controversy, or international crises than the Middle East. It has been an important arena of world events from the beginning of written history. Throughout the nineteenth century the great powers recognized the strategic value of the Middle East as the gateway to Asia and made attempts to neutralize it or if possible to seize it for themselves as an area of influence. During both World War I and II, the Middle East played a major role in the grand strategy of the major contestants. The importance of the region's oil and its strategic location on the air and sea routes between Europe and Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Far East involved the Middle East in the bipolar conflict between superpower and local conflicts

and potential conflicts in the area. So the Middle East has gone from war to war. The world is now aware that the question of Palestine is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that the legitimate rights of Palestinian people must be respected. The problem can be solved by achieving a comprehensive and just peace settlement that ensures the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, guarantees security and stability in the Middle East region, and enhances international peace and security.

0156

The Nature and Future of Shi'ite Fundamentalism.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Angus I. Ramsey. March 28, 1990. 58pp.

This paper studies the major dissenting sect of Islam called Shi'ism, which comprises about one tenth of all Moslems. The Shi'ite community is of substantial interest to the West because of its apparent propensity for radical militant fundamentalism, which reached its zenith in 1979 with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The paper examines the crucial differences in belief between Shias and most other Moslems, and traces how the sect has followed a unique and sometimes violent path toward the unattained utopian goal of a supra-national Islamic state. The paper concludes with a forecast for the future, which suggests that although the appeal of Shi'ism has been recently degraded by war and privation, the root causes of militant radicalism remain. After a pause to shore up the faith's economic, military, and political position, further extreme manifestations of Shi'ite fundamentalist activism are likely to occur.

0214

Chemical Weapons Proliferation In the Middle East.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Garard Schumeyer. April 1, 1990. 57pp.

Since the early 1980s, chemical weapons proliferation in the Middle East has been a growing problem. Most recently, the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, marked by the repeated use of chemical weapons, has set an alarming precedent in this region that can no longer be ignored. The threat is acute and the implications for the Middle East, an area where animosities are high and relations tense, are significant. This study addresses chemical weapons proliferation in the Middle East. It examines why proliferation occurred and looks at initiatives and efforts to prevent proliferation. This study also discusses the chemical weapons capabilities of the Middle East states, the threat to the region posed by chemical weapons, and some of the implications for balance and stability in the region. Finally, this study examines future prospects for the region in terms of chemical weapons proliferation there.

1991

0271

Chemical Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East: What Is the Proper Response?

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. April 9, 1991. 31pp.

The use of chemical weapons in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa in recent regional and ethnic conflicts illustrates the proliferation of chemical weapons and their use in the Third World. The use of these weapons has been indiscriminate and intentionally directed at both noncombatants and combatants. This paper focuses on chemical weapons proliferation in the Middle East, assessing the motivations behind the proliferation and providing a perspective on the nature of the threat, as well as the role Western industry plays in facilitating the development and proliferation. The study points out that Middle East countries have greatly expanded their chemical capability and that they have every intention of using it. Moreover, foreign suppliers are providing assistance to these countries as negotiations are underway to decrease worldwide chemical armaments through a Chemical Weapons Treaty. Finally, the study suggests that the proper response ought to be a strategy with a multidimensional approach aimed at the political and economic sources of passion that drive nations in the Middle East to acquire chemical weapons.

1991 cont.

0302

Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Strategies and Scenarios.

Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Mohamed Bin Nasser Al-Rasby. May 1990. 73pp.

Despite the efforts of the nuclear nonproliferation regimes and that of the United States, Israel, among other countries, has crossed the nuclear threshold and possesses nuclear bombs. The balance of power in the Middle East has shifted in its favor. Furthermore, the presence of nuclear weapons has impacted on the military strategies in the region. On the other hand, Israel's destruction of the Osiraq reactor has stalled an ambitious nuclear program in the Arab world. The Arab countries, however, possess weapons of counter value—chemical and biological—and do not need to embark on nuclear weapons programs. The ultimate proposal is to have a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East.

- 0376 **All Countries Are Not Equal: U.S. Security Assistance to the Middle East during the Reagan Era.**
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Mark G. Ewing. May 1990. 65pp.
The U.S. security assistance and arms transfer programs to the Middle East during the Reagan era did not support U.S. national security objectives for the region. Congress gave the preponderance of aid to Israel and Egypt for participation in the Camp David peace process. Israeli actions often worked against assuring access to oil, limiting Soviet influence, creating an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, and fostering an overall regional peace. Yet Israeli representation efforts in the U.S. Congress prevented any cuts in military aid to Israel. Moderate Arab states were often unable to purchase or receive credits for U.S. arms because of the domestic political strength of Israel's first congressmen. Inconsistencies and insensitivities to legitimate non-Camp David security needs prevented arms transfers to numerous moderate Arab states. As a result, the implementation of the security assistance and arms transfer programs failed to contribute to the achievement of U.S. regional security objectives, leading to a loss of influence and credibility.

1991 cont.

- 0442 **Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 1992 (Agency for International Development).**
Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. March 21, 1991. 317pp.
The Agency for International Development (AID)'s FY 1992 Congressional Presentation (CP) reflects the administration's program and budget justification for the bilateral foreign assistance program. The document summarizes the budget request and discusses the programs and activities implemented through its centrally funded programs and through the four geographic regions (Africa, Asia, Europe and Near East, and Latin America and the Caribbean).
- 0759 **OECD Trade with the Middle East: A Reference Aid.**
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. March 1991. 182pp.
The publication is one of a series of reference aids that provides the most recent detailed commodity statistics of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) trade with different regions of the world. Iceland, New Zealand, Portugal, and Turkey are excluded. In the reference aid, data are provided on total OECD trade with the Middle East, trade of the five largest OECD countries with the region, and U.S. trade with several key Middle Eastern countries.

Reel 3

General cont.

1991 cont.

- 0001 **Conflict in the Middle East: A Twentieth Century Legacy and a Twenty-First Century Challenge.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Charles C. Campbell. April 12, 1991. 79pp.
Since the end of World War II, the Middle East has witnessed the clash of religions, ideologies, and emergent nation-states. All of these conflicts are, in a very real sense, an outgrowth of the political arrangements imposed upon the Middle East by Britain, France, and Russia after the First World War. This study examines the extent to which the political arrangements imposed by the allies after the First World War have contributed to the upheavals that plague the Middle East today. The study focuses on the British experiences in the Middle East and the lessons that can be learned from that experience. The study concludes by addressing the degree to which the region's political inheritance has implications for the nature of U.S. security strategy in the Middle East.
- 0079 **Red Star Reflected: Regional Perspectives of Soviet Influence in the Middle East.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Edward O. Walsh. April 15, 1991. 26pp.
Understanding of the Soviet role in the Middle East is crucial to U.S. interests in the region. Key to this understanding is the decades-long relationship between the peoples of the region and the Kremlin's representatives, a relationship characterized by clear regional advocacy of self-interests and repeated examples of area independence countering Soviet desires. While Gorbachev was to repudiate many of the unsuccessful Soviet policies of the past, the latest Gulf War between Iraq and the U.S.-led coalition forces once again confirms the long history of regional rejection of Kremlin Middle East goals and interests.
- 0106 **Security Perspectives and Policies: Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and the Palestinians**
Defense Academic Research Support Program, Washington, D.C. Asher Arian, et al. May 1991. 57pp.
Chapter Titles: "The Labor in Israeli Politics," "Israel and the Palestinians: Influence and Interest in Likud," "Asad's Syria: Into the Nineties," "Palestinian Security Fears," and "The Maronites and the Future of Lebanon: A Case of Communal Conflict."

0167

The PLO: A Victory In Terrorism?

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Leonard C. Blevins. June 7, 1991. 119pp.

This study begins with a generic discussion of terrorism and its growth from a national to an international problem. The PLO is then used as a case study to address how successfully terrorism has served as a tool to advance organizational goals from the PLO's formation to the end of the 1980s. The case study discusses the history of the PLO. Then it examines specific terrorist acts aimed at achieving recognition of the organization as the sole representative of the Palestinians, Arab states, the international community, and—as a key element of PLO strategy—the United States. Conclusions and implications are drawn from this examination. In light of the recent Gulf War and its impact on the PLO, an epilogue is included.

Afghanistan

1988

0285

The United States and the War In Afghanistan.

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Alexander Alexiev. January 1988. 22pp.

In late December 1987 the war in Afghanistan, which has already lasted twice as long as the Great Patriotic War, as the Soviets refer to World War II, entered its ninth year. With well over a million Afghans killed and about a third of the Afghan prewar population forced to flee their homeland, the Soviet-Afghan war easily qualifies as one of the most brutal guerrilla wars of our less than benign century. Although prospects for an imminent termination are still uncertain, for the first time since the beginning of this war, there are definite signs that we are entering its endgame. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also marked a watershed in Soviet relations with the West and especially with the United States. It was seen by many, including the Carter administration, as an example of the kind of unacceptable Soviet international behavior that made friendly relations with Moscow all but impossible and signaled the end of the period of detente and arms control characterizing much of the 1970s.

Egypt 1988

0307

The Egyptian Air Force: Insurance for U.S. National Interests in the Middle East.

Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Stephen B. Plummer. April 1988. 65pp.

A synopsis of history-making events in Egypt from the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952 until 1988: remarks on the contrasting leadership styles of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak; a brief history of the Egyptian Air Force as well as lessons learned from past wars; an analysis of pros and cons of being a Soviet protege and the rationale behind the switch from east to west; a comparative analysis of the Egyptian and Israeli air forces of 1988; and an assessment of Egyptian foreign policy in 1988 and an assertion of similarities between it and U.S. national interests within the region. The author believes that by continuing to supply Egypt with vast amounts of military and economic aid, the United States will achieve a balance of power between Israel and the moderate Arab states, increasing regional stability and serving U.S. interests in the region.

1989

0372

Privatization of Input Supply Activities of the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) Arab Republic of Egypt. Volume I.

Scientex Corporation, Washington, D.C. April 1989. 503pp.

Since the mid-1970s, Egypt has moved cautiously in allowing greater participation of the private sector in the national economy. Volume I of the report analyzes the proposed privatization of the input supply activities of Egypt's Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC). It first describes the roles of the PBDAC and the private sector in the supply of agricultural inputs to farmers. This is followed by two chapters analyzing the implications of privatization for the PBDAC's organization, staffing, and finances. The report recommends a gradual privatization (over 6-8 years) to allow the private sector ample time to take over the PBDAC's monopoly and to lessen the adverse effects on the PBDAC's income. Volume II of the report consists of the following annexes: a fertilizer review; an economic analysis dealing with removal of subsidies and application of world prices on inputs and farm products; the sociological assessment of farmers' and private sector attitudes toward privatization of inputs; and detailed findings about PBDAC's finances.

0873

The Egyptian Rice Market: A Model Analysis of the Effects of Government Interventions and Subsidies.

International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. Ahmed Mahmoud Elminiawy. September 1989. 116pp.

The areas planted to rice in Egypt decreased from a record high of 1.2 million feddans in the late 1960s to 985,000 feddans in the 1980s. Rice yield increases also slowed down during the same period. Stagnating rice production was the result of these developments. At the same time, domestic demand for rice grew rapidly as a result of population growth and improved incomes, especially after 1973. Developing policies that would induce an expansion of rice production to meet growing domestic consumption and possibly provide foreign exchange from exports is a matter of great importance to the Egyptian economy. The major objective of the study is to develop an econometric model of the Egyptian rice market and apply it to policy analysis. Model simulations could provide decision makers with information about different market outcomes based on alternative policies and courses of action. The first simulation examined the effect of the public distribution of subsidized rice in the rice-producing areas. The results show that setting public distribution quantities to zero for the 1969–82 period results in an increase of about 5.4 percent in the area planted to rice, 4.8 percent in rice production, and 3.3 percent in quantities of rice delivered to the government. These increases are mainly the result of the effect on prices of public rice distribution.

1990

0985

Helwan Housing and Community Upgrading Project for Low-Income Egyptians: The Lessons Learned.

PADCO, Inc., Washington, D.C. Donald Gardner and Alfred P. Van Huyck. February 1, 1990. 55pp.

The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) housing and community upgrading project in Helwan, Egypt has drawn strong criticism. An October 1988 audit showed that, after 10 years and an expenditure of \$134 million, not a single low-income family was living in the new community and many promised improvements in other communities were years behind schedule. The report documents the major lessons learned for the project. The project context is described, including issues related to Egypt's economy, the USAID/Egypt Mission, trends in international housing assistance, and the level of professional skills required for the project. Events leading to project authorization are traced, followed by an assessment of the project objectives, the status of the Helwan new community and the community upgrading program, project management and construction, and institutional

development. Since the 1988 audit, progress has been rapid, with some 7,200 plots fully serviced and most community facilities completed. Housing construction is well underway and initial sales have taken place.

Reel 4

India

1989

- 0001 **The United States and India: Strategy for the 1990's.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Teresa L. Shanahan. June 1989. 123pp.

This thesis recommends a policy shift based on evidence that shows that the United States could benefit from an improvement in relations with India. The problematic U.S.-Indian relationship is traced from its inception in 1947. Political, economic, and strategic benefits available through a policy shift are outlined. The most significant gain would be in the strategic sense, with India as a dominant regional actor maintaining regional peace and stability while keeping trade and communication lanes open. A concomitant and almost equally important benefit of such a policy shift would be the added political prestige or influence for the United States, especially within the Third and Non-Aligned Worlds. Finally, India represents significant economic potential for U.S. investments and export. This study also examines the risks inherent in the policy recommended.

1991

- 0124 **Convergence of United States and Indian Strategic Interests in South Asia.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Shamsher S. Mehta. April 10, 1991. 32pp.

India and the United States are confronted with the most difficult task of all: normal diplomacy in a world of competing and cooperative states. In this new international era, both have visions of what the world should become. These visions assume relevance, because now there is a unique opportunity to shape and adjust them. The United States is committed to making the planet safer for pluralism and diversity. India, for its part, is embarked on a unique adventure in which the greatest experiment of cultural synthesis has to be successfully completed. These are converging interests with wide-ranging ramifications to the global community.

Indian Ocean Region 1990

- 0157 **The Indian Ocean as a Geostrategic Region: Recent Evolution, Status, and Prospects.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Inderjit S. Sawney. May 1990. 33pp.

After the British announcement in 1968 of their withdrawal from the Indian Ocean Region by 1971, the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were drawn in in a big way. The last two decades have witnessed increased militarization and superpower rivalry leading, at least until recently, to heightening of tensions. This evolution is studied, with an attempt to see the future while analyzing the recent events in the region and superpower rapprochement. The events in Europe, taking place with tremendous rapidity, are having an impact on superpower relations and the global geopolitical landscape. The current state of flux makes speculation extremely problematic.

1991

- 0189 **Indian Ocean: Zone of Peace or Conflict? The Impact of India's Military Capability on Regional Stability.**
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Earl F. Carter, Jr. May 20, 1991. 36pp.

The impact of India's growing military capability is explored with regard to South Asian (Indian Ocean) regional stability. The impact of current Indian military capability on regional stability is analyzed by comparing India's defense doctrine with existing military capability and neighboring littoral state perceptions. A review of India's defense doctrine is conducted to illustrate the conflict that exists between stated Indian policies such as territorial defense versus power projection, and actual applications of India's armed forces within the region. Although portrayed as a purely defensive force, it is shown that India's military has grown beyond realistic defense needs and has assumed a power projection capability that has led to an increasing escalation in arms procurement and instability within the region.

Iran 1989

0225

Clausewitz and the Iran-Iraq War.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Ronald Rokosz. March 6, 1989. 62pp.

During the 1980s there has been a resurgence of interest in *On War*, Clausewitz's famous study of warfare. His work has been used extensively in the developing study of operational art. At the same time, the longest mid-intensity war in modern history has raged between Iran and Iraq. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the conduct of the Iran-Iraq conflict using concepts found in *On War* and, in so doing, to assess the continuing validity of using Clausewitz as a conceptual framework for the study of warfare. The paper provides a brief overview of the conflict, to include discussion of its causes and the manner in which the land, sea, and air campaigns were fought. It then presents an analysis using Clausewitzian principles related to intelligence, culminating points, political-military relations, concentration of force, primacy of the defense, center of gravity, and role of the commander and the military. The paper discusses how failure of both sides to apply the concepts affected the course of events and unnecessarily prolonged the conflict. Finally, the paper discusses lessons learned from the Iran-Iraq war that the U.S. Army must consider if called upon to fight in the Middle East.

0286

The Iran-Iraq War of Exhaustion: The Result of the Paradoxical Trinity.

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Michael D. Barbero. May 9, 1989. 57pp.

This monograph analyzes the Iran-Iraq War to determine the role of society—the government, the people, and the army—in forming a state's strategy and action in war. It applies the writings of two classical theorists—Clausewitz and Delbruck—to explain why the war ended the way it did. First the theories of Clausewitz and Delbruck are explained to establish the theoretical framework for the monograph. Next, Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity" is used to analyze each antagonist's strategic development during the course of the war. After that analysis, Delbruck's theory of annihilation and exhaustion is used to determine how each nation's strategy resulted in the operational stalemate. This monograph concludes that the Iran-Iraq War demonstrates the inextricable link between the paradoxical trinity of a state and that state's strategy and actions in war.

0345 **An Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War: Military Strategy and Political Objectives.**

Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Maedh Ayed Al-Lihaibi. May 1989. 49pp.

The Iran-Iraq War was one of the longest and the costliest wars of the twentieth century. This conflict did not begin only because of the countries' historical and geographic differences. It also started due to deep ideological and political differences as well. This paper examines the political and military objectives of both countries. It describes the four phases of the war, an analysis of the strategy and tactics involved, and the weaponry used. Finally, it concludes with important military and political lessons learned.

0393 **The Clerical Establishment In Iran.**

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Nikola B. Schahgaldian. June 1989. 140pp.

This study analyzes the evolution of the Shia clerical establishment in the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979, and assesses the prospects for the durability of the current regime. It examines the nature, role, modus operandi, and sources of various clerical power centers; considers major issues of fractional discord; and identifies the probable domestic and foreign policy directions of the clerical elite in the post-Khomeini era. The study also includes detailed analyses of the composition, hierarchy, and organization of this establishment and scrutinizes the present status and possible future political role of clerical factions. The report is based in part on interviews with informed Iranians and others, including many Shia clerics and other religious functionaries, and supplemented by analysis of open-source literature in local and Western languages. The author suggests that, though a major change in Iran's position vis-à-vis the United States is unlikely in the immediate post-Khomeini period, the United States should strive to establish a working relationship with Iran. Such a relationship is desirable because it might prevent Iran from sliding into the Soviet orbit and discourage it from overtaking the other Persian Gulf states, and because Iran is the most important Persian Gulf state from the standpoint of population, economic and military power, and geo-strategic location.

1990

0544

Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian-Sponsored International Terrorism.

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Bruce R. Hoffman. March 1990. 43pp.

International terrorism has been a prominent feature of Iran's foreign policy since the revolution of 1979 that brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power. At the root of this policy is a desire to extend the fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law by exporting the Islamic revolution in Iran to other Muslim countries and cleansing the Middle East of all Western influence. This report examines the basic rationale of Iran's international terrorism campaign, its trends and patterns of activity over the past six years, and the Iranian personalities behind the policy. It assesses the future course of Iran's policy of supporting terrorism and, accordingly, focuses on the ongoing power struggles within the Iranian regime that are likely to determine the country's foreign policy now that Khomeini has died. The author discusses four key issues: (1) the reason Iran has supported international terrorism as a foreign policy instrument; (2) the ties between Iran and extremist Shia organizations elsewhere; (3) the trends in international Shia terrorism activity and the explanations for these patterns; and (4) the ways these trends have been affected or influenced by internal rivalries within the Iranian ruling elite.

1991

0593

Directory of Iranian Officials: A Reference Aid.

Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. June 1991. 124pp.

The Directory of Iranian Officials identifies individuals who hold positions in selected government, party, or other public organizations in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It also provides a guide to the internal structure of some of these organizations and an explanation of their functions where necessary. Types of information provided include dates of information, transliteration, personal names, and clerical titles. An index of major organizations and an index of personalities follow the directory listing. Duplicate names in the personality index refer to different individuals.

Iraq 1990

- 0736 **Iraqi Military Effectiveness in the War with Iran.**
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. W. Jack Dees. February 11, 1990. 48pp.
The effectiveness of Iraqi military activity is evaluated based on a previously published analytic framework. Political effectiveness is judged as high, for the Armed Forces enjoyed virtually unlimited access to financial, material, and manpower resources. Iraqi strategic effectiveness was initially poor, but re-assessment led to more viable strategies over the long term. Army operational performance improved substantially over the course of the war, but Air Force campaigns were generally ineffective in achieving operational goals. Increased emphasis on professional competence accounted for much of the operational effectiveness of the Army in the later years of the war. Tactical effectiveness throughout the Armed Forces was marked by steady, gradual improvement, especially in the Army. In the Army's final campaign, conducted in the spring of 1988, its leaders and soldiers displayed great operational and tactical skill.
- 0784 **Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East.**
U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II, and Leif R. Rosenberger. May 30, 1990. 106pp.
This study is an examination of the Iraqi defeat of Iran in the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War and the implications of that outcome on future U.S. Middle East policy. It concludes that Iraq's achievement in forcing Iran to accept a truce represents an authentic victory attained because the Iraqis planned for and successfully executed complicated, large-scale military operations and shrewdly managed their resources. Iraq appears to have become a formidable military power.
- 0890 **A Case Study of Cultural Ethnicity and Enduring Social Patterns: The Kurds of Iraq.**
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. Richard P. Donovan. June 1990. 171pp.
This thesis examines the close relationship among members of Iraqi Kurdish culture and society and emerging nationalist/modernist political structures currently in opposition to the Hussein regime in Baghdad. In addition to providing updated information regarding various aspects of Kurdish society, this work supports the view that political actors and systems are primarily a product of, and subsequently supported by, socio-cultural factors such as

tradition, environment, and religion above and beyond the generally recognized economic and poli-historical influences. Following a descriptive portrait of Kurdish ethnicity and political structure, the author introduces what he feels are enduring social patterns in Kurdish society. These patterns of personal and political relationships that have long flourished in tribal societies like the Kurds can be seen still in Kurdish national leadership. One model, "saint-disciple," appears to render aptly not only Kurdish patterns of norms and social order, but much of Near Eastern and Islamic North African structures. In short, this thesis examines primordial ties within Kurdish society in transition from traditional to modernist. One system does not merely supplant the other but rather adds to and adjusts the former according to the needs of society, leaving underlying relations among social groups unchanged.

Reel 5

Iraq cont.

1990 cont.

0001

Saddam Hussein and the Uses of Political Power. An Examination of the Relative Power of the Cult of Personality and the Nationalist Myth.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London, England. David B. Des Roches. September 1990. 46pp.

The success of Saddam Hussein in governing Iraq for the eleven years since he became president and secretary general of the Revolutionary Command Council has been nothing short of amazing. In the time since he replaced his mentor, General Hassan al-Bakr, Saddam has not only managed to stay in power, but has strengthened his position in spite of a devastating war and other setbacks to the point where it currently takes a coalition of practically all the world's major governments just to keep his army in a stalemate. In this paper the author examines the various methods that are used for control in modern Iraq: the security apparatus, the Ba'th party, the rise of a Saddam Hussein cult of personality, and the ideological and rhetorical appeal to both international issues and what is promoted as a uniquely Iraqi history and identity harking back to ancient times. The author evaluates these four factors in an attempt to discover the most important ones in allowing Saddam Hussein to retain and even expand upon his power base.

1991

0047

Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson II. 1991. 135pp.

The Iran-Iraq War was the prelude to America's involvement in the tragic troubles afflicting Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. Conditions born of the war produced the dangerous impasse leading Iraq to invade its neighbor. Now that American military men are confronting Saddam's forces in the Gulf, it behooves us to look back at the eight-year struggle between Iraq and Iran for lessons that will enable us to cope in the present crisis. The report focuses on the qualitative development of Iraq's forces over the course of the long war. It points out their weaknesses and strengths and makes some significant observations about the maturation of modern armies.

0179

The Iraqi Army: Organization and Tactics.

Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. January 3, 1991. 196pp.

A joint intelligence work group under the direction of the National Training Center (NTC) Threat Manager developed the tactical handbook on the Iraqi armed force. Using the FM series 100-2, The Soviet Army, as the foundation for its content and organization, it is intended for use at the NTC as a third-world threat model. Contents: Iraqi Ground Forces; Iraqi Military Concepts; Command and Control; Tactics: Division and Below; Intelligence; Reconnaissance; Artillery Support; Antitank Support; Air Defense; Air Support; Smoke; Engineer Support; Electronic Warfare; Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare; Directed Energy Warfare; Combat Service Support.

0372

The Iraqi Way of War: An Operational Assessment.

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Gary B. Griffen. January 28, 1991. 70pp.

This monograph is an assessment of the performance of the Iraqi Army in selected major operations from 1941 to 1988. Focused primarily at the operational level, this study first describes the Iraqi Army's performance in an abbreviated 1941 conflict with Britain. Next, there is an analysis of the role the Iraqis played in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. The historical review of Iraqi operations ends with a more detailed account of the opening and closing campaigns of the Iran-Iraq War. The operational performance of the Iraqis is measured against the six Operational Operating Systems (OOSs) described in Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 11-

9, *Blueprint of the Battlefield*. Serving as the analytical criteria for this study, the OOSs include operational movement and maneuver, fires, protection, command and control, intelligence, and support. Even though the Iraqis represent a formidable military challenge to the United States, this study finds that historically, with the final campaign of the Gulf War being the single exception, the overall operational performance of the Iraqi Army has been generally poor. The conclusions reached in this study also suggest that Iraqi operational weaknesses far outweigh their strengths, especially in the areas of maneuver, command and control, and protection. Finally, this monograph closes with recommendations on how these operational vulnerabilities can be exploited by U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf in the event the current crisis leads to war with Iraq.

0442

Can Strategic Bombing Work against Iraq?

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Patrick J. Shaughnessy. February 11, 1991. 25pp.

This paper addresses the question of whether or not a strategic air campaign can defeat Iraq. In order to answer this question brief consideration is given to the American definition, experience, and doctrine of strategic bombing. Next, the coalition's political aims and enemy intentions are examined in order to see if the air option is suited to accomplishing these goals. The outline of the air campaign over Iraq is detailed, with a discussion of its pros and cons. The essay concludes that, given the political goals and current conditions in the region, the strategic air campaign is the best military option.

0467

Responding to Chemical Attack.

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. R.W. Bagley, Jr. February 11, 1991. 20pp.

In view of Iraq's stated intention of using chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf War, the coalition forces must be prepared to respond. Iraq is capable of conducting such an attack. While the use of chemical weapons may not be militarily significant, the political effect of the use and the response to it may be very significant. Responses including the use of chemical and nuclear weapons are assessed in terms of their legality, political cost, and military effectiveness and found unacceptable. Reliance on diplomatic protests and on post-war criminal sanctions are judged ineffective. A response in the form of increased conventional attack on the Iraqi chemical infrastructure is recommended because that response will preserve the present coalition, effectively counter the chemical attack, contribute to regional stability, and enhance the reputation of the United States for lawfulness and dependability, thus increasing American ability to assemble and lead coalitions in future crises.

0487

Saddam Hussein's First War: An Assessment of Iraqi Operational Art in the Iran-Iraq War.

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. David B. Lacquement. May 9, 1991. 59pp.

This monograph examines the Iran-Iraq War from an operational perspective. This eight-year war represents Iraq's only experience with successful operational maneuvers. As such, it is likely that lessons learned, particularly in the final campaign where they synchronized successive battles, will shape their operational thinking for the foreseeable future. Should U.S. interests again be threatened by a revitalized Iraqi military, a thorough understanding of how they operated in this war will be relevant in assessing their future capabilities. This study proposes to answer the question: to what degree did the Iraqis conduct operational art in their prosecution of the Iran-Iraq War? Classical and contemporary theory are first examined to develop sound criteria for the identification of operational art. Four criteria are identified as representing the essence of good operational art. They include the ability to (1) conduct joint operations, (2) execute synchronized, simultaneous and successive operations, (3) conduct operations across the breadth of the theater, and (4) provide logistical support for distributed operations. Then the war is briefly reviewed to assist in placing elements of the analysis in their proper perspective. The analysis section examines the historical evidence using the four criteria to answer the research question. This examination of Iraqi performance reveals little evidence of operational art early in the war. However, by their final campaign it is apparent that the Iraqis were practicing operational art. Like the evolution of operational art in the Soviet Union, Iraqi operational art will likely continue to develop.

0546

Saddam Hussein: Portrait of an Arab Leader.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Ray T. Bradley. May 1, 1991. 102pp.

This study examines how Saddam Hussein's past has shaped his political outlook and how he has used power to make that outlook a reality. His past is reviewed in terms of Iraq's social environment during his youth and his early political career to 1963, the date of the first Baathist Revolution. A major portion of this thesis is devoted to Saddam's use of power in shaping three areas: national will, political power, and military power. Since it is not the author's intent to provide exhaustive coverage of Saddam's political life, only two or three examples are discussed in each area. Iraq's history of political violence and Western interference helped mold Saddam into the ruthless

leader he is today. By investigating his use of power, certain character traits become apparent. He views the world in simple terms, believes violence is the proper response to most situations, and has aggressive regional goals.

0648

Operational Insights of Iraq Gained from the Iran-Iraq War.

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Joseph F. Cramer. February 11, 1991. 34pp.

The purpose of revisiting the Iran-Iraq War is to gain any operational insights of Iraq's military forces relevant for consideration by the military forces of the coalition in the present Persian Gulf crisis. Only a general overview of the Iran-Iraq War is presented. The paper concentrates on the operational level of war, not the strategic or tactical levels. Additionally, this paper is not a present day listing of the operational capabilities of Iraq's military forces. The conclusion is that these operational insights provide a baseline of knowledge from which one can better understand and evaluate the operational aspects of Iraq in today's conflict.

Israel 1988

0682

An Examination of the United States' Role in the Development of the Israeli Lavi Fighter Aircraft Program.

Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Duane M. Petzoldt. September 1988. 68pp.

Security assistance is an outward sign of the long-standing special relationship between the United States and Israel. The United States has used security assistance as an aid to its foreign policy objectives of providing for Israel's security, promoting stability in the Middle East, and containing Soviet expansion into the area. For the purposes of this research, security assistance was examined through an analysis of the U.S. role in the development of the Israeli Lavi fighter aircraft program. The methodology included an overview of Israel's historical dependence on U.S. aid and addressed the following objective questions: (1) why did Israel want to build the Lavi when there were several advanced fighters already available?; (2) why did the United States fund the Lavi?; and (3) what did the Lavi project accomplish in terms of U.S. foreign policy? The examination of the Lavi analyzed how Israel developed the initial proposal for the aircraft, how they acquired the funds and technology from the United States, how the program costs escalated, why the project was cancelled, and how Israel will meet future threats to its security. Also examined were the effects the Lavi had on promoting U.S. foreign policy goals in the Middle East and if those goals were met.

0750

Lessons from Israeli Battlefield Air Interdiction during the Battle for Golan, October 1973.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Thomas D. Entwistle. June 3, 1988. 90pp.

This study establishes lessons and draws conclusions from Israeli Air Force air-to-surface operations during the battle for Golan in October 1973. The Israeli air mission and principal operational factors are identified and described. A historical analysis then considers how the principal factors influenced Israeli fighter operations and determine what results were achieved. The study shows that Israeli air-to-surface operations during the battle were equivalent to current U.S. Air Force doctrine for Battlefield Air Interdiction. Enemy ground forces and their objectives, Israeli assets, threats to fighter operations, and environmental conditions are described and analyzed to establish how they influenced operations. The results of operations are then measured against the doctrinal goals of Battlefield Air Interdiction to determine Israeli success. The study concludes that Israeli air operations effectively contributed to the defeat of the enemy ground forces, but the delayed nature of the effects produced important risks to the outcome of the battle. Further, the principal factors had a significant and mixed influence on the results of air operations.

1989

0840

The West Bank of Israel: Point of No Return?

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Graham E. Fuller. August 1989. 65pp.

This study discusses the causes of the intifada—the Palestinian uprising on the West Bank—as well as its evolution, institutionalization, and ultimate goals. It treats the complex question of local leadership and the natural state of tension between internal and external (PLO) Palestinian leadership. It explores the long-term ambivalence of Jordan toward the West Bank and the definitive death of the Jordanian option. It reviews the character and implications of the Palestinian option, along with the key political dilemmas the PLO must eventually resolve. It also considers Israeli dilemmas. Finally, the report discusses the new international factors affecting the situation. The author concludes that a Palestinian state on the West Bank is overwhelmingly the most probable long-term outcome of the present struggle.

1990

0905

The Israeli Defense Forces: An Organizational Perspective.

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Matthew J. Green. March 1990. 153pp.

The author traces the organizational growth and change within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) over its forty-year history. A model is offered that depicts a military organization as an open system embedded within a changing environment. Selected inputs to this organizational system are shown to affect organizational structure and, in turn, the combat capabilities of the force. The author uses the five major Arab-Israeli wars as critical junctures in examining the IDF's organizational history. The IDF is shown to have a willingness and ability to adapt to changing environmental factors. This capacity is determined to be a major reason for the IDF's long military dominance in the region. The author concludes with an analysis of the IDF's unique organizational adaptability.

1058

The Evolution of Israel's National Security Policy.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Lior Risin. March 1990. 95pp.

This paper focuses on the evolution of Israeli political and military doctrine. The paper examines the basic factors that determine the development of doctrine on strategic and operational levels. After examining the permanent factors that define doctrine, particular attention is given to recent changes and the dynamic nature of the Israeli doctrine. Israel's policy and military doctrine have essentially remained the same since the 1950s, despite the impact of far-reaching changes. These changes include increased involvement of superpowers in the region; Israel's increased dependence on U.S. aid; Israel's international isolation; the peace agreement with Egypt; the increasing importance of the Arab World and "oil power"; Israel's demographic and economic difficulties; the decreasing military threat to Israel's existence; and an increasingly divided Israeli society. Other problems discussed are the development of new military technology and the ability of the Arab nations to counter Israeli offensive military doctrine. The paper concludes that Israel must increase the importance of the political component relative to the military component in its national security policy. Israel must begin to take political risks for peace at the expense of its quest for absolute security, while still retaining its military power as the most significant factor to guarantee its existence.

Reel 6

Jordan 1987

0001

The Jordan Valley Dynamic Transformation: 1973–1986.

Louis Berger International, Inc., East Orange, New Jersey. Steven C. Shepley, et al. 1987. 272pp.

Since 1962 the equivalent of \$773 million has been invested, 45 percent of it by AID, in the integrated rural development of the Jordan Valley. The paper measures the agricultural and socioeconomic impact of these efforts. An overview of agricultural production rates and trends is presented, followed by an analysis of marketing constraints and resource efficiency. The paper then evaluates various institutions and services, including regional department planning, agricultural research and extension, education, systems, and pest control. Social indicators are assessed, such as population, migration, employment, income distribution, literacy, per capita income, contraceptive use, and housing conditions. Individual attitudes and expectations are presented through case studies. Finally, the paper describes specific project activities in the land and water, public utilities, and transport sectors, as well as institution building, followed by a summary of external financial assistance.

1988

0273

Comparative Assessment: Investment Incentives in Jordan.

Arthur Young & Company, Reston, Virginia. Kathleen Heffeman, James Emery, and John Mathieson. March 1988. 184pp.

Jordan is looking increasingly for foreign investment as a source of jobs, technology, and foreign exchange. The paper compares Jordan's investment climate to that of seven other nations—Turkey, Tunisia, Taiwan, Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, and Bahrain—and then suggests policy changes. The report finds that Jordan's investment incentives are competitive with those in other countries and in some respects are more generous. There are no striking reasons for Jordan to add new incentives. The underlying causes for the relatively low level of foreign investment in Jordan are the government's control over business activity through the licensing of forms, depressed regional markets, and regional political instability. The government of Jordan can reduce the first constraint through policy reform and can make important strides to address the second, but can do little, at least in the short-term, about the third. A policy program is outlined to remove, gradually at first and then more radically, the policy constraints on investment. The report includes substantial information on investment climates in the seven competing nations mentioned above.

1989

0457

Macroeconomic Policies in Jordan: Implications for Horticultural Exports.

Sigma One Corporation, Raleigh, North Carolina. Curtis E. Youngblood, Grant M. Scobie, and M. Haitham El-Hurani. August 1989. 75pp.

Until the mid-1980s, Jordan had enjoyed a long period of relative macroeconomic stability, together with high growth in real incomes and exports. This was due in part to prudent domestic policies. Since 1986, external and internal circumstances have changed very rapidly for Jordan. A fundamental hypothesis that is explored in the study is that macroeconomic policies constitute a very important part of the incentive structure facing agents involved in the production and marketing of fruits and vegetables. The objectives of the study are to (1) document the recent performance of agricultural exports; (2) link this performance to the real exchange rate, which is a measure that reflects the overall effects of macroeconomic policies, and (3) investigate some of the determinants of the real exchange rate.

1990

0532

The Hashemite Connection: Current Issues in Jordanian-Palestinian Relations.

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Ralph H. Magnus. June 28, 1990. 186pp.

This report first examines the basic orientations of the Hashemite dynasty and kingdom toward Palestine and the Palestinian people in the light of pan-Arab, Israeli, and international dimensions of the issue. The major policies since the 1967 loss of the West Bank are examined to demonstrate the application of these orientations to policy decisions. The three major policy decisions of the 1980s (the agreement of King Hussein and Yasir Arafat of 1985, the suspension of the agreement in 1986, and the disengagement decision of 1988) are examined in detail. The current state of Jordanian-Palestinian relations since the intifadah is examined for the relevant segments of the Palestinian people for Jordan: those of the PLO, the occupied territories, and the Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom. The new relationship might enhance the stability of a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, even if it removes Jordan as the key player in attaining such a settlement.

Kuwait 1990

0718

Application of Decision-Making Models to Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the Reflagging of Kuwaiti Oil Tankers.

Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Michael T. Rehg. September 1990. 116pp.

The purpose of this research was to apply conceptual models of decision making to a case study of the reflagging of the Kuwaiti oil tankers that occurred in 1987–1988. The actions of key players in U.S. foreign policy making were analyzed using the rational actor model. From the evidence found on the interactions between the president, his department secretaries, advisers, and the Congress, the political-process model developed by Roger Hilsman best described the case. The other three models (developed by Graham Allison) were useful in describing the actions of parts of the policy-making process, but not as completely as Hilsman's political-process model. All power centers agreed on the objectives of the U.S. action in the Persian Gulf, but conflict ensued over the means to accomplish the goals of the policy. The president and his advisers were for the most part united on the policy. The fight between the president and Congress centered on the war powers resolution and went on for more than a year. Personal ideologies were more important than organizational perspectives in determining the actions of decision makers.

1991

0834

The Iraq-Kuwait Crisis of 1991: A Lesson In Interregional Politics and Economics.

Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Mike D. Goodwin. June 13, 1991. 72pp.

The thesis examines the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis of 1991. Though many arguments were given by Iraq, the basis for Iraq's actions were economically motivated. Reaction by Great Britain and Arab nations were motivated both by economic and political reasons.

Lebanon 1989

0906

A Self-Inflicted Wound: The U.S. In Lebanon, 1982-1984.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. James A. McWhirter. April 10, 1989. 21pp.

This study describes some of the assumptions underlying the diplomatic-military decision making over the eighteen-month period in which the United States was involved in Lebanon. The Marine Headquarters disaster on October 23, 1983 signaled the end of U.S. involvement in Lebanon. The causes of the disaster had their roots in the unrealistic assumptions made by the United States following the Israeli invasion, none of which were realized over the following months. Personalities of policy makers, over-confidence leading to unrealistic assumptions, disregard of local realities, inconsistencies due to critical turnovers of key U.S. decision makers, frustrations in failure causing the reckless use of force, and simple negligence were all ingredients in the Lebanon fiasco. These threads are herein traced from the original overoptimism following the successful evacuation of PLO forces from Beirut, through the unsuccessful attempts to pressure and cajole a U.S.-brokered peace plan, and finally to the realization that the diplomatic-military efforts on behalf of the Lebanese government could not prop up an otherwise hopeless regime. There were many lessons learned during the U.S. involvement if, within the narrow political-military context of the conflict, they are heeded. Military means can accomplish but military ends; they cannot furnish to an unhealthy regime credibility, should it be otherwise lacking. Likewise the rules of engagement must be tailored to fluctuating realities on the ground, and, most importantly, they must be clearly communicated to the military, the Congress, and the public, without whose support there can be no consensus of will. The lives lost to the folly in Lebanon will be in vain if a thorough examination of the causes goes unstudied.

0927

Who's Who In Lebanon, 1989: A Reference Aid.

Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. July 1989. 19pp.

The report provides U.S. government officials with information on people, political groups, religious groups, and miscellaneous groups in Lebanon. The report is based on information as of June 27, 1989. Contents of the reference aid covers political history, the current scene, Maronite Christians, Sunni, Druze, miscellaneous groups, an alphabetical listing of groups, and a chronology of the civil war.

1991

0946

The New Look, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Lebanon Intervention, 1958.

U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. James F. Ponzo. March 13, 1991. 74pp.

Recently declassified documents from the Eisenhower administration are used for a historical review of administration policy, strategy, and regional security decisions. A strong manager, President Eisenhower recast U.S. strategy to support the containment policy. Dubbed the "New Look," it was expected to achieve an economical force structure through reliance on the technology of the "atomic age." A fiscal summary of the four years prior to the Lebanon intervention for each service is provided and reviewed. Reductions in defense spending did not prevent conventional force modernization. The Eisenhower Doctrine was a signal of the administration's commitment to maintaining stability through the use of conventional force and financial assistance. The decision to place U.S. troops in Lebanon was a part of administration efforts to come to terms with regional instability. The Eisenhower administration had a responsive strategy program, and it used conventional forces in achieving its objectives.

Reel 7

Libya

1989

0001

Center of Gravity—Libya, 1989.

Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Lawrence A. Grannis. May 1989. 79pp.

Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, as a key practitioner of state-sponsored terrorism targeted against the United States, has become a focus of U.S. national security concerns. U.S. passive, defensive measures complicated Qadhafi's operations but did little to curb his determination. With the El Dorado Canyon operation, the U.S. moved toward a more offensive policy against terrorism. However, the operation did not support the proper national objectives, did not apply force to Libya's center of gravity, and hence, did not deter future Libyan-sponsored terrorism. Libya's center of gravity is evaluated in the context of U.S. national policy and objectives, characteristics of the Libyan theater of operations, and the nature of the threat. Libya is found to have two strategic centers of gravity: Qadhafi and Libya's overdependence on petroleum revenues. Its operational center of gravity is the pipeline network that transports the oil to shipping terminals.

1990

0080

Libya, 1969–1989: An American Perspective. A Guide to U.S. Official Documents and Government-Sponsored Publications.

Library of Congress (African and Middle Eastern Division), Washington, D.C. Julian W. Witherell. November 1990. 192pp.

The guide records a selection of publications on Libya issued by or for agencies of the U.S. government in the two decades since the Libyan military coup d'état of September 1, 1969, which brought Muammar Qaddafi to power. These materials document the deterioration of diplomatic relations between Libya and the United States, the American reaction to Libya's nationalization policies, and the dispute concerning the issue of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra. They also illustrate American policy in regard to Libya's involvement in supporting international terrorism. Recorded here are holdings of the Library of Congress, additional material in other government collections in the Washington, D.C. area, and selected titles in other American libraries. Entries are grouped by general subject, with further division in some cases to facilitate access to material on a specific topic. The guide is limited to unrestricted documents. Also omitted are congressional bills and resolutions and material prepared exclusively for Congress by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

Pakistan

1990

0272

Pakistan's Security Problems and Opportunities in the Indian Ocean Region.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Pervez Khan. March 1, 1990. 52pp.

The Indian Navy, which is already the fifth largest in the world and the largest in the Indian Ocean region, is not predicated solely on the rationale of defensive security doctrine. There are clear indications from the force levels, expansion programs, and statements of Indian political/military leaders and defense experts, of an offensive maritime security doctrine for the Indian Navy, with regional and global objectives. India apparently aims to dominate the Indian Ocean by raising the cost of superpower intervention, so as to exercise hegemony over the Indian Ocean littoral from Australia to South Africa. Such a politico-military aim is a matter of great concern not only for the smaller states of South, Southwest, and Southeast Asia, but also the world powers having vital political, economic, and strategic interests in the region.

The Indian aims and objectives seem to threaten not only the security of the smaller littoral states but also eventually the world order by creating regional imbalance and destabilization of the smaller and already fragile societies of the region. There is need, therefore, for Pakistan to analyze its Indian Ocean security posture vis-à-vis India, with a view toward identifying Islamabad's policy alternatives.

0324 **Government Intervention In Pakistan's Agricultural Economy.**

U.S. Department of Agriculture (Agriculture and Trade Analysis Division), Washington, D.C. Gary Ender. April 1990. 26pp.

This report analyzes the nature of the government of Pakistan's policy interventions in the agricultural sector using producer and consumer subsidy equivalents (PSEs and CSEs). It outlines the government's position toward the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and possible changes in Pakistan's policies if trade were liberalized. Commodities examined are cotton, wheat, basmati rice, and coarse rice.

0350 **Government Intervention In Pakistan's Cotton Sector.**

U.S. Department of Agriculture (Agriculture and Trade Analysis Division), Washington, D.C. Gary Ender. June 1990. 57pp.

Pakistan is a major producer and exporter of cotton—the world's second largest exporter in 1985/86. Since 1984/85 cotton production has increased dramatically because of the rapid spread of a new high-yielding variety and improved plant protection practices. Pakistan can generally export cotton competitively at world prices, although subsidies were necessary to sustain exports when world prices declined sharply during 1986 and 1987. Estimated producer subsidy equivalents (PSE's) indicate that producers have been implicitly taxed by the government's trade and output price policies, an effect that is only partially offset by input subsidies. Maintenance of low domestic cotton prices favors increased production and exports by the textile industry.

Persian Gulf 1988

- 0407 **The Arab Gulf Cooperation Council.**
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Mohammad F. Albishi. April 1988. 33pp.
Many people including the United States believe the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a very important part of the Middle East, and its stability is a major issue. This paper attempts to answer the question, "Do the GCC countries have a common interest with the USA and why is its stability so important to the West?"
- 0440 **U.S. Objectives and Policies in the Persian Gulf Region.**
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. James L. Campbell. April 1988. 32pp.
U.S. policies toward the Persian Gulf region are designed to meet U.S. national objectives. This study examines the development of President Reagan's policy as it related to achieving U.S. objectives in the Gulf region. To better understand the evolution of this policy, the author reviews the policies of Presidents Truman, Nixon, and Carter. Additionally, threats to both past and present U.S. objectives are discussed. The study concludes by presenting some recommendations designed to help the reader better understand what is required of future successful U.S. Persian Gulf policies.
- 0472 **Economic and Policy Implications of Proposed Arms Sales or Transfers to the Persian Gulf.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. James R. Gilbert II. December 1988. 157pp.
Presidents Carter and Reagan each established a new U.S. policy to govern sales or transfers of conventional arms to foreign nations. President Carter called for stricter controls and an overall reduction in arms transfers to foreign nations. President Reagan believed that arms transfers to friends and allies strengthened the United States' position in the world. This thesis analyzes the success of both arms transfer policies in the Persian Gulf by comparing the dollar amount and type of equipment actually transferred against the formal Congressional Notifications (Arms Export Control Act section 36b). It further examines proposed arms sales and transfers with respect to strategic access of the Persian Gulf. Finally, it examines employment and financial impacts of the Foreign Military Sales program on the U.S. economy.

1989

0629 **United States Military Strategy in the Persian Gulf.**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. E.E. (Butch) Whitehead. March 27, 1989. 48pp.

The importance of Persian Gulf oil in the context of U.S. national security has been demonstrated in recent political, economic, and military terms. Substantial U.S. military resources have been devoted to maintaining national security interests in the Persian Gulf region. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the United States' military strategy designed to ensure the United States and its allies continued access to Persian Gulf oil and to suggest alternatives for possible improvement. Although the focus of this paper is on U.S. military strategy in the Persian Gulf, it also covers other aspects of U.S. national security policy and strategy. U.S. military policy in the Persian Gulf is derived from a complex process that inextricably links the elements of national strategy with the elements of national power. Conclusions about U.S. policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf that are properly focused and logical require an understanding of U.S. interests and their priorities, U.S. strategies and their feasibility, plus U.S. capabilities and their limitations.

0677 **The Gulf Cooperation Council, Its Future and Impact on Middle East Stability.**

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Arnold Fields. March 31, 1989. 38pp.

In May of 1989, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) celebrated its eighth anniversary. Principally formed to consolidate the economic interests of six Persian Gulf states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—the GCC has evolved into an astute political instrument with ever increasing military power. Fearful that the Iran-Iraq War would spread to the Western Gulf, the level of cooperation between the GCC states transcended age-old rivalries and unsettled disputes. Now that the Gulf war has subsided, these old rivalries and disputes may surface, and superpower initiatives may cause major regional policy changes. This paper seeks to broadly analyze the past, present, and future role of the GCC in the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf region. It first addresses the social threats endemic to each GCC state and the threats to stability they pose. Next, the paper provides a broad historical perspective of U.S.–Persian Gulf regional policy, including how it evolved and how the Iranian revolution caused it to be re-evaluated. Finally, the paper suggests that the void left by the demise of the “twin pillars” policy has not been filled and that allowing the GCC to become a *de facto* U.S. surrogate is not in the best interest of regional stability.

- 0715 **United States National Interests In the Persian Gulf.**
U.S.Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. April 2, 1989. 30pp.
For the last decade, U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf has been shaped by the Gulf War. With the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in place and an end to open hostilities in the region, a review of the U.S. national interests in the Persian Gulf and policies aimed at protecting those interests may be in order. The purpose of this study is to identify current U.S. national security interests in the Persian Gulf, examine the problems that developed as a result of U.S. ties with the Shah of Iran and what that experience implies for future policy, identify threats to Persian Gulf interests, examine available options for protecting those interests, and recommend the policy that best serves that purpose.
- 0745 **Joint Task Force Operations in the Persian Gulf.**
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. James W. Fondren, Jr. May 1989. 60pp.
The purpose of this study is to examine Persian Gulf operations in light of past deficiencies in some operations since the turn of the century. Congressional critics have commented for years on the failure of the military services to perform together in an effective and efficient manner, but saw little reform taking place within the Department of Defense (DOD). Recent Joint Task Force (JTF) operations in the Persian Gulf are compared to historical examples of past military deficiencies.
- 0805 **The Effects of United States Naval Forces Deployed to the Persian Gulf.**
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Larry D. Carr. June 2, 1989. 83pp.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the U.S. Navy's ability to surge forces forward to meet crises and still meet its day-to-day commitments. This study reviewed the 43 treaties and agreements the United States has with other nations and the strategy and policies of the United States in support of these agreements, policies, and strategies on the Navy. Key areas of personnel and material readiness are then examined. As a case study, the paper used the U.S. response to the crises in the Persian Gulf from 1970 to the present. This crisis is typical of the employment of naval forces to show U.S. interest in world affairs and is the most recent one. The author was part of the forces deployed to meet this crisis. The research showed that the navy's ability to surge its forces and continue to meet its everyday commitments is limited.

The navy lacks a sufficient number of ships and personnel to man them. The mission in the Persian Gulf was successfully completed only by pushing the ships and men of the fleet to their limits. The paper ends with five proposals that will increase the navy's ability to continue this type of crisis intervention and still be prepared to meet its day-to-day commitments in support of U.S. policy.

1990

0888 **The Persian Gulf—U.S. Interests and Policy.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Neuendorf. May 1990. 33pp.

The intensity of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf increased during the last ten years. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced President Carter to declare access to oil "vital" to the United States and to protect our interests by committing military forces to the region. The end of the Gulf War, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the death of the leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, occurred in short succession. These events have presented a window of opportunity for the United States to reevaluate and adjust national policy to secure our vital interests in this strategic part of the world. Although the Persian Gulf is more stable internally with the end of the Iran-Iraq War, external forces may now be key to U.S. policy in the region. The Palestinian-Israeli problem and the Iraqi response to it must be considered in formulating regional policy. This study examines U.S. national interests in the Persian Gulf, analyzes current internal and external regional threats to U.S. interests that exist following the Gulf War, examines current U.S. policy for the region, and recommends policy initiatives that will secure U.S. objectives.

Reel 8

Persian Gulf cont. 1990 cont.

0001 **Ends Versus Means: A Critical Analysis of the Persian Gulf Crisis (1987-1988).**

*The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Massachusetts.
William J. Luti. August 1990. 384pp.*

An analysis of the 1987-88 Persian Gulf Crisis is pursued by examining the relationships between the stated political objectives and the military means (role of force) used in attempting to attain those goals. The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to evaluate the "strategic" process that led to U.S. involvement in the Gulf and determine how effective that process was in achieving the stated political goals, and second, to evaluate allied cooperation and NATO's effort to address Persian Gulf security issues and its subsequent impact on the U.S. reflagging policy. The study does not evaluate tactics but rather focuses on the strategic perspective of U.S. Persian Gulf policy in terms of the relationship between ends and means, objectives and resources, and capabilities and intentions. U.S. policy is found to be strategically deficient as the military tactic of protecting Kuwaiti ships was not placed in a comprehensive strategic context. The confusion over the proper definition of the objective allowed the available options to remain limited to two unattractive alternatives: reflag and protect Kuwaiti ships or abandon the public commitment to Kuwait and suffer the loss of credibility in the Arab world. Moreover, the strategic course of action chosen to achieve the stated political objectives depended on Iraqi war aims and Iranian restraint to succeed. Similarly, by framing the initial protection of shipping plan in unilateral terms and then pursuing diplomatic efforts to enlarge the commitment into a multilateral operation by securing allied assistance, the United States forced a showdown with its allies over who had the greater share of responsibility in protecting Western oil supplies. The study concludes that U.S. policy violated one of the cardinal rules of matching political objectives with military realities: avoid multiple objectives with competing priorities. Finally, the study proposes a set of alternative strategies and recommendations based on a regional and collective security approach that emphasizes low-intensity conflict while confining the military objective to the more narrow issue of freedom of navigation in international waterways.

1991

- 0385 **Chemical Warfare: Implications for Desert Storm and Beyond.**
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Frederick G. Trummer, Jr. and Bruce L. Twining. February 11, 1991. 48pp.

This paper presents the potential for use of lethal and incapacitating chemical agents in the Persian Gulf. Insight from past chemical warfare case studies, current international law, and U.S. and Soviet policy, strategy, and tactics provide a basis for examination of Iraq's chemical warfare potential and operational strategy. In addition, a survey of Naval War College students assesses the current U.S. Armed Forces level of chemical warfare readiness. This analysis, combined with the U.S. experience and current global situation, provides a basis for the implications on the United States' current war with Iraq as well as proposing a more viable operational capability to meet stated national policy in response to chemical weapons.

- 0433 **Military-Media Relations: First Impressions of Operation Desert Shield.**

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Kenneth S. Plato. February 11, 1991. 30pp.

Military-media relations in Operation Desert Shield are analyzed by comparing how the media has been handled in recent military operations to how they were handled in Operation Desert Shield. Past operations are reviewed to discern if the military is learning from these experiences so that a healthier environment might be created for media coverage of the military. Military-media relations are reviewed in Operation Urgent Fury, the Kuwaiti reflagging operation, and Operation Just Cause. Lessons learned from these operations, in addition to the Sidle Panel, are extracted to examine their applicability to Operation Desert Shield. The military-media relationship that developed up to the termination of Operation Desert Shield is covered. In this regard, the military continues to make some of the same mistakes in dealing with the media, to include delaying media entry to the scene of the operation, lack of detailed planning regarding how to host the media during the operation, and a lack of regular briefings to keep the media aware of the progress of the operation. To solve these problems demands a close examination by DOD and each branch of the service concerning their goals in media coverage of military operations. A process of educating the media must also be undertaken by the military.

- 0463 **After the Persian Gulf War: A Multinational Gulf Security Force.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Mathias Knorr. March 11, 1991. 26pp.
 The crisis in the Persian Gulf poses a serious threat to world order. Predictions of Iraqi actions were inaccurate and the unprecedented world response was surprising. A vision of peace, security, and stability in the future is equally perplexing. A complete U.S. military strategy including both peacekeeping and collective defense would shape this vision or strategy. Peacekeeping is essential but only part of the strategy; it is an interim solution. Peacekeeping was not intended to function as a regional collective defense. This paper focuses on collective defense, which is needed to enhance GCC security and protect U.S. interests. Collective defense can be achieved through several military options, most of which were used prior to the Gulf War. The continuing post-war threats and volatile environment dictate a military option with the highest assurance of success and immediate, tangible results. A forward-deployed force is the only option that meets the criteria. This force, called the Multinational Gulf Security Force (MGSF), replaces the current military structure. The MGSF consists of air, ground, and naval components from Arab, GCC, and Western nations including the United States. The most important element, the ground force, has multinational corps with unimational divisions. It is a sophisticated, lethal force that provides what the GCC cannot—a credible self-defense. The MGSF is the key to a successful collective defense.
- 0489 **Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf Crisis.**
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Joseph P. Englehardt. March 25, 1991. 86pp.
 This is a chronology of the Gulf Crisis and a list of the major troop units involved, derived primarily from news media reporting during 1990 and 1991.
- 0575 **The Arab Gulf Area and the Conflicts Influencing It.**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Mohamed T. Mansour. April 25, 1991. 28pp.
 The Gulf area has a significant importance in today's world order. It is important geographically, politically, economically, and militarily. Beside these factors, there are in the region several contrasts and elements of tension due to different political regimes, religions and cultural heritages, economic resources, and the existence of crisis situations. The region is considered a confrontation arena between the superpowers, since each has tried to establish and then promote its military presence and influence there.

The region's nations have tried to cooperate among themselves to promote peace and security in the region. These attempts still need the support of superpowers and more effort to achieve the results they seek. This paper analyzes the situation in the region, focusing on its importance and elements of tension, and it examines the possibility of achieving a state of peace and security. This peace and security can be achieved through cooperative economic behavior as a prelude to achieving political stability and peace. The participation of both superpowers and all Arab countries in the region is an essential requirement to changing the Gulf area to a peaceful region.

0603

Gulf Security and the Gulf Arab Contribution.

U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. W. Jack Dees. June 1991. 114pp.

The defeat of Iraq in the 1991 war was so decisive that it appeared that the military balance in the Gulf had been fundamentally altered. However, the six states of the GCC remain incapable of meeting the external military threats posed by the various hostile states of the region and are limited by a number of immutable factors in the degree to which they can modernize and expand their armed forces to counter these threats. In this study, the military capabilities of those threat states are examined and specific capabilities are determined. GCC military efforts are analyzed in detail, to include the armed forces of each state and the various cooperative efforts that have been undertaken. Specific vulnerabilities are determined. The various factors that act to constrain GCC military capabilities and potential are analyzed in detail.

0717

Chemical Warfare: The Legacy of Desert Storm.

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Mark R. Henscheid. June 21, 1991. 33pp.

The United States and allied forces deploying in the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf region faced a formidable Iraqi offensive chemical weapons capability. This threat immediately challenged U.S. policy and resolve as outlined in the 1990 bilateral chemical weapons treaty with the Soviet Union. The necessity to assess retaliatory options, in the event of Iraqi chemical use, was apparent; the options are evaluated in this analysis. The proliferation of chemical weapons worldwide, disarmament efforts, and chemical defense readiness are also reviewed in the context of the 1991 Gulf War. The conclusion that retaliation by conventional means alone as the only acceptable alternative supporting the presidential goal of increased stability in the Middle East is reached. Prospects for revitalized postwar multilateral chemical disarmament efforts and a reduction in chemical warfare proliferation are also assessed. Recommendations for a postwar national chemical defense policy are made.

- 0750 **The Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict. An Interim Report to Congress.**
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. July 1991. 219pp.
Pursuant to Title V of Public Law 102-25, the DOD has prepared the Interim Report in the Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict. The report reflects many of the preliminary impressions formed by the department since the cessation of hostilities. However, much of the technical information needed for sound analysis is still being collected. The final report of the Commander-in-Chief of Central Command has not yet been completed. Nonetheless, it is possible to describe some of the key events that occurred in the conflict and to identify preliminarily some lessons to be learned. The DOD will continue to study the lessons of the war and will submit a final report in accordance with Title V in January 1992.

Reel 9

Saudi Arabia 1988

- 0001 **The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Contribution to Stability in the International Arena.**
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Mohammad S. Al-Daham. April 1988. 49pp.
Saudi Arabia is a country that has, throughout the ages, occupied a privileged position from the time Islam was born until the foundation of the Kingdom. The expansion of Saudi interest and influence to an international level was a direct result of King Abdul Aziz's strategy in the early years of the Kingdom. The position the Kingdom takes worldwide is based on principles of law, justice, respect for the rights of man, and opposition to all forms of aggression and socialism. The Kingdom, besides its promotion of peace and international stability, considers its wealth is for the prosperity of the international society.
- 0050 **Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States—Workshop Papers.**
The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C. Emile Nakhleh, et al. September 27, 1988. 165pp.
Chapter Titles: "Internal Stability in Saudi Arabia," "Economic Achievements and Prospects for Saudi Arabia and Other GCC States," "Social Change in the Arab Gulf States," "The Role of Saudi Military Forces in the Gulf Region," "The Outlook for the GCC in the Postwar Gulf," "Regional Relations and Superpower Interests," and "Statistical Data."

1989

0215 **United States Air Force Contributions to Saudi Arabian Air Defense: Present Needs and Future Options.**

Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Michael A. Nelson and Thomas P. O'Neill. May 1989. 54pp.

This report discusses the background that has led to the long-term augmentation of the Royal Saudi Air Force's (RSAF) air defense system with a detachment of deployed U.S. E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which began in September 1980. The regional and global threats to Saudi Arabia are examined, as are the weaknesses present in the RSAF air defense system in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Planned improvements to Saudi air defense under the PEACE SENTINEL and PEACE SHIELD Foreign Military Sales programs are detailed along with the current status of both programs. Recognizing the growing organic air defense capabilities of the Saudi Air Force, an assessment is made with respect to the present and future need for continued active involvement of U.S. AWACS in the defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Specific recommendations regarding continued U.S. augmentation are made for a variety of threat scenarios.

0269 **AWACS for Saudi Arabia: A Study of Foreign Policy and Political Progress.**

Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Robert J. Congelli. September 1989. 131pp.

The purpose of this study was to examine the 1981 sale of five Airborne Warning and Control System (AWAC) aircraft to Saudi Arabia in terms of the sale's actual effectiveness in achieving the foreign policy goals that former President Reagan claimed it would achieve. President Reagan, early in his first year in office, quickly discovered that the proposed sale was not popular with Congress, despite the fact that President Carter fielded the sale request from the Saudis just prior to the November 1980 election and was generally in favor of the sale himself. Congress, then having the authority to block major arms sales by virtue of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, forcibly challenged the president not only on his interpretation of the national interest, but also on his ability to conduct foreign policy effectively. The thesis examines President Reagan's expressed rationale for promoting the sale. The specific areas covered deal with U.S.-Saudi security concerns as well as the concept of presidential influence and leverage in the Middle East. The thesis also looks at the intense political battle and shows that a major arms sale was sanctioned not through logic or reason, but through raw emotion and

political clout. The Saudis found the heated arguments over their reliability, stability, and motives to be a bitter embarrassment. The thesis concludes by citing specific examples of how the Saudis have since avoided such embarrassment by turning to other nations for arms, most notably, perhaps ominously, to the Chinese for long-range surface-to-surface missiles.

0400

Sale of Abrams Tanks to Saudi Arabia.

Department of State, Washington, D.C. October 12, 1989. 24pp.

President Bush has informed the Congress of his intent to sell Saudi Arabia 315 M1A2 Abrams tanks, along with support equipment, spare parts, ammunition, and training, in response to a request by the Saudi Arabian government. It is U.S. policy to provide for the legitimate security and defense needs of our moderate Arab friends. This sale will demonstrate to the Saudi government as well as to others in the region that the United States supports Saudi Arabia's reasonable, responsible efforts to improve its national security. It will enhance the deterrent value of Saudi forces that guard natural resources of critical strategic importance to the United States and the West. It will preserve the interoperability between Saudi and U.S. forces that proved so valuable and successful during the Persian Gulf operations resulting from the Iran-Iraq War. It will reinforce the mutual trust and confidence that have existed between Saudi and American forces for forty-five years. Finally, it will provide a \$3 billion boost on the export side of the U.S. balance of payments ledger, tens of thousands of man-years of employment, and over \$680 million in savings and revenues to the U.S. Treasury.

1990

0424

U.S. Military/Security Assistance to Saudi Arabia: Strategic Implications for the 1990's.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Lawrence R. Mayes. February 15, 1990. 32pp.

Since the 1950s the United States has had a strong Military/Security Assistance program with Saudi Arabia. This paper looks at the history of this program in some detail. Additionally, the paper looks at the dynamics of military balance among the nations in the region that are friends and enemies to Saudi Arabia. The furthering of U.S. national interests through the development of strong ties with Saudi Arabia via the assistance programs is explored, and examples of quid pro quos are given. The paper then draws some conclusions and presents recommendations toward the continuance of this program between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The recommendations of this paper are for continued use of security assistance

programs toward the longstanding U.S. friend, Saudi Arabia. The strong relationship developed between the two nations over the past several decades has generally served the key interests of the United States in the Middle East/Persian Gulf regions, and continued U.S. military support will help ensure that these bonds remain viable.

1991

- 0456 **Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG).**
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Bandar O. Nahil Al-Harbi. March 27, 1991. 32pp.

This paper reviews the history of the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG), emphasizing the role it played in the unification of the Kingdom. Current SANG organization and assigned national taskings are fully developed as the background for a discussion of the extensive SANG ongoing modernization plan. The Iraq war with Iran and the Iraq invasion of Kuwait have influenced the revision of SANG national taskings, force sizing, and the overall SANG employment operational concept. The paper concludes with a vision of the SANG at the completion of the modernization plan.

Syria

1990

- 0488 **President Assad's Foreign Policy.**
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Antun Attallah. June 1990. 326pp.

This thesis is a study of Assad's foreign policy and the factors that helped him consolidate his power and transform his country from a proxy state to a regional power. Syria's relations with its neighbors and the two superpowers are discussed in detail. Syria's strategic significance is accentuated here; it is a remarkable specimen in the Middle East political aquarium. Syria had a glorious history. The Syrians are working very hard to restore that glory—the glory of Great Syria. Syria's modern history has been a saga of coups and counter-coups. After leading a bloodless coup in 1970, Assad took over. Under the leadership of President Assad, Syria has been transformed from a weak, shaky, and vulnerable country into an apparently strong and stable state, a regional power in the Middle East. What the Syrians and their president want is precisely what nationalists have always wanted in every part of the world: an integrated (Syrian) society, which is industrialized, modernized, centralized, socialized, and populated by proud and spirited masses; which

enjoys the benefits of economic prowess; and which is capable of sustaining its independence in the anarchic, chronically unstable, pervasively violent, and breathtakingly convulsive Middle East.

Tunisia

1988

0814

Private Sector Strategy: USAID (United States Agency for International Development)/Tunisia.

Arthur Young and Company, Reston, Virginia. G. Stimson Eveleth, Roberto Fernandes, and Sydney Lewis. July 1988. 51pp.

In light of an economic crisis caused by oil price reductions, the Tunisian government has recognized the need to reform and liberalize its economy. The report defines the country's economic needs and priorities, as well as opportunities for private sector development. It then summarizes USAID/Tunisia's private sector strategy, which complements current or planned government actions and which focuses on reforms in three areas. Privatization is the mission's top priority, since the government currently owns 500 enterprises, many of which incur chronic deficits. Financial markets, which are closely linked to privatization, are the second priority, while trade liberalization is seen as necessary for alleviating Tunisia's long-standing balance of payments problems. The report discusses the need for reform in each of these areas, outlines relevant government policies and guidelines for implementing them, and describes the extent of proposed AID support in the form of technical assistance, training, research, policy dialogue, and credit.

Reel 10

Tunisia cont.

1989

0001

Tunisian Naval Defense Forces in Support of Modern Battle Strategy.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Moncef Khabthani. March 1989. 66pp.

For Tunisia, the main military threat is from the sea. Accordingly, this paper reviews traditional methods of seapower as they apply to the modern battle strategy of the Tunisian Defense Forces. Sea power is the key to future independence and prosperity of Tunisia. To be credible, sea power must adopt a realistic, defensive role, exclusive of air or subsurface capabilities, but inclusive of sea-to-sea missiles or smaller, faster vessels.

1990

- 0067 **Food Subsidies: A Study of Targeting Alternatives for Tunisia.**
Academy for Educational Development, Inc., Washington, D.C. Carol S. Kramer. March 1990. 67pp.
The report analyzes food subsidies and food subsidy targeting alternatives in Tunisia. It focuses on strategies for reducing financial costs to the government without adversely affecting food consumption or nutritional status of the most vulnerable groups. It begins by describing major features of the food subsidy program in Tunisia, develops a framework for assessing targeting options in the Tunisian context, and provides descriptive statistics on food consumption patterns. It then examines international experience with food subsidies and food subsidy targeting efforts. Major lessons are noted. It concludes by presenting a preliminary analysis of the short and medium term relevance of subsidy reform policies for Tunisia. These include targeted and self-targeted price subsidies incorporating new product development, increased direct food distribution, food stamps, and income enhancement efforts.
- 0134 **Tunisia. Urban Implications of Export-Oriented Economic Development.**
PADCO, Inc., Washington, D.C. Duane Kissick, et al. May 1990. 204pp.
The report assesses Tunisia's capacity to take advantage of the new economic opportunities provided by the transition to an export-oriented economy on the basis of available institutional capacity, human resources, and economic infrastructure in the affected cities. Individual chapters discuss Tunisia's urban setting in terms of the national space plan, the national transportation network, urban population, housing and land, and the environment; employment and related policies; infrastructure services; the roles of regional councils, governorates, and municipalities; and municipal finance. A final chapter summarizes the urban implications of an export promotion strategy and recommends a series of program guidelines. A major conclusion is that only a small number of urban areas are capable of fully and positively responding to the new export-oriented policies and programs. Even in these areas, success will be dependent on a partnership between local government and entrepreneurs and cooperative efforts of all levels of government.

Turkey 1989

0338

Turkey: A Bridge to the Middle East.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Allen K. McDonald. March 1989. 54pp.

Turkey's geostrategic importance to NATO is widely recognized in the West. Sharing a common border with the Soviet Union and maintaining the second largest standing army in NATO, Turkey is positioned astride the main southern route of advance into Western Europe from the East. It is this NATO role that is most often used as the rationale for U.S. military and economic aid. Often neglected is the critical role Turkey plays as a barrier to Soviet expansion and influence in the Middle East. Recent improvement of economic and diplomatic relations with other Islamic nations has added a new dimension to this equation. Today, Turkey is enjoying the most prosperous period it has experienced since the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Since 1980, rapid economic growth has resulted in a significant increase in trade with Arab states, and this has led to corresponding increases in cultural and diplomatic relations. Increased influence connotes a stronger voice in issues affecting the region. The government's foreign policy objectives are a direct reflection of Turkey's geographical location, historical ties, and expanding Arab relations. They are also in consonance with U.S. national security interests. As an outsider, the United States is naturally handicapped in its ability to exert a direct influence in regional affairs. Turkey is an ideal partner to help bridge this gap. However, Turkey's continued influence is in large measure dependent upon its economic growth and stability. Therefore, the United States should vigorously pursue policies that would directly benefit the Turkish economy. Such action would make Turkey an even more valuable partner, one that is not only fully committed to the United States and the Western alliance, but also enjoying a degree of influence in the most volatile region in the world today.

0392

Transfer of Military Technology to Developing Countries: The Turkish Case.

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Aziz Akgul. June 1989. 129pp.

There is a switch from direct arms sales to military technology transfer to produce arms in the name of self-sufficiency. The value of domestic arms production at the beginning of the 1980s was about 500 times higher than that at the beginning of the 1950s. By the early 1980s, more than fifty developing

countries were producing weapons. The evidence indicates that Turkey has enough arms production potential. However, there is a technological gap that needs to be closed. Turkey should first follow a "path strategy" to create the minimum required technological base by using some form of military technology transfer. Then, in the efforts toward indigenous arms production, "engineering strategy" may be applied.

Yemen 1988

0521 **Marxism in Islamic South Yemen.**

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Michael G. Russell. April 1988. 35pp.

South Yemen is a unique Arab-Islamic state because it has a Marxist government. This blending of Islam and Marxism is a concern for pro-Western Arab governments and U.S. interests in the region. This study concludes that unique internal and external factors promoted Marxists to power in South Yemen. Additionally, there is slight probability that South Yemen can export its Marxist revolution to other pro-Western Arab states. Currently, the greatest threat to U.S. interests is the military presence of the Soviet Union in strategically located South Yemen.

0556 **The Yemen Arab Republic: An Export Market Profile.**

Agriculture and Trade Analysis Division, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. Fawzi A. Taha. December 1988. 65pp.

The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) will continue importing food grains and feedstuffs largely because of increasing demand and declining local production. Prospects for expanding U.S. agricultural exports to YAR are promising. The U.S. Export Enhancement Program and credit programs were instrumental in more than tripling the value of U.S. agricultural exports between 1985 and 1987. By 1991, wheat and flour imports may rise to 1.1–1.2 million tons from 821,000 tons in 1986, due mainly to increased gross domestic product from newly discovered oil and increased consumer preference for wheat. The Yemani market could absorb a variety of other U.S. agricultural commodities, especially high-value products and processed foods.

1989

0621

Yemen Arab Republic: Farm Prices and Incentives.

Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. Luther Tweeten, Bechir Rassas, and Thomas Earley. December 7, 1989. 260pp.

Written for USAID/Sanaa under the auspices of the Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II (APAP II), this report examines farm prices and incentives in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). The main constraints to agricultural development in the YAR are limited water supplies, fragmented landholdings, inadequate supporting infrastructure, and macroeconomic and trade policies inhibiting growth. Two major objectives of the report are to explore the effects of agricultural import restrictions on the pricing structure and to investigate comparative advantage in YAR agriculture. Nominal and effective protection coefficients indicate that domestic prices are well above import parity for all commodities. The overall gap is so large in certain cases that the domestic price is seven or eight times higher than its international price equivalent. While Yemen has comparative advantage in fruits, vegetables, and poultry, it is unlikely to have comparative advantage in coffee, and has a clear comparative disadvantage in cereals.

1990

0881

Macroeconomic Development In Yemen.

International Science and Technology Institute, Inc., Arlington, Virginia. Ronald D. Hood. January 1990. 46pp.

New and upsetting economic forces are at work in the YAR. The opening of the migrant labor market in the Gulf States in the 1970s has absorbed as much as 15 percent of the Yemani population, much of it from traditional rural communities. A slack in the demand for the market in the early 1980s caused a drop in worker remittances and a surge in foreign borrowing, leading to increases in foreign debt and fiscal deficits. Government attempts to rectify the situation by restricting foreign exchange transactions have strangled the flow of imported inputs needed by industry and agriculture and led to an excess capacity in manufacturing. The government's foreign exchange reserves are critically low, and government restrictions have stifled the growth of foreign currency deposits in domestic banks. The latter are also weak in their ability to mobilize domestic savings. While oil revenues will help resolve some of these problems, there is a need for immediate reform of the exchange and trade regimes, medium-term improvement of tax collection measures, and changes in the domestic banking system.

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