

*A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of*

# **MIDDLE EAST**

**Special Studies,  
1985–1988**

**Supplement**

**UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA**

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# **MIDDLE EAST**

**Special Studies,  
1985–1988**

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Editorial Note .....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Acronyms/Initialisms .....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>Reel Index</b>	
<b>Reel 1</b>	
Middle East .....	1
<b>Reel 2</b>	
Middle East cont. ....	6
Afghanistan .....	7
Cyprus .....	7
Egypt.....	8
<b>Reel 3</b>	
Egypt cont. ....	11
India .....	14
<b>Reel 4</b>	
India cont. ....	15
Indian Ocean .....	18
<b>Reel 5</b>	
Iran.....	19
Israel .....	23

**Reel 6**

Israel cont. ....	24
Jordan .....	26
Kuwait .....	27
Lebanon .....	27
Libya .....	28
Oman .....	28
Morocco .....	29

**Reel 7**

Pakistan .....	30
Persian Gulf .....	32
Saudi Arabia .....	33

**Reel 8**

Sri Lanka .....	35
Syria .....	36
Tunisia .....	37
Turkey .....	38
Yemen .....	41

Subject Index .....	43
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# EDITORIAL NOTE

The executive branch of the U.S. government requires a massive amount of information to make policy decisions. Many departments, agencies, and commissions of the government devote much of their energies to gathering and analyzing information, however, even the resources of the U.S. government are not adequate to gather all the information that is needed; therefore the government contracts universities, colleges, corporations, think tanks, and individuals to provide data and analyses. Because the great majority of these studies are difficult to find and obtain, University Publications of America (UPA) publishes some of the most important ones in its *Special Studies* series. The *Middle East Supplement* collection consists of studies on the Middle East that became available during the period 1985–1988.

# ACRONYMS/INITIALISMS

The following acronyms and initialisms are used frequently in this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the researcher.

<b>AID</b>	Agency for International Development
<b>FY</b>	Fiscal Year
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>PLO</b>	Palestinian Liberation Organization
<b>R&amp;D</b>	Research and development
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>USAID</b>	U.S. Agency for International Development

# REEL INDEX

The following index is a guide to the documents in the collection. The four-digit number on the far left is the frame number where a particular document begins. This is followed by the title, in bold, the originating institution and author, the date of the document, and the total number of pages in the document. A brief abstract follows.

## Reel 1

*Frame*

### Middle East

**1981**

0001

**The Cultural Impact of U.S.-Arab Military Relations.**

*Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Edward V. Badolato. June 24, 1981. 81pp.*

This study examines the potential, cultural impact that U.S.-Arab behavioral differences can have on military relations. U.S.-Arab cultural differences are first explored through a detailed look at three major factors influencing Arab behavior: group dynamics, the emotional impact of language, and idealism. A case history of the Soviet Union's advisory mission in Egypt is depicted as a classic example of how the failure to deal effectively with the cultural aspects of a military program can lead to its failure. The impact of Arab cultural motivations on their own military forces are discussed using two examples, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are considered to represent the opposite ends of the military spectrum. The Egyptian and Saudi Arabian forces are shown in contrast through their differing approach to the military. The Egyptian army is depicted as a force for social change, and the Saudi military is described as a tribally oriented, conservative organization dedicated to maintaining the status quo. Effective ways to deal with U.S.-Arab cultural differences are discussed, and U.S. advisory experience and training provide some useful insight in this area. Some suggestions are made for decision makers when dealing with the Arab military such as modifying the U.S. problem solving technique. The direct approach method is analyzed against the indirect Arab approach. The influence of personality, language, and patience is also explored.



**1984**

0082

**Food Self-Sufficiency Investments in the Middle East.**

*Center for Cybernetic Studies, University of Texas, Austin, Texas. A. Al-Saffar, et al. May 1984. 23pp.*

This study proposes a dynamic goal, programming model for planning joint investments in agriculture to achieve self-sufficiency in food production in the Middle East. The issue of equitable allocation of returns to participants in the joint investments is addressed as well. Equitable divisions of profits and equitable assessment of costs to collaborating investors are developed through an associated characteristic function game.

**1985**

0105

**The Role of the Soviet Union in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.**

*Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. Douglas T. Carrow. September 1985. 58pp.*

After defining the significance of the Middle East in Soviet foreign policy, and reviewing current Soviet initiatives in the region, this paper examines major post-World War II trends and events that have brought Moscow's involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process to its current juncture, ending with the August 11, 1985, adjournment of the Casablanca Conference.

0163

**The Key to Middle East Peace: Solving the Arab-Israel Conflict.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Luther Bernard Foley. December 1985. 192pp.*

This thesis analyzes the requirements of Israel and the Palestinians in reaching a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This author covers previous attempts at settlement, the foundations of which were laid by UN resolutions. The thesis also puts forth a new peace initiative that the author feels is the only hope left for the Palestinian people to regain a portion of their homeland.

0355

**The Role of the United States in the Search for an Arab-Israeli Peace.**

*Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. Joseph B. Burroughs. December 1, 1985. 50pp.*

This paper examines both the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process (with its close relationship to U.S. perceptions of the extent of the Soviet threat in the area) and the policies followed by the Reagan administration in seeking peace between the Arabs and the Israelis.

**1986**

0405

**United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East.**

*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Hani M. Dorgham. March 1986. 38pp.*

A brief historical background of the Middle East is provided and how both superpowers regard this important region is discussed. Recent Middle Eastern changes, none of which can be considered as in the U.S. interest, are discussed. These changes reflect the continuing growth of threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East and indicate the absence of an effective U.S. foreign policy tailored to the complexities and uncertainties of this region. Ultimately, these changes emphasize the need to design a new policy able to secure U.S. and allied interests in the region by concentrating on the realities that drive the region. The author suggests that U.S. foreign policy should involve effective U.S. participation in developing the region's military and economic capabilities that promote the political stability necessary to preserve the U.S., allies, and friendly nation's interests in the region.

0443

**Background Issues Concerning Soviet Foreign Policy and Syrian Initiatives in the Middle East.**

*Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. John C. Burch. March 1986. 93pp.*

The complexities of the contemporary Middle East have frustrated policy makers since the conclusion of World War II. Both superpowers seek regional influence, often at the expense of the other. This research identifies the Soviet's three fundamental foreign policy goals as (1) national security of the homeland on its southern flank, (2) exclusion of Western influence in the area, and (3) simultaneous growth of Soviet influence and presence. Syria has emerged as the principal Soviet client state within the region. Its foreign policy and relationship to the Soviets are at the focal point of most regional issues. The author examines the Soviet-Syrian entente and provides a proposal to resolve the regional dilemmas.

0536

**Mineral Industries of the Middle East.**

*Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C. John R. Lewis, et al. April 1986. 70pp.*

This report presents a summary of the mineral industries of the sixteen countries in the Middle East. Countries in this region differ widely, from those heavily endowed with hydrocarbon resources but with limited non-fuel resources, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, to those heavily mineralized countries with limited petroleum reserves, such as Turkey, and those heavily mineralized countries with little mineral activity of any kind, such as Lebanon. Base maps and tables show the location and salient features of each country's mineral supply and trade, mineral policy,

industry structure, labor, energy, and the outlook for future developments in the industry. Infrastructure of importance to the mineral industry of each country, including railways, roads, and pipelines is included on each map. Photographs of some operations are included.

0606

**U.S. Role in the Middle East Peace Process.**

*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Ahmad Azzam El-Mustafa. April 1986. 33pp.*

This report reviews the importance of the Middle East to the whole world and, in particular, the United States. It examines the factors affecting U.S. vital interests in the area and what U.S. security policy in the region must consider to best achieve its objectives and the security and objectives of its allies. The author attempts to prove that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart and the major fundamental problem in all of the Middle East Crises. Solving this conflict with a broader, just, and lasting peace and comprehensive settlement to the Palestinian question will enhance the stability of the region, contain the Soviet influence, and eliminate the need for the Soviets to oppose Israel (the main adversary to the Arab states) and Israel's main supporter, the United States. Satisfying the Palestinian rights will eliminate their reasons for any retaliatory actions such as terrorism. This unique and vital role of the United States in the peace process is emphasized. Specific recommendations for U.S. policy, diplomatic, political, moral, military, and economic assistance to the countries in the region are offered, as well as the actions to be taken to best serve the Middle East countries and U.S. interests in the region. The author concludes that the United States should foster the peace process and use its influence to constrain Israel and all parties concerned and stop taking sides. Doing this, the United States will be in a better position of credibility and will be more effective in the region.

0639

**A Focused Comparison of Soviet and American National Interests in Southwest Asia.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. John M. O'Sullivan, Jr. June 1986. 205pp.*

This thesis develops a framework for analysis by which to compare the national interests of the Soviet Union and the United States. Because of the problem of mirror-imaging Soviet and American views, this analysis carefully attempts to consider the definition of a national interest from both societal perspectives and to apply the framework of analysis to two related case studies; superpower interests in Afghanistan and Iran. The Southwest Asian region provides an interesting environment to apply this paradigm because of the significant challenges to both Soviet and American positions in light of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan. This analysis concludes with a brief comparison of U.S. and Soviet interests in the region. Given the geostrategic position of the region, the dominant role of ethnicity in Iran and Afghanistan, and the risks to superpower prestige, it is obvious that the Soviet Union has a greater intensity of interests in this region.

0844

**Middle Eastern Strategic Deployment—Oasis or Mirage?**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Stephen Brooks Howard. June 6, 1986. 124pp.*

This study assesses the feasibility of the United States deploying its planned military forces for the protection of its national interests in the Middle East, within time constraints previously established in our Southwest Asian contingency plans. The actual deployment feasibility was determined based upon comparisons of historical and current transportation-related problems, which have been encountered during actual and exercise strategic military deployments. Past deployments by the United States to Europe in 1944 (Normandy Invasion), to Lebanon in 1958, to Grenada in 1983, and by the United Kingdom to the Falkland Islands in 1982, as well as recent Joint Readiness Exercises, were analyzed. Thus, common transportation-related problems served to identify the general causes for delay in the smooth movement of U.S. military forces. This study identifies three consistent courses of delays in strategic deployments as (1) lack of adequate deployment training, (2) inadequate coordination of operational requirements, and (3) failure to execute specific details in pre-established contingency plans and procedures. The study concludes that the United States is not capable of successfully deploying its combat forces to the Middle East within the time schedules contained in our current contingency plans. This lack of force projection capability is attributed to delays that will be encountered because of unanticipated transportation-related problems. This study cites a weakness in the structure of army and joint commands at division level and above. The weakness, as identified, shows that the contingency planning function is separated from contingency execution/operations functions within these command structures.

## Reel 2

### Middle East cont.

**1987**

0001

**How Do United States Domestic Factors Affect Arms Sales to the Middle East?**

*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Nader A. Dahabi. May 1987. 59pp.*

This report identifies, examines, and analyzes U.S. domestic factors that affected Congress' decision to approve arms sales to moderate Arab countries in the Middle East. The report discusses the increasing congressional control on arms sales and how it has given some countries like France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union the opportunity to take advantage of the situation and to sell their arms to moderate Arab countries. A Jordan case study provides an example of a moderate Arab country turned down by Congress that tries elsewhere to satisfy its national security requirements. Several recommendations are included for future activities by moderate Arab states to help them pave the way for future congressional approval of arms sales.

0060

**Psychological Operations in Urban Warfare: Lessons from the 1982 Middle East War.**

*Abbott Associates, Inc., Springfield, Virginia. Phillip P. Katz and R. D. McLaurin. July 1987. 65pp.*

This report examines the planning, organization, operations, and effectiveness of Israeli psychological operations (PSYOP) during the 1982 campaign in Lebanon and draws implications for U.S. forces in future conflicts. The report clearly established the criticality of effective tactical and strategic PSYOPs mated to the overall strategy, especially in the conduct of limited warfare operations. The campaign to eradicate the PLO in Lebanon presented numerous problems to Israeli forces that are representative of highly politicized, limited conflicts. The report fully illustrates the difficulty of addressing effective PSYOP to diverse audiences, especially when the intended audiences cannot be isolated from each other, such as in a city.

**1988**

0125

**OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Trade with Middle East.**

*Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] March 1988. 180pp.*

This publication is one of a series of reference aids that provides the most recent, detailed commodity statistics of Organization for Economic Coop-

eration and Development (OECD) trade with different regions of the world. In the reference aid, data are provided on total OECD trade with the Middle East, trade of the five largest OECD countries with the region, and the U.S. trade with several key Middle Eastern countries.

## Afghanistan

1986

0305

### **Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Causes and Future Options.**

*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. David C. Gregory. May 1986. 35pp.*

This document examines six causative factors leading up to the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan. It disagrees with the commonly held view that the Soviets moved into Afghanistan primarily to improve their strategic position vis-à-vis the United States in the Persian Gulf area. Instead, it is asserted that the principle reasons for the invasion were predicated on the tenets of the Brezhnev Doctrine, growing instability on the Soviet southern border, and the perception that the move was a low-risk operation. The paper also examines future Soviet courses of action to meet their objectives and concludes that the present force level/strategy will continue for the foreseeable future.

## Cyprus

1986

0340

### **Cyprus: The Key to Stability on the Southeastern Flank of NATO.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Robert J. Davis. April 7, 1986. 26pp.*

Turkey occupied northern Cyprus in July 1974, shocking the world and creating military and political stresses on the NATO alliance that have not been settled to this date. This essay analyzes the Cyprus situation and highlights the importance of its resolution to NATO's interest. The paper discusses the military capability of Greece and Turkey to confront any aggression by Warsaw Pact forces. It focuses on the resolution of the Cyprus issue as the linchpin that must occur to remove many of the frictions that confront Greece and Turkey. The author concludes that once that happens, there will be improved cohesiveness and credibility on the southern flank of NATO.

## Egypt

**1984**

0366 **Small-Scale Enterprise Sectors In Egypt: A Critical Analysis of Seven Selected Studies.**

*Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. G. N. Howe. October 1984. 52pp.*

Three factors have prompted further consideration of Egypt's formal and informal small-scale enterprise sectors: The government of Egypt's general concern about increased economic productivity, USAID/Egypt's programmatic developments centering on revenue generation, and an agency policy priority focusing on private sector development. Contents: The small-scale industrial sector: Arthur D. Little International, Inc. report; The small-scale industrial sector: Paul G. Clark report; Artisanal production in major industrial area; The ubiquity of artisanal and household production; and Elements of the social context and organization of small-scale production.

**1985**

0419 **U.S. Economic Assistance Program for Egypt Poses a Management Challenge for AID (Agency for International Development).**

*National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. Frank C. Conahan. July 31, 1985. 74pp.*

The United States has provided Egypt with \$7.3 billion in Economic Support Fund assistance since 1974. This high level of funding has been provided to help maintain peace and stability in the Middle East, which is the political objective of the program. A longer term, supportive objective has been to help Egypt strengthen its economy. AID's progress toward this second objective has been limited by the program's political nature. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recognizes that AID must work within the constraints of the Egypt program's political nature but believes certain actions can be taken to help determine how best to achieve economic development goals in view of the program's political objective. To do this, the GAO believes that AID should (1) gain more in-depth knowledge of Egypt's development sectors and the economic policies that affect these sectors and (2) assess Egypt's development efforts undertaken in response to the provision of cash payments.

- 0493     **Agricultural Statistics of Egypt, 1970–1984.**  
*International Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. George R. Gardner and John B. Parker. August 1985. 101pp.*  
Egypt is one of the world's largest food importers, annually consuming over \$4 billion worth of imported agricultural commodities to feed a population of 48 million. The import bill is growing rapidly as population and consumption growth rates exceed that of agricultural production. Egypt was the tenth largest market for U.S. agricultural exports in 1984. The U.S. market share is about 25 percent, with wheat, wheat flour, and corn making up the bulk of the shipments. This report consists of ninety data tables documenting the Egyptian market. The areas covered include population and labor force, economic indicators, farm characteristics, land use and cropping patterns, commodities, agricultural inputs, per capita consumption, food imports and agricultural trade, agricultural exports, agricultural prices, and other topics. This report is intended as an English-language reference source for commodity exporters dealing with the Egyptian market, government agency planners working with Egypt, and researchers studying the Egyptian economy.
- 0594     **Egypt: An Export Market Profile.**  
*International Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. George R. Gardner and John B. Parker. September 1983. 86pp.*  
The United States, the leading supplier of Egypt's massive food imports, will continue to be a major supplier to the \$4 billion annual market if favorable financing arrangements continue to be available. U.S. exports to Egypt, primarily wheat and wheat flour, make up about 25 percent of the value of food imported into Egypt. By 1990, with continued rapid population growth and only slight income gains, Egypt will probably import over 8 million tons of wheat and flour (compared with 6.4 million tons in 1983), 4 million tons of corn (1.7 million tons in 1983), 1 million tons of sugar (716,000 tons in 1983), 500,000 tons of vegetable oil (330,000 tons in 1983), and 500,000 tons of meat (255,000 tons in 1983).
- 0680     **Egypt's Role in the Middle East Peace Process.**  
*Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. John J. Creighton. September 1985. 43pp.*  
For the first time in many years, all of the key players in the Arab-Israeli conflict are coordinating their efforts in an attempt to revive the peace process. The problems associated with achieving a framework for negotiations are many, and they are mentioned throughout this paper. In the past, peace talks have been guided by an outside force (usually the United



States), but this latest proposal has come from the actual parties to the conflict through their own efforts. Egypt, which has always been the key Arab player in the Middle East peace process, maintains a vital role in the process today. In this paper, Egypt's current and historical role in the Middle East peace process is examined.

**1986**

0723

**Rice Research and Training Project in Egypt.**

*University of California, Davis, California. A. L. Isa, et al. 1986. 117pp.*

This is the final report to the USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Rice Research and Training Project, USAID Project No. 263-0027. The project goal has been to increase Egypt's production and quality of rice, a major food crop for a rapidly increasing population. Activities undertaken to achieve the goal were improvements in program planning and management, more effective research and extension programs, the training of Egyptian professionals, the development of new facilities and improvements in existing ones, and motivation of rice farmers to adopt improved rice production practices.

0840

**The Ramadan War.**

*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Tarek A. Awad. March 1986. 58pp.*

As in any combat, the two participants view the events differently, because of their individual objectives and interests and because of the facts known uniquely to each of them. Since the Arab participants in these wars have published little, and their side of the conflict was not covered in the Western press in the detail that the Israeli side was, there has not been an equal opportunity for Westerners to evaluate it adequately, or even to understand the Arab position. This research paper attempts to highlight the Fourth Round between Israel and some of the Arab countries. Remarks on some historical aspects of this war from the Egyptian point of view will be presented, attempting to articulate the facts, without propaganda or false facts. The author, an Egyptian soldier, believes that the Americans have an incorrect idea about the Ramadan War, also known as "the October 1973 War," and hopes to clear up these misperceptions.

0898

**Egypt's Food Subsidy Policy: Evaluation of Effects and Policy Options for the 1980s.**

*International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. H. Alderman and J. von Braun. April 1986. 61pp.*

Few developing countries allow food prices to be determined unhindered by market forces. Governments commonly employ a variety of instruments—consumer subsidies, quantity rations, import and export restrictions, parastatal marketing companies, forced procurements, and foreign

exchange undervaluation—to influence consumer and producer prices. The current subsidy system, then, does not represent a sharp break from the past. By 1980 the cost of food subsidies had risen to more than 1 billion Egyptian pounds.

## Reel 3

### Egypt cont.

#### 1986 cont.

0001

**Conflict in the Middle East: Egyptian Policy and Strategy to Create an Egyptian Proposal to Achieve Stability in the Region.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Mohammed Ahmed Ghayaty. May 14, 1986. 262pp.*

Although the conflict between the Arab nations and Israel antedate the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, the proximate causes of the current problem are the Arab unwillingness to recognize the state of Israel and the Israeli refusal to peacefully resolve the Palestinian refugee problem that was caused by the creation of Israel. The problem is compounded by the existence of terrorist organizations that are dedicated to a violent solution of these problems. This study examines the sources of conflict in the Middle East. The current conflicts in the area are analyzed to include the Gulf War, the Arab-Israeli wars, the Syrian and Libyan situations and the problems in the Horn of Africa. The situation in Lebanon is also examined, as well as the regional role of the superpowers [United States and Soviet Union]. After the contemporary crises have been reviewed, the role of Egypt in the region is studied. This includes the political and economic aspects of Egyptian foreign policy, its security requirements and its relationship with the United States, with special emphasis on the Camp David Accords. Finally, a workable proposal from the Egyptian perspective including both political policy and strategic elements is presented that aims at achieving regional stability.

0263

**The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The War of Attrition and Preparations Preceding the October 1973 War.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Jerry R. Thornberry. 1986. 163pp.*

This study is a historical analysis of two definitive periods of the conflict between Israel and Egypt—the War of Attrition between July 1967 and August 1970, and the period of “No Peace, No War” between August 1970 and October 1973. The study discusses the lessons learned by Egypt and Israel following the Six-Day War. The lessons of the Six-Day War were not

lost on the Egyptian leaders. President [Gamal Abdul] Nasser's assessment of the military aspects of the war revealed several shortfalls in Egypt's military capabilities and superiorities of Israel's forces that needed modifying before Egypt could successfully mount a campaign against Israel. President [Anwar] Sadat believed Israel's intransigence on retaining the occupied territories could only be changed by taking actions that would cause the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations to become involved. Sadat's decision to go to war was a political gamble designed to end the stalemate. Israel's military leaders constantly underrated the Egyptian's Armed Forces potentials. Military and political leaders continually misread Nasser's and Sadat's intentions and their resolve to regain the occupied territories. The study concludes that Egyptian preparations for the October War included recognizing their failures and Israeli strengths and weaknesses of the Six-Day War, then vigorously applying corrective measures: (1) restructured the High Command, (2) improved training methods, (3) developed new tactics, (4) incorporated new equipment into the armed forces, (5) constructed a high-density, surface-to-air missile system, and (6) neutralized the Israeli superiorities of the air force, mobile ground forces, and rapid mobilization of reserves. The Israelis analyzed the weaknesses of the Egyptians and their own strengths after the Six-Day War, then did little to reassess those views, retaining the perception of their strength and the Egyptian weaknesses. The Israeli preparations entailed developing a static defense strategy along the Suez Canal.

0426

**The Role of Political Parties in Egypt.**

*Middle East Research Consultants, Inc. Stony Brook, New York. Jerrold D. Green, et al. December 30, 1986. 111pp.*

Recent history and development of Egypt's political parties are discussed. This study examines political parties from the perspective of political stability in Egypt and includes an appendix that summarizes data on the Egyptian political parties.

**1987**

0537

**The Suez Crisis: A Multifaceted Case Study of National Strategy.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Colin L. McArthur. March 23, 1987. 33pp.*

The Suez Crisis of 1956 is a classic case study showing the dangers of a flawed national strategy. The complex series of events that led up to the crisis pitted three countries (France, England, and Israel) against Egypt. Once hostilities were initiated, it took the actions and restraints of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the diplomacy of the still immature United Nations to resolve and contain the

event. This event was the first major confrontation between the two superpowers in the nuclear era. It also involved strong international personalities and clearly depicted how fragile traditional international relationships could become when one or more nations attempted to take unilateral conventional action without superpower sponsorship. It also pointed to the folly of such a policy by bringing the world to the brink of global conflict. This paper argues for the inclusion of the Suez Crisis as a student case-study during Course 2, War, National Policy, and Strategy, as presented by the USAWC [U.S. Army War College] Department of National Security and Strategy.

**1985**

0570

**Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan: Macroeconomic Policy and Agricultural Development.**

*Office of Agriculture, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. M. Bredahl. March 1985. 87pp.*

The impact of macroeconomic policies and macro prices—exchange rates, interest, and wage rates—on the ability of Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco to compete in international horticultural markets is assessed. A conceptual framework for evaluating exchange rate and price policies is developed and then applied to each country. The study finds that the three countries face similar economic constraints: large fiscal and current account deficits coupled with a dependence on external forces (exports of raw materials, international credit or aid, and worker remittances) for economic growth. All three countries recognize the need to reduce their dependence on external forces by promoting exports.

**1987**

0657

**A Dramatic Challenge to Operational Theory: The Sinai Campaign, October 1973.**

*School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Robert W. Mixon, Jr. May 26, 1987. 50pp.*

This monograph analyzes the 1973 Sinai Campaign in light of the theoretical implications that this historical model has to offer the professional soldier. Following a chronological format, this paper discusses the major elements of the planning and conduct of the campaign. Concurrently, the principal theoretical aspects are presented and reviewed. The major theoretical propositions that evolve from the analysis of the 1973 Sinai Campaign are instructive in the study of the operational level of war. The pivotal relationship of means, ways, and ends form the foundation of this study. Both the Egyptians and the Israelis discovered the importance of this relationship at various times during the campaign. The ability of the

Israelis to seize the concept and remain oriented on it was a key factor in their success. Similarly, the superiority of the defense was challenged in the Sinai. The Israeli superiority in maneuver was initially overcome by the Egyptian formulation and execution of a plan that placed the Israeli Defense Forces in a battle of attrition. After their success on the defensive, however, the Egyptians proceeded to exceed their culminating point with an abortive attack on October 14, 1973. That mistake hastened the Israeli assumption of the initiative and spelled the end of the superiority of the defense in this campaign. This monograph suggests that the defense can only be superior for limited periods of time in modern war—and, even then under specific circumstances. Among the other theoretical propositions that are challenged in this paper, the concept of the center of gravity stands out as one of the major issues. The Egyptians correctly identified the Israeli Air Force and armor forces as “the hubs of all power and movement” for their enemies; however, they failed to neutralize them while protecting their own (the surface to air missiles and their operational armor reserves). Thus they failed the test of the operational art as defined by FM 100-5, and were on the brink of defeat at the end of the campaign. Finally, the paper addresses the involvement of the superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) in limited wars. Fighting against the backdrop of possible global conflict, both the Egyptians and the Israelis attempted to reach limited goals before the superpowers grew alarmed and called a halt to the fighting. This evolution in modern war has far-reaching implications for future campaign planners, and this paper suggests the need for increased emphasis on this important aspect of the modern operational art.

## India

1985

0707

### **Implementation of Rural Technology Projects in India: An Exploratory Research.**

*Twente University of Technology, Enschede, Netherlands. F. P. Blankenberg. 1985. 301pp.*

This book is the result of anthropological research in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, two states of India. It concerns the implementation of seven intermediate rural technology projects. The main research question is: Which explanations can be given for the nature and results of implementation of intermediate technology projects. The answer is sought in an analysis of a complexity of explaining factors, including cultural, social, economic, political, technological and management aspects. In this

complexity of factors an analytical distinction is made between project management, subdivided in organization and basic decision making, and project environment, subdivided in socioeconomic and political structures and transformation processes.

## Reel 4

### India cont.

#### 1985 cont.

0001

#### **India Health Sector Analysis.**

*Management Sciences for Health, Inc., Arlington, Virginia. J. Walsh. February 8, 1985. 79pp.*

This report outlines the current status of infant and child health in India and health-related factors affecting them. It reviews what is known concerning the historic changes in these variables and geographic differences that exist and discusses the causes of infant and child mortality, reviews the organization of health services, the government of India's goals for health, and the present status of government and private services. The report reviews USAID's involvement in the health sector, the stated goals, and the experience. Based on the review of interviews with USAID and government of India health officials, problems have been identified and priorities for future involvement in the Indian health sector by USAID are discussed.

0080

#### **India's Relations with the Great Powers and Pakistan: Present Status and Implications for the Future.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Richard J. Crites. April 15, 1985. 27pp.*

The assassination of India's prime minister Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, followed immediately by the succession of her son Rajiv will likely lead to a reassessment of Indian domestic and foreign policies. There are sufficient differences between mother and son in leadership style and background to deduce that in the ensuing months the character of the new government will be quick to take shape. This will also be a period when the new administration will review its foreign contacts and be more responsive to advances from other states for renewal or reformation of relations, particularly with the Great Powers [United States, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China] and Pakistan. The Soviet Union enjoys a special relationship with India and will be committed to continuing those ties. The United States will look for ways to break through the cold formality

- 0244      **Indian Defense Policy: Its Implications for Nepal.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Dharmapal Barsingh Thapa. April 15, 1986. 55pp.*  
This paper analyzes the Indian Defense Policy, presenting the implications on smaller countries of the region with particular emphasis on Nepal. The author addresses his opinion that there is a natural tendency on the part of bigger powers to view different parts of the world only through the eyes of the larger countries of that region. The problems and susceptibilities of smaller nations tend to get overlooked and are forced into the background. All countries, big or small, have their own security problems. If bigger regional powers are affected by the policies and strategies of the two superpowers, smaller nations have to adjust themselves with fewer options at their disposal. The views expressed in this paper are the author's and do not reflect the views or policies of His Majesty's Government of Nepal or any of its agencies.
- 0299      **Food Consumption, Nutrient Intake, and Agricultural Production in India.**  
*Nutrition Economics Group, Office of International Cooperation and Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. R. E. Evenson. October 1986. 185pp.*  
Over the past decade, foodgrain production in India has increased more rapidly than the demand for food grains at prevailing prices. India has moved from a substantial foodgrain importing position fifteen years ago to a position where substantial foodgrain stocks are now being held. Food consumption data from the National Sample Survey Organization and the National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau have recently become available. The study assesses changes in food consumption over the 1952 to 1982-1983 period. It also discusses the relationship between changes in food consumption and changes in foodgrain production.
- 0484      **Research and Development in Industry.**  
*Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, New Delhi. Shri Rakesh Chetal, et al. November 1986. 67pp.*  
This report contains a great deal of statistical information on the R&D being carried out by the private sector in India. It can help U.S. companies interested in joint ventures or otherwise working in India. The report contains information on R&D in the industrial sector in general, R&D in the private sector, and R&D in the public sector. The report includes twenty-five tables.

**1987**

0551

**Directory of R and D Institutions.**

*Ministry of Science and Technology, Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, New Delhi. Ishraq Ahmed. September 1987. 257pp.*

This directory is divided into two parts. Part I contains the names and complete addresses of the R&D institutions arranged according to: (1) central government institutions, including the public sector in-house R&D units; (2) state government institutions, including their public joint sector in-house R&D units; (3) universities, including institutions of national importance; and (4) private sector in-house R&D units. In Part II these R&D institutions are organized according to the states and union territories in which they are located. Within each state, the classification as indicated in Part I above is followed. There is a demand from different experts for the analyses of the distribution of the R&D units in different regions of concentrations with a large number of R&D institutions located in such regions as compared to others.

## **Indian Ocean**

**1987**

0808

**Indian Ocean Region—Super Power Interest.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Kulwant Mann. April 21, 1987. 46pp.*

This essay traces the history of the Indian Ocean from the early period of the Persian, Arab, and the Roman eras to the arrival of the Europeans in the fifteenth century and the emergence of the British as the leading power in the eighteenth century, until their withdrawal in 1968. The importance of the Indian Ocean as a trade link between the Mediterranean and the Pacific Ocean is discussed. The economic and strategic importance of the region has been highlighted in the paper with particular reference to oil and minerals for the industrialized world leading to superpower rivalry. [U.S., Soviet Union, China]. The key problem areas such as South Africa with its policy of apartheid, the Palestinian problem leading to Arab-Israeli wars, the Iraq-Iran War dividing the Muslim world, and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet troops, leading to regional conflicts and superpower involvement have been discussed. The paper discusses the regional perspectives and the need for a new strategic consensus in the region in the hope of furthering regional cooperation leading to a reduction of tension and superpower involvement.



## Reel 5

### Iran

**1985**

- 0001 **The Iran-Iraq War and the Development of U.S. Responses toward the Region.**

*Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Garret L. Albert. 1985. 59pp.*

The Iran-Iraq War, which began in September 1980, and the evolution of regional, Soviet, and U.S. responses are addressed in this study. Although the Persian Gulf war is presented as the latest manifestation of a millenia-long struggle, this outbreak has the potential of involving other regional states in the conflict, curtailing the vital flow of Gulf oil to the free world and drawing the superpowers into an armed conflict. The primary U.S. objectives for the region are described as maintaining the cost-effective flow of Gulf oil to the allies, insuring the security of friendly governments in the region, and preventing the Soviet Union from capitalizing on the war to the detriment of the West. To facilitate these objectives, the United States seeks a near-term, negotiated settlement to prevent either side, and especially fanatical Tehran, from becoming victorious and destabilizing the Gulf. The author concludes that the United States must avoid the caprices of changing U.S. administrations and can best develop a viable policy toward the region in consultation with allies and friendly Gulf states.

**1986**

- 0060 **Iran: Economy, Senility, and Ineptitude Greasing the Slide to Instability.**

*Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. Franz H. Porter. January 1986. 38pp.*

Iran is approaching a critical juncture in its political revolution. Pressures of economic deterioration, an aging Primate [Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini], and overtly inept leadership, present prospects of serious instability. Acknowledging inherent intelligence-gathering limitations, this assessment reviews the current political and economic implications of these problems and briefly addresses the many hazards and few opportunities they present to the United States.

- 0098 **Iran-Iraq War (Background, Development, and Regional Responses).**  
*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Ahmed Eisa Osman. March 1986. 30pp.*

The Iran-Iraq war, which broke out in September 1980, had caused both

antagonists heavy economic damages and posed severe casualties on both sides. All mediation efforts have failed to bring the war to an end because neither side felt compelled to make concessions to produce a negotiated agreement. This is because the political risk that either regime ran if it obtained less than total victory was considered more threatening than continuing the war. The war convinced the Persian Gulf states to cooperate closely and remain very cohesive against any Iranian aggression, and the role of Saudi Arabia in the political, military, and security affairs of the Gulf will be enhanced. Terrified of an Iranian total victory, however, the Gulf Cooperation Council remains supporting Iran and enhancing the capability of the Gezeira Shield, a combined Gulf Cooperation Council force formed in late 1983.

0128 **Iranian Foreign Policy toward the [Persian] Gulf after [Ayatollah Ruhullah] Khomeini.**

*Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Wayne A. Nissen. April 1986. 38pp.*

The purpose of this study is to examine Iranian foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf region after the eighty-three-year-old Khomeini dies. A historical background provides insight into the centuries-old conflict between Iran and the Arabs. Included is a comparison of contemporary Iranian foreign policy goals under the Shah's [Mohammed Reza Pahlavi] dynastic rule and as an Islamic republic under Khomeini. The ruling clergy elite group is made of competing factions that have different ideological views toward foreign policy. An analysis of which faction is more likely to succeed Khomeini and its related policy goals is provided. Lastly, the nature of internal and external constraints on Iranian policy is examined.

0166 **Assessment and Implications of the Iraq-Iran War.**

*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Keith H. Manning. May 1986. 33pp.*

This report comments on the religious, ethnic, and territorial background to the Iraq-Iran War. It reviews the military forces and strategies used by both countries in prosecuting the war, as well as sources of outside military assistance. The paper analyzes the perceived and actual impact the conflict has had on the world oil supply and presents the economic gravity of the war for Iran and Iraq. The author summarizes the significance of the war on regional stability, emphasizing how nations have aligned with their warring neighbors. Finally, the strategic interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are discussed, and the author states his conclusions on the relevance of the war in each superpower's pursuit of its respective national objectives. A strategy for future U.S. involvement is recommended.

0199

**Strategic and Operational Implications of Iranian Military Operations In the Iran-Iraq War.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Donald H. Zacherl. 1986. 112pp.*

The progress of the Iran-Iraq War has surprised analysts. In order to gain insight into events in the region and their implications, an analytical framework using Carl Von Clausewitz and Martin Van Creveld is used to analyze the military worth of the Islamic Iranian Army. This thesis has three logical steps leading to the eventual conclusion. First, the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces were fundamentally flawed. From its inception under Reza Shah, the people-army-government trinity had fatal cracks throughout. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, attempting to build on the same structure, increased the pressure on the people-army-government trinity, resulting in a collapse. The weaknesses of this trinity were demonstrated by the patent inability of the army to defeat the revolution in spite of, or even because of, the lavish augmentation of equipment. Second, the Islamic Iranian Army proved to have remarkable power and resilience in the Iran-Iraq War. Surprised by a powerful invader, hampered by desertion, eroding equipment, and unreliable logistics, the Iranian Armed Forces resisted the attack and went on the offensive. Actions were characterized by courage and fighting power, excellent staff work, and operational level planning. Third, the change in the Armed Forces was causally linked to the impact of the Islamic Revolution on the people-army-government trinity. The strong bond between [Ayatollah Ruhullah] Khomeini and the people, and the new army's legitimacy and ethic, had a multiplicative effect on the military capability of the army. The result was an army with resilience, flexibility, and potential for real growth in military power. The war, paradoxically, has had a stabilizing effect on the Persian Gulf Region. The region now has a viable collective security organization, less vulnerable oil lines of communications, and is carefully watched and guarded by the United States; however, the war, when it ends, is likely to have a destabilizing effect on Iran's neighbors. Iran has the military growth potential to become the dominant regional power with a capability to challenge the superpowers (United States and Soviet Union) for control of the Persian Gulf.

**1987**

0311

**The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic.**

*Rand Corporation. Nikola B. Schangaldian. March 1987. 174pp.*

This study assesses the Iranian military as a factor in internal Iranian politics. It examines successive influences on the Iranian armed forces since the Islamic Revolution of February 1979. The analysis includes both

the professional military and the new paramilitary organizations, the Pasdaran and the Basij. The findings of the study are based primarily on interviews with former Iranian military personnel living outside Iran who have seen service since the revolution, and with nonmilitary individuals. The interview data were supplemented by an analysis of open-source literature in local and Western languages. The findings suggest that the long-term U.S. policy objective ought to be to re-establish a working relationship with Iran and to prevent it or any part of it from coming under Soviet influence. A directory of Iranian military officials and a chronology of events in Iran since 1979 are included in appendixes.

# 1988

- 0485 **Exports to Iran: U.S. Controls Have Recently Been Strengthened.** *National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. Joseph E. Kelley. January 1988. 8pp.*

This report provides information on a sale of helicopter engine parts to an Iranian company by Pratt and Whitney. Although the parts exported to Iran were probably for military use, the sale was made in accordance with applicable U.S. laws and regulations. The Department of Commerce, however, recently expanded controls encompassing exports to Iran.

- 0493 **Relations with Fundamentalist Iran—A Dilemma for the United States.** *U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Rizwan Qureshi. March 18, 1988. 80pp.*

To people in the West, the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran appears fanatical, irrational, and impossible to deal with, and yet the West cannot afford to ignore Iran. For the United States, this is a particularly confounding situation, wherein a former and important ally refuses all contacts, resulting in a communication disconnect that leaves both parties at a disadvantage. But is the Islamic revolution a historical aberration without a future or a new and dynamic phenomenon with its roots in the past? An analysis of the Iranian example indicates that strong historical, political, and religious causes lie behind the wave of religious resurgence sweeping through the Islamic world. Disappointed with the political alternatives offered by the West and communism, Muslims all over the world are harking back to the Islamic faith that provides a universal creed encompassing both the spiritual and temporal. To the West, long accustomed to moderate and liberal Islam, the values espoused by the leaders of the Islamic Republic appear strange and even irrational. But instead of engaging in a confrontation with resurgent Islam and its prime manifestation Iran, it is essential that the West, and particularly the United States, understand and achieve a *modus vivendi*; for it is apparent that this phenomenon will be around for some time to come.

0573

**Directory of Iranian Officials.**

*Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. [Author unknown.] November 1988. 91pp.*

This directory identifies individuals who hold positions in selected government, party, or other public organizations in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It also provides a guide to the internal structure of some of these organizations, and an explanation of their functions where necessary.

## **Israel**

**1985**

0664

**"Irreversibility" of Israel's Annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Critical Evaluation.**

*Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire. Ian S. Lustick. October 1985. 82pp.*

Gaza Strip: Historical Background; Likud Policies toward the West Bank and Gaza: 1977–1981; Changing Perceptions and Changing Terms of Debate over the Future of the West Bank and Gaza; 1982–1984; Meron Benvenisti and the Irreversibility of De Facto Annexation; Review of the following papers: Haim Tzaban, et al., "Master Plan for the Settlement of Samaria and Judea: Development Plan for the Area 1983–1986"; Simcha Bahiri, "Peace Separation and Enforced Unity: Economic Consequences for Israel and the West Bank/Gaza Area"; Aryeh Shaley, "Defense Line in the West Bank"; Mark Heller, "A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel"; Shmuel Snadler and Hillel Frisch, "Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank."

0746

**Problem of Jerusalem.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Alan H. Sherman. December 16, 1985. 28pp.*

This essay explores the problem of Jerusalem from a multidimensional perspective. The areas covered consist of the early history of the city and the significance that each major denomination holds for the city, a discussion of the events leading up to the current crises including the U.S. position in regards to Jerusalem, the impact of UN Resolution 242 and the Senate proposal to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a Harris Poll Survey on the complexities of the problem, and possible recommended solutions to the Jerusalem problem by leading scholars. In view of the fact that Jerusalem cannot be discussed in isolation, considerable attention also was paid to the problems of the West Bank Palestinians, the PLO, and Jordan as principal players in the region. The study recognizes that if any negotiated settlement on the West Bank is to be reached, it ultimately will have to be decided between Israel and Jordan.

**1986**

0774

**Israel's Position on Non-Proliferation.**

*Leonard David Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Ran Marom. June 1986. 83pp.*

Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be to progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone, as it relates to the Middle East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. Contains an annotated bibliography of 186 references.

## Reel 6

### Israel cont.

**1986 cont.**

0001

**Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel.**

*Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. Ian S. Lustick. November 1986. 108pp.*

This report traces the history, development, evolution, and current significance of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel. The study traces origins of this movement to Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook through the Gush Emunim (the Bloc of the Faithful) and includes an in-depth analysis of the book *The Zionist Revolution* by Harold Fisch and numerous articles published in the monthly journal *Nekuda*, a periodical that serves as a forum for the views of Jewish settlers on the West Bank.

**1987**

0109

**Foreign Assistance: Analysis of Cost Estimates for Israel's Lavi Aircraft.**

*National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. Frank C. Conahan. January 1987. 53pp.*

This report evaluates the United States' and government of Israel's cost estimates for Israel's fighter aircraft, the Lavi. Israel is developing the Lavi to replace its aging U.S.-produced A-4 Skyhawks and Israeli-produced Kfir. Thus far, it has been financed predominantly (over 90 percent or \$1.3 billion) from U.S. assistance funds. There are significant differences

between the U.S. and Israeli figures, \$22.1 million versus \$14.5 million per aircraft for flyaway costs, respectively. The report compares the two estimates, noting any substantial differences, and provides an assessment of their reasonableness.

- 0162 **Growth and Change In the Israeli Defense Forces through Six Wars.** *U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Karl Farris. May 20, 1987. 123pp.*

The Israeli Defense Forces are the most seasoned practitioners of mechanized combat in the latter half of the twentieth century. Since Israel's independence in 1948 they have fought a major conflict an average of every seven years against either one or a coalition of Arab states. They have also been consistently successful, a remarkable achievement when generally facing a well-equipped and quantitatively superior enemy. This paper traces the origins of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from the pre-independence underground Jewish militia, called the Hagannah, and reviews each of the six Arab-Israeli wars. The focus is on the growth and change of the ground forces; more specifically, how the lessons from each of those conflicts were used to review and make changes where necessary in organization, equipment, doctrine, and tactics. In other words, how the forces prepared for the next war based on the lessons gleaned from the previous conflict. The evidence and the IDF's continuing success show that they are both candid in assessing their performance and quick to implement changes at all levels where, and when, necessary. A review of each of the six Arab-Israeli wars also clearly shows that the margin of victory for the Israelis, in each case, has been the qualitative superiority of its manpower from the top leadership down to the level of the fighting soldier. The firepower, flexibility, and speed inherent in mechanized/armored operations can only be realized on the battlefield if the soldiers are technically and tactically proficient and the leaders are bold, imaginative, and decisive. This has been Israel's advantage in its wars with the Arabs.

**1988**

- 0285 **The American Airlift to Israel in 1973: Political and Military Implications.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Roger W. Hansen. March 30, 1988. 65pp.*

The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 provides an excellent case study for the use of airlift resources during a modern day battle. The two sides in conflict, the Arabs and the Israelis, were supplied with sophisticated weapons that would increase the rate of attrition and operational tempo. This excessive rate of loss caused the Israelis concern about supplies of equipment and

ammunition needed to provide for a counteroffensive. The Israelis would need the help of their friend the United States. The United States had the capacity to deliver much needed supplies but the new secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, did not want to disrupt detente with the Soviets. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger wanted to be sure the United States could play an "honest broker" role in the peace settlement after the war ended. The Defense and State Departments were pursuing their own course of action, but the combination was causing a delay in the start of the airlift. This paper will look at the effects of airlift and its ability to play a deterrent role in conflicts. The decision-making process in the United States was hindered, but a timely decision needed to be made. This paper will evaluate the decision process and the airlift resources available. A brief comparison of airlift with sealift will be made. The American airlift will be compared with the Soviet effort to show our strengths. The plans needed for the future are discussed in light of the lessons learned during the American airlift to Israel in 1973.

## Jordan

1985

0250

### **Jordan and Peace In the Middle East.**

*Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. W. Travis Hall. September 1985. 47pp.*

This paper addresses some aspects of the involvement of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The primary concern is the contribution of Jordan to the peace process between Israel and the Arabs. An assessment of Jordan's role in further peace negotiations is also provided.

1986

0397

### **Survey of Initial Prospects for Privatization In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.**

*Center for Privatization, Washington, D.C. A. C. Tomlinson, et al. July 28, 1986. 53pp.*

This report is on a ten-day mission to Jordan to review and assess the prospects for privatization in the country, with particular emphasis on the enterprises and activities that have been mentioned in the past year as likely candidates. The Government of Jordan is committed to move forward with privatization and considerable work has been done in preparation. There are few legal impediments, and these are being dealt with by new legislation. There is a willingness to accept a degree of foreign ownership. There is seen to be a considerable advantage in freeing these



enterprises from the necessity to adhere to the laws and regulations governing the civil service, particularly the rigid salary structure and the tendency toward excess personnel.

## Kuwait

1987

0450

**Additional Costs to Government: Reflagging Kuwaiti Ships and Protecting Them in the Persian Gulf.**

*National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. Frank C. Conahan. October 1987. 9pp.*

This fact sheet provides information on the additive costs to the U.S. government of the reflagging of eleven Kuwaiti ships and protecting them in the Persian Gulf with U.S. military forces. Additive costs presented are estimates through September 30, 1987, based on forces assigned to protecting the reflagged Kuwaiti ships as of August 24, 1987.

## Lebanon

1987

0459

**Israel and the Lebanon War—Psychological Attrition and the Face of Battle.**

*National Defense Research Institute, Stockholm, Sweden. Ben Shalit. October 1985. 28pp.*

This is a descriptive report based mostly on public material and on some restricted reports on the psychological reactions of soldiers and officers in the Israeli Defense Forces to the Lebanon War. The main negative psychological effects of this war seem to be: (1) loss of structure, confusion as to the rules and codes of war in that setting; (2) alienation and fear that often lead to poor cohesion and subsequent, psychological dysfunction; and (3) loss of the sense of control both by the soldier over his actions and by the command over policy. It is concluded that although the Lebanon War is a specific scenario in the Middle East setting, similar psychological factors are likely to be relevant in any conflict in any country. These should be studied to enable us to increase our own coping potential.

1988

0487

**The Bekáa Valley—A Case Study.**

*Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. David E. Clary. April 1988. 32pp.*

The combined arms effort of the Israelis against the Syrians in Lebanon's Bekáa Valley in June 1982 was one of the most spectacular and lopsided

operations from modern warfare. This case study re-examines that operation, specifically the suppression of enemy air defenses and the air battle. The study concludes with some lessons learned.

## Libya

1986

0519

**[Muammar] Qaddafi: Idealist and Revolutionary Philanthropist.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. B. Cordes. March 1986. 11pp.*

While actually doing some good for his people and his country, Qaddafi has been ruthless toward his opposition and has courted the hatred of the West.

1987

0530

**International Trade: Libya Trade Sanctions.**

*National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. Frank C. Conahan. May 1987. 20pp.*

This report examines the effectiveness of the Libyan trade sanctions, extent of continuing U.S. trade with Libya, and any options available for strengthening these trade restrictions. The report focuses on the import and export provisions of the trade sanctions implemented by the Treasury Department in January and amended in June and July 1986.

## Oman

0550

**Oman's Role in the Strategic Balance.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. S. H. Mahrouki. April 1986. 23pp.*

This paper touches upon the explosive Persian Gulf area and Oman's critical importance to U.S. strategic interests. Guardian of the Straits of Hormuz, Russia looks with covetous eyes upon Oman from South Yemen, its surrogate to the south, and from Afghanistan and its staging area to the north. This paper touches upon Oman's geographical, historical, religious, economic, and international significance as the lynchpin to both the export of oil from the region and import of raw materials into the region. Additionally, this paper addresses the aggressive nature of its neighbor to the south, South Yemen, and its role as a staging area for both Russian and Cuban military adventures.

## Morocco

1986

0573

**Agricultural Sector of Morocco: A Description. Annex C. Country Development Strategy Statement.**

*Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. P. R. Crawford and M. J. Purvis. February 1986. 172pp.*

Prepared as a background document for USAID/Morocco's FY 1988 Country Development Strategy Statement, the document synthesizes information from a number of primary and secondary sources to provide a comprehensive description of the agriculture sector in Morocco—its performance, problems, and potential. After an initial section on the situation and outlook for the Moroccan economy as of 1985, the study discusses the role and structure of Moroccan agriculture, as well as performance and issues related to crop and livestock production, forestry and fisheries production, agricultural input use, foreign trade, and government investment in and subsidies to the sector. A 154-item bibliography (1977–1986) listing AID, World Bank, Moroccan government, and other documentary sources is included.

1985

1742

**The King [King Moulay Hassan of Morocco] and the Shah [Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran]: Modernization, Dependence, and Regime Stability.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. John C. Wright. June 1985. 177pp.*

Critics of U.S. support for conservative monarchs in the Middle East have pointed out disturbing parallels between the current situation in Morocco and conditions that existed in Iran prior to the fall of the Shah. The purpose of this thesis is to assess the validity of such comparisons. The author analyzes the forces leading to revolution in Iran in terms of five categories: domestic, Islamic, leadership, economic, and foreign. The stability of the Moroccan regime is then assessed using these categories as a guide. Because of its clear bearings on future developments in the country, Morocco's war in the Western Sahara is also discussed even though it falls outside of the categories drawn from the Iranian experience. The author concludes that although it is impossible to rule out an assassin's bullet or a military coup, an indigenous mass uprising comparable to that which led to the fall of the Shah does not appear imminent in Morocco. The king's stability is based on several factors absent in the Iranian case, including his wider power base, his role as an Islamic leader, the historic identification of his crown with nationalism, increased opportunities for political participation, restrained foreign associations and, most importantly, superior royal leadership.

## Reel 7

### Pakistan

#### 1985

- 0001 **Evaluation of Existing Irrigation Water Pricing Policy In Pakistan.**  
*PRC Engineering, Inc., McLean, Virginia. M. Aslam Chaudhry. November 1985. 70pp.*

The irrigation water pricing policy in Pakistan is discussed, as well as the need to bridge the increasing revenue-expenditure gap and to initiate measures to reduce the operations and maintenance cost of public tubewell schemes. The economic evaluation includes the impact of present levels of water charges on allocative and water use efficiencies, net farm income, cropping patterns, and other parameters.

#### 1986

- 0071 **The United States-Pakistan Security Relationship.**  
*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Khalid Iqbal. March 1986. 22pp.*

The security relationship between superpower United States and third world, developing country Pakistan has seen many ups and downs in the last four decades. This relationship has not only varied with varying national interests but also with the change of administrations and political parties in the United States. The future of this relationship is dependent upon the harmony of national interests of the two countries and also the turn of events in South West Asia.

- 0093 **Negotiating and Programming Food Aid: A Review of Successes. PL-480, Title I Case Study—Pakistan.**  
*RONCO Consulting Corporation, Washington, D.C. R. Newberg and A. Jones. May 1986. 122pp.*

Pakistan is the subject of this case study on self-help measures and local currency programming in PL-480 food aid programs. Key lessons learned from the Title I program in Pakistan include (1) USAID technical offices should participate in policy dialogue; (2) PL-480 should be integrated where possible with other forms of U.S. assistance; (3) a low profile in policy dialogue can work; and (4) continuity in self-help measures is important, and simplicity and a sharp focus on self-help conditions are very important.

**0215 Common Interests of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in South West Asia.**

*School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, Air University, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Maqbool A. Ranjha. September 1986. 177pp.*

Southwest Asia is predominantly a Muslim region and is the birth place of the world's major religions. Its strategic location and petroleum resources make it important and attractive to the major powers. The United States has vital interests in Southwest Asia, and Europe and Japan depend on oil from the region. In the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan was a close ally of the United States and played a key role in containing communism in the region. Pakistan has once again become important to the United States after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The United States needs the support of states in the region to counter Russian advances in Southwest Asia. This research focused on finding common interests that could become the basis of an alliance between Pakistan and the United States in Southwest Asia. Despite differences, both countries do have common interests in the region, for which an alliance with each other could be beneficial. Any alliance should be established on well-defined, mutual interests, appreciating each other's differences and limitations, so that subsequent frustrations emerging from ambiguities can be avoided.

**1987**

**0392 An Integrated Logistic Support Model for Major Weapon Systems of the Pakistan Navy.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Shahid Latif. June 1987. 49pp.*

Previous acquisitions of major weapon systems by the Pakistan Navy have lacked adequate logistic support planning. During most weapon system acquisitions, emphasis has traditionally been placed on getting the hardware in place with the least possible cost. Other elements affecting operational use, and specifically, sustained readiness, have clearly been secondary. Accordingly, after systems have been introduced into the navy, additional costly expenditures have been necessary to operate and maintain these systems effectively. As a solution to this problem, this thesis offers a simplified version of the Integrated Logistic Support used by the U.S. Navy and other components of the U.S. Department of Defense for the life cycle support management of weapon systems from "womb-to-tomb." By following the road map provided in this thesis, the Pakistan Navy should be in a better position to develop a streamlined life cycle support management plan for weapon systems during future acquisitions.

## Persian Gulf

**1986**

0441

**Arab Gulf Cooperation Council.**

*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Mohammed Bin Abdullah. April 1986. 20pp.*

This report on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) discusses the common factors leading to the formation of the council. It was written due to the lack of information regarding the GCC and its important aspects of language, culture, religion, customs, and family values.

**1987**

0461

**The Strategic Implications for U.S.-Persian Gulf Relations on Domestic and Worldwide Oil Production for Future U.S. Oil Demand.**

*Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Sanford S. Kaplan. March 1987. 115pp.*

The U.S. dependence on oil imports is examined in light of current U.S. oil production, its potential for future discoveries, and the availability of oil products from Venezuela, Mexico, and other South American countries. There is no geologic reason why the United States cannot continue to replace its reserves consumed annually, continue conservation efforts reducing its import dependence, and shift its foreign oil supply closer to home (i.e., Mexico and South America). Increasing the price of oil domestically ensures continued exploration and shifting the source of imports reduces the length of sea-lines-of-communications carrying critical oil products.

0576

**The Iran Arms Scandal: What Is Its Impact on the Persian Gulf?**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Robert J. Nemeth. March 23, 1987. 25pp.*

Persian Gulf oil is vital to the West, and any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf is viewed as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and will be met by military force, if necessary. Our interests in the region, however, are faced with many challenges, including Soviet expansionism, Iranian theological radicalism, the destabilizing effect of the Iran-Iraq War on our Arab allies, and international terrorism sponsored by Iran, Syria, and Libya. These problems were magnified in November 1986 by the revelation that the U.S. government had secretly sent arms to Iran in order to secure the release of U.S. hostages held in Lebanon. Our Arab allies, who all support Iraq in the Gulf War, were naturally displeased by this revelation, but they quickly recovered from their shock and began to take advantage of the situation by playing on U.S. shock and guilt over the incident in order to request more

modern weaponry and other assistance. For its part, the administration has acceded to many of these requests in an effort to repair the damage it believes was done to its reputation in the Arab world by the Iran affair. The problem is that many of these actions were taken in haste with little time for reflection or study and they may prove more damaging to our long-range regional goals than the original arms scandal itself.

0601 **Report to the Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf.**

*Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. C. W. Weinberger. June 15, 1987. 37pp.*

U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf reflects longstanding American strategic, political, and economic interests in the area. Our policy has been consistent and is calculated to defend and advance critical U.S. interests, as well as those of our allies and friends in the region. There has long been a mutuality and overlap of such interests, and this fact has enabled the United States, our Western allies, and friendly Gulf states to pursue parallel policy lines. Protecting eleven Kuwaiti ships under U.S. flag is not part of an open-ended unilateral U.S. commitment to defend all non-belligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf. It is a limited but effective signal of our determination to stand up to intimidation to support our friends, and to help contain, and eventually end, the Iran-Iraq War.

## **Saudi Arabia**

**1985**

0638 **Saudi Arabia Has the Ability and Political Force to Influence the Decision-Making Process in the West, or Does She?**

*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Parnes Israel. March 1985. 56pp.*

This work represents the author's personal research into the real power that Saudi Arabia has to influence the West in the area of decision making. In this research report the author sets forth his beliefs about how best to assess the true extent of Saudi power, taking into consideration Saudi geopolitical-demographic characteristics, how the centralization of power in the hands of the royal family ties in with the discovery and exploitation of oil, the components of strength and weakness, her position in the Arab world, and the ability to use oil as a political weapon. He outlines the asymmetry in Saudi-U.S. relations and attempts an analysis and forecast.

0694

**Security Assistance for Force Modernization on the Saudi Arabian National Guard Program.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Daniel J. Kelleher. April 15, 1985. 29pp.*

This study provides an overview on the modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). It addresses the U.S. Security Assistance and U.S. Army Project Management efforts that were brought to bear in the modernization effort. It provides examples of how foreign military sales cases are used in procuring both weapon systems (hardware) and support services (training/technical assistance). It describes organizational structures used by U.S. agencies to carry out the task of modernization. It provides a brief overview of the modern SANG's capabilities to include unit organization and equipment. Program costs and milestone dates are shown along with an analysis of the effectiveness of U.S. management. Information and data presented was obtained through various means: U.S. official documents, input from U.S. contractors, personal interviews with members of contractors' staff and U.S. Project Manager's Office, and actual on-site experience of the author. A series of concepts and recommendations are put forward by the author to demonstrate how (1) future U.S. security assistance efforts might capitalize from lessons learned with SANG program, and (2) use of non-standard weapon systems provided to the Saudi Arabian government could be used to offset present mobility problems of the new U.S. Army Light Infantry Divisions.

**1986**

0723

**The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: The Saudi Arabian Experience and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Gordon M. Butler. March 1986. 26pp.*

This paper addresses two basic questions: Has the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) learned anything from its Saudi Arabian experience and is this type of mission for the USACE an effective use of U.S. power in the foreign policy arena? An Engineer Studies Center report and various general officer memoirs along with other Corps of Engineers historical data were reviewed. Personal interviews with Corps of Engineers officers and a representative of the State Department were conducted. It was concluded that the USACE performed well in Saudi Arabia. The corps learned or relearned many lessons that are applicable to any future USACE mission overseas. It was obvious to all interviewed, as well as to the author, that the USACE has served U.S. foreign policy interests well in the past and remains ready and able to contribute positively to future U.S. foreign policy efforts through nation building anywhere in the world.



- 0749     **Saudi AWACS: American Foreign Policy in Conflict.**  
*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. William F. Doogan, Jr. March 1986. 39pp.*  
This report analyzes the 1981 foreign military sale of Airborne Warning and Control System and F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Subject areas include a review of the political background and events leading up to the sale, a brief discussion of the major actors involved, and a more in-depth look at the congressional debate of the issue and resulting vote. Concluding remarks assess the congressional treatment of more recent and similar Middle East arms transfer proposals, as well as the value of "arms sale diplomacy" as a realistic method of projecting U.S. influence into the Persian Gulf region.  
**1985**
- 0788     **Soviet Perceptions of Saudi Arabia and Iran, January–June 1983.**  
*Harvard University Russian Research Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Herbert L. Sawyer. September 30, 1985. 47pp.*  
This report identifies options available to the the Soviet Union regarding its policies toward the key states of Saudi Arabia and Iran during the period January to June 1983. Those options, an assessment of which options Moscow is likely to choose, and in what circumstances it will choose one option over another are discussed.

## Reel 8

### Sri Lanka

- 0001     **1986**  
**Formulating Agricultural Policy in a Complex Institutional Environment: The Case of Sri Lanka.**  
*Abt Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C. R. J. Jiron and J. S. Tilney. July 14, 1986. 29pp.*  
For two and one-half years, the National Planning Division of the Ministry of Finance and Planning of Sri Lanka, with the support of AID and other donors, was engaged in the formulation of an agricultural development strategy in collaboration with the ministries concerned with development in the country. The exercise afforded the government the opportunity to explore new avenues for accelerating the pace of Sri Lanka's agricultural development. Carried out on each subsector of the agricultural economy, the review critically examined the existing situation, identified the constraints of achieving identified development goals, and offered proposals for overcoming these limitations.

**1987**

0020

**United States Leverage In Sri Lanka.**

*Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Richard A. Huddleston, Jr. April 1987. 63pp.*

This paper examines the ethnic conflict facing the island nation of Sri Lanka. The topic is developed by tracing the history of the conflict, the current position of all parties involved, the U.S. relations with Sri Lanka, and the important issues affecting future policies toward Sri Lanka. The conclusion addresses the U.S. leverage strategy required to convince the Sri Lankan government to come to grips with the ethnic conflict.

## Syria

**1986**

0093

**The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Role of Syria.**

*Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. Peter B. Zwack. February 6, 1986. 67pp.*

In this study of Syria and its role in the peace process, several key questions are asked: How is it that Syria has emerged after five consecutive defeats on the field of battle, the most recent being in 1982 in Lebanon, to become such an important and influential player in blocking repeated attempts to secure a permanent and long-lasting peace in the region? How is it that despite a damaging military setback in 1982 against the Israelis, and military conflict with the United States in 1983, the Syrians have emerged as a near hegemonistic power within Lebanon, while the United States has withdrawn from that country and the overt Israeli presence has been reduced to a small enclave just north of its border with Lebanon? What is the Syrian role as guarantor of the Palestinian quest for self-determination, and within this role, why have the Syrians on several occasions viciously turned on the PLO? And finally, as the only frontline Arab nation still in confrontation with the Israelis, how will the Syrians work the peace process to effect the return of the strategic Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty? Seeing no progress, will the Syrians continue to be intransigent on all peace overtures proposed? These are but a few of the many questions proposed in this study of Syria within the context of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Although many of [Hafiz] Assad's policies appear contradictory and self-defeating at first glance, this paper shows that through the determined and methodical pursuit of distinctly Syrian interests, he has effectively manipulated other nations and factions to Syria's advantage.

## Tunisia

1985

- 0160 **Private Sector Development: Policies, Past Activities, and Future Strategy.**

*Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge, Massachusetts. S. Goldmark, et al. November 19, 1985. 108pp.*

Two analyses—one of the constraints to the long-term growth of the Tunisian economy, especially its manufacturing sector, the other of the high administrative burden and lack of coherent focus of AID's Private Sector Development Project (PSDP)—preface this strategy for the future development of Tunisia's private sector. It is recommended that USAID help Tunisia alleviate constraints on production of export goods by redesigning the PSDP to focus on export promotion issues. Specifically, the project should (1) establish a loan fund to finance the goods and equipment needed by small and medium exporters, and a hard currency fund for exclusive use by Tunisie Leasing clients; (2) use funds from the Financial Markets project for a constraint analysis study, long-term teaching assistant to Tunisia's financial sector, and mid-level commercial and development bank staff seminars; (3) strengthen the capacity of the Federation of Exporters to provide market information and product development services to its members, and (4) help the Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce, and Small Business become the focus of ongoing analysis of Tunisian export policies.

- 0268 **The United States and Tunisia: A Foreign Policy Analysis.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Eric T. Olson. December 1985. 93pp.*

The Republic of Tunisia is an Arab Muslim nation whose primary orientation since achieving independence nearly thirty years ago has been toward Westernization and modernization. Its political stability and economic progress have been remarkable. The coming decade, however, promises to be a period of turmoil for Tunisia, as a number of social and political forces are creating an atmosphere of disunity and dissension that can be expected to undermine the national equilibrium. For the United States, the development of events in Tunisia is a matter of concern. The loss of Tunisia as a voice of moderation in Arab affairs would cause the United States to lose one of its strongest allies in the region and suffer a loss of prestige and influence in the North Africa/Middle East area. Further, the concept of Westernization as a means to promote human development would be weakened. This study analyzes the current situation in Tunisia and its implications for the United States in the context of its

economic, political, and strategic dimensions. U.S. policy goals and options are examined and recommendations for future U.S. policy toward Tunisia are made.

## Turkey

1985

0361

**The Key Political Decisions of the Military Government in Turkey, September 1980–November 1983, and the Impact of Those Decisions.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Robert F. Hervey. May 1985. 40pp.*

In the two years preceding September 12, 1980, more than five thousand Turkish citizens were violently killed by other Turkish citizens. These were primarily political murders, reflecting the bitter hatred between extreme rightist and leftist political factions. The enmity had infected almost the entire society—schools, universities, unions, police forces, media, even the government bureaucracy were all largely stagnated by the threats or acts of violence. The principal political leaders refused to cooperate to end the killing. On September 12, 1980, the five ranking leaders of the Turkish Armed Forces took over the complete administration of the country. They did so in spite of the tradition of not mixing active military duty with politics; however, their action was historically justified by the mission assigned to them by the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to protect and preserve the nation in accordance with its basic tenets. The generals administered the country for slightly over three years. During that time, they not only successfully ended the violence, they also made a number of key political decisions concerning the basic structure of the government and the nature of politics within the society. They opted for a civil government operating under an elective mandate, revised constitutional authorities, limited political organizations and activity, [introduced] new political actors, and a new system of military oversight. A postscript briefly outlines developments since November 1983 and suggests that the decisions have been largely successful in the short term; however, more time is needed to insure the validity of such basic changes. The author concludes that successful civil government in Turkey must meet three criteria: it must insure domestic tranquility, it must advance economic development, and it must remain politically viable. If any future government fails to achieve those goals, the armed forces could again intervene.

**1986**

0401 **Turkey, NATO, and the Middle East.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. David F. Herr. April 25, 1986. 20pp.*

The territorial integrity and sovereignty of Turkey have been and will continue to be the prime motivators of Ankara's political policy. Although there have been changes in the relative international balance of power over the last three decades, the ties between Turkey and her allies remain quite secure. This essay focuses on the evolution of relations between Turkey and NATO, the continuing strife between Turkey and Greece, and the reorientation of Turkish policy toward the Middle East. The majority of information was drawn from contemporary periodicals and serves to support the continued military and economic assistance to Turkey for NATO's direct benefit.

0421 **Turkey: Defender of NATO's Southeastern Flank.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Jimmie K. Lackey. May 12, 1986. 29pp.*

The basic question is the viability of Turkey's ability to fulfill its role in the defense of the southeastern flank of NATO. In the 1970s, Turkey faced numerous political and economic problems, exacerbated by the U.S. arms embargo, which cast serious doubts on that ability. Research shows that in the 1980s, Turkey has made dramatic improvements in all areas through aggressive internal reforms and increased external support. Those initiatives have resulted in a stable political situation, a fast growing economy with enhanced foreign trade agreements, a ten-year modernization program for its armed forces, and strengthened foreign relations.

**1987**

0450 **NATO and Turkey.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Izzettin Gurdal. March 23, 1987. 60pp.*

NATO has provided a general balance of power and European stability since the late 1940s. The southern flank is vital to NATO not only from a military standpoint but also economically. Turkey plays a vital role in defending the southern flank of NATO by safeguarding the Turkish Straits (Bosporus, Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles) and lines of communication to vital elements of the Middle East. Turkey maintains the largest armed forces in NATO after the United States. Although Turkey is trying to modernize its armed forces by using more than 25 percent of the general budget, it cannot be said that equipment obsolescence is being overtaken. On the other hand, Greece, in accordance with historic ambitions, is

creating problems in the Aegean Sea and espousing policies that are anti-NATO. Unless these problems are properly addressed and security assistance to Turkey significantly increased, the deterrent role of NATO forces in the Southern Region will be increasingly and dramatically lessened.

0510

**State Economic Enterprises and Turkish Economy.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Bulent Dogan. December 1987. 68pp.*

In Turkey, the state had a stake in economic affairs, either in terms of orientation of economic life or in terms of state-managed enterprises, both before and after the Republic. In the early years of the Republic, the state, instead of developing the productive potential of the state-owned enterprises and reorganizing them to increase their effectiveness, continued to operate them as they were. After the 1930s, a considerable number of state economic enterprises (SEEs) were established with different legal structures. The attempts at reforming and reorganizing the administration of these enterprises increased in frequency. Since 1960, the scope of SEEs' economic activities has been further extended, in spite of their continued operation at low levels of productivity under inefficient management. The SEEs need to improve their efficiency so as to provide savings, and their transformation is a vital aspect of Turkey's modernization.

0578

**Cost Benefit Analysis for Turkish Navy.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Fikretin Emanet. December 1987. 73pp.*

National security depends on many factors, like the morale of a country's soldiers, the character and skill of its political and military leaders, its geographic position relative to other countries, etc. But national security also depends on economic factors, which are variously interpreted and defined. Most writers who stress the importance of economic factors are referring to the economic strength of the nation, as contrasted with its military forces. When a country like Turkey, which has one of the most important strategic locations in the Middle East, is trying to accomplish its defense objectives as a NATO allied country with limited resources, it must use these resources as effectively as possible in order to select defense systems. The aim of this paper is to select the best force structure by using cost-benefit analysis. Each candidate force structure includes a different type of new frigate for the Turkish Destroyer Fleet.

## Yemen

**1983**

- 0651 **Inventory of Agricultural Land Use for the Yemen Arab Republic. A Project Using Earth Resource Satellite Technology and Cost-Effective Methods. Final Report. Land Use Summary and Arabic Translation.**

*Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. R. S. Senykoff and D. J. Norton. May 1983. 64pp.*

The purpose of the land use summary is to give the reader a broad overview of the Yemen land use project, its objectives, and its findings. Presented herein are abstracted and summarized materials from the several volumes of the final report. Included are discussions on project background, land use classification methods, descriptions, mapping, and statistical compilation of the land use data derived from Landsat satellite image interpretations.

**1986**

- 0715 **Soviet Goals in the Yemeni Civil War.**

*Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. William H. Thornton. March 1986. 36pp.*

Soviet involvement in the Yemeni Civil War constituted a landmark in Soviet-Third World relations, and in particular, Soviet-Arab relations. Never before had the Soviet Union provided major quantities of military material and manpower to overtly support a client state's attempt to alter the political structure of a neighbor through force of arms. This Soviet attempt to alter the political structure of a regional subsystem (the Arabian Peninsula) failed in the face of both Arab traditionalism and the constraints of the erupting 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The outcome of the Yemeni Civil War could have provided a number of lessons to the Soviet Union (and to the United States for that matter) in the pursuance of non-regional policy goals in the Middle East; however, these lessons were missed by the Soviet Union and remained to be addressed until a later date.

- 0751 **Security Assistance for the Yemen Arab Republic.**

*Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Frederick C. Stutsman. May 1986. 52pp.*

Survey of U.S. and Soviet security assistance in the YAR includes YAR history and background related to U.S. and Soviet security assistance, as well as the author's personal observations and conclusions drawn from a tour of duty in the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation, Sanaa, YAR, from April 1984 to April 1985.

# SUBJECT INDEX

The following index is a guide to the major subjects of this collection. The first Arabic number refers to the reel, and the Arabic number after the colon refers to the frame number at which a particular document containing the subject begins. Therefore, 8: 0651 directs the researcher to the document that begins at Frame 0651 of Reel 8. By referring to the Reel Index located in the initial part of this guide, the researcher can find the main entry for the subject.

## **Aegean Sea**

Greek influence in 8: 0450

## **Afghanistan**

general 6: 0550

Soviet invasion of 1: 0639; 2: 0305;  
4: 0808

U.S. interests in 1: 0639

## **Africa, Horn of**

3: 0001

## **Agriculture**

dynamic goal programming model  
1: 0082

## **AID**

Egyptian economy 2: 0419

Morocco country development  
strategy statement 6: 0573

Private Sector Development  
Project—in Tunisia 8: 0160

Sri Lanka agricultural development  
8: 0001

## **Arab-Israeli War of 1967**

8: 0715

## **Arab-Israeli War of 1973**

6: 0285

## **Arabs**

arms sales to 2: 0001

behavior—comparison to U.S.  
1: 0001

culture—comparison to U.S.  
1: 0001

history 4: 0808

Iran and—conflict 5: 0128

Israel—reluctance to recognize  
3: 0001

Israel and—conflict 1: 0105–0355,  
0606; 2: 0680, 0840; 3: 0001;  
4: 0808; 6: 0162, 0350

military—comparison to Israel  
6: 0162

military—impact of culture on  
1: 0001

Ramadan War 2: 0840

Soviet relations with 8: 0715

traditionalism 8: 0715

U.S. allies—effects of Iran-Iraq War  
on 7: 0576

U.S. and—military operations  
1: 0001

## **Arms sales**

to moderate Arab countries 2: 0001

U.S. —to Iran 7: 0576

U.S. influence in Persian Gulf—use  
to 7: 0749

## **Asia**

*see* Southwest Asia

## **Assad, Hafiz**

policies 8: 0093

## **Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal**

8: 0361



## **Aviation**

A-4 Skyhawks 6: 0109

Kfirs 6: 0109

Lavi 6: 0109

## **Bahlrl, Simcha**

West Bank/Gaza area 5: 0664

## **Beirut, Lebanon**

siege of 2: 0060

## **Benvenisti, Meron**

*de facto* annexation—irreversibility  
of 5: 0664

## **Brezhnev, Leonid**

doctrine 2: 0305

## **Camp David Accords**

3: 0001

## **Casablanca, Morocco**

1985 conference 1: 0105

## **China, People's Republic of**

India—relations with 4: 0080

Indian Ocean region—involvement  
in 4: 0808

## **Clark, Paul G.**

Egyptian small-scale enterprise—  
report on 2: 0366

## **Communism**

Islamic rejection of 5: 0493

## **Cuba**

South Yemen—military operations  
in 6: 0550

## **Cyprus**

Turkish occupation of 2: 0340

## **Egypt**

agricultural imports 2: 0493–0594

agriculture 2: 0493; 3: 0570

economy of 2: 0493; 3: 0570

food subsidy policy 2: 0898

foreign policy 3: 0001

Israel—conflict with 3: 0263

land use in 2: 0493

military 1: 0001

Ministry of Agriculture 2: 0723

peace process—role in 2: 0680

political parties in 3: 0426

Ramadan War (October War)

2: 0840

Ramadan War (October War)—  
preparations for 3: 0263

Rice Research and Training Project  
2: 0723

security 3: 0001

Sinai Campaign 3: 0657

Six-Day War—military assessment  
of 3: 0263

small-scale enterprise in 2: 0366

Soviet relations with 1: 0001

U.S.—relations with 3: 0001

U.S. economic aid to 2: 0419

## **England**

Suez Crisis—role in 3: 0537

*see also* United Kingdom

## **Europe**

interest in Southwest Asian oil  
resources 7: 0215

NATO's role in stability of 8: 0450

## **Falkland Islands**

British military deployment in  
1: 0844

## **Federation of Exporters (FEDEX)**

in Tunisia 8: 0160

## **Fisch, Harold**

*The Zionist Revolution* 6: 0001

## **France**

arms sales to Arab countries  
2: 0001

Normandy invasion 1: 0844

Suez Crisis—role in 3: 0537

## **Gandhi, Indira**

assassination of 4: 0080

leadership of 4: 0080

## **Gandhi, Rajiv**

leadership 4: 0080

## **Gaza Strip**

economic consequences of unity  
with Israel 5: 0664

future of 5: 0664

history of 5: 0664

Israeli annexation of 5: 0664

Likud policies toward 8: 0664

## **Gezelra Shield**

5: 0098

## **Golan Heights**

return to Syria 8: 0093

## **Greece**

anti-NATO policies 8: 0450

influence in Aegean Sea 8: 0450

military capability in opposition to  
Warsaw Pact 2: 0340

Turkey—conflict with 8: 0401

## **Grenada**

U.S. military deployment in 1: 0844

## **Gulf Cooperation Council (Persian Gulf)**

factors leading to formation 7: 0441

support of Iran 5: 0098

## **Gulf War**

3: 0001

## **Gush Emunin**

6: 0001

## **Haganah**

6: 0162

## **Harris Poll**

Jerusalem problem 5: 0746

## **Hassan, Moulay II, King of Morocco**

stability of regime 6: 0742

## **Heller, Mark**

Palestinian state—implications to  
Israel 5: 0664

## **India**

agricultural production 4: 0299

defense policy 4: 0244

domestic policies 4: 0080

economic policies 4: 0200

Five-Year Plan 4: 0200

food consumption in 4: 0299

foreign policies 4: 0080

government's role in health  
services 4: 0001

Gujarat 3: 0707

health of infants and children  
4: 0001

health problems in 4: 0107

industrial research and  
development 4: 0484

mortality of infants and children  
4: 0001

mortality rates 4: 0107

Nepal—relations with 4: 0244

Pakistan—relations with 4: 0080

People's Republic of China—  
relations with 4: 0080

population growth in 4: 0107

private health services in 4: 0001

research and development

institutions 4: 0551

rural technology projects in 3: 0707

Soviet Union—relations with  
4: 0080

Tamil Nadu 3: 0707

U.S.—relations with 4: 0080, 0200

U.S. businesses in 4: 0200

## **Indian Ocean**

history of 4: 0808

importance of 4: 0808

## **Iran**

Arabs and—conflict 5: 0128

Armed Forces 5: 0199

Basij 5: 0311

chronology of events 5: 0311

clergy—views toward foreign policy  
5: 0128

economy 5: 0060

foreign policy to Persian Gulf region  
5: 0128

Gaza—annexation of 5: 0664

history 4: 0808

international terrorism 7: 0576

Iraq—war with 4: 0808–5: 0001,  
0098, 0166–0199; 7: 0576–  
0601

leadership of 5: 0060

military assistance to 5: 0166

military officials—directory of  
5: 0311

officials—directory of 5: 0573

party officials 5: 0573

Pasdaran 5: 0311

politics—military's effect on 5: 0311

public organizations 5: 0573

revolution in 1: 0639; 5: 0060, 0199,  
0493; 6: 0742

## **Iran cont.**

- Soviet interests in 1: 0639
- Soviet policy to 7: 0788
- theology in 7: 0576
- U.S. arms sales to 7: 0576
- U.S. hostages held by 7: 0576
- U.S. interests in 1: 0639; 5: 0060, 0311, 0493
- U.S. sale of helicopter engine parts to 5: 0485
- West Bank—annexation of 5: 0664

## **Iraq**

- Iran—war with 4: 0808–5: 0001, 0098, 0166–0199; 7: 0576–0601
- military assistance to 5: 0166

## **Islamic**

- communism—rejection of 5: 0493
- religious resurgence 5: 0493
- role in Iranian revolution 6: 0742
- West—view of 5: 0493

## **Islamic Revolution**

*see* Iran

## **Israel**

- Air Force 3: 0657
- Arab and— conflict 1: 0105–0355, 0606; 2: 0680, 0840; 3: 0001; 4: 0808; 6: 0162, 0350
- creation of 3: 0001
- defense forces 3: 0657; 6: 0162
- economic consequences of unity with Gaza Strip 5: 0664
- economic consequences of unity with West Bank 5: 0664
- Egypt—conflict with 3: 0263
- Gaza Strip—annexation of 5: 0664
- Jewish fundamentalism in 6: 0001
- Jordan—relations with 5: 0746; 6: 0350
- Judea—settlement of 5: 0664
- Lebanon—psychological operations in 2: 0060
- military—comparison to Arab 6: 0162

- military aircraft 6: 0109
- military assistance to 6: 0285
- nuclear weapons—position on 5: 0774
- Palestinian refugees—attitude toward 3: 0001
- Palestinian state—implications of 5: 0664
- psychological effects on soldiers from war in Lebanon 6: 0459
- Ramadan War (October War) — preparations for 3: 0263
- Sinai Campaign 3: 0657
- Six-Day War—military assessment of 3: 0263
- Suez Crisis—role in 3: 0537
- Syria—war with 6: 0487; 8: 0093
- U.S. airlift to 6: 0285
- U.S. embassy in 5: 0746
- U.S. interests in 5: 0664
- West Bank—annexation of 5: 0664

## **Japan**

- interests in Southwest Asian oil resources 7: 0215

## **Jerusalem**

- history of 5: 0746
- Jordan's role in 5: 0746
- religions' significance in 5: 0746
- UN's impact in 5: 0746
- U.S. position in 5: 0746

## **Jews**

- fundamentalism in Israel 6: 0001
- on West Bank 6: 0001

## **Jordan**

- agriculture 3: 0570
- Arab-Israeli conflict—role in settlement of 6: 0350
- arms sales to 2: 0001
- civil service in 6: 0397
- economy 3: 0570
- Israel—relations with 5: 0746
- Jerusalem—role in 5: 0746
- Judea—settlement of 5: 0664
- privatization in 6: 0397
- Samaria—settlement in 5: 0664

**Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhullah**

Armed Forces 5: 0199  
foreign policy 5: 0128  
general 5: 0060  
support of 5: 0199

**Kissinger, Henry**

detente with Soviets—military  
assistance to Israel and  
6: 0285

**Kook, Abraham Isaac**

Jewish fundamentalism 6: 0001

**Kuwait**

hydrocarbon resources of 1: 0536  
U.S. protection of ships 6: 0450

**Lebanon**

Bekaa Valley—military operations  
in 6: 0487  
history of 3: 0001  
Israeli psychological operations in  
2: 0060  
limited mineral resources of  
1: 0536  
PLO in 2: 0060  
Syrian policies in 8: 0093  
U.S. hostages held in 7: 0576  
U.S. military deployment in 1: 0844  
war in—psychology of Israeli  
soldiers to 6: 0459

**Libya**

history of 3: 0001  
international terrorism 7: 0576  
U.S. trade restrictions with 6: 0530

**Arthur D. Little International, Inc.**

Egyptian small-scale enterprise—  
report on 2: 0366

**Mediterranean Sea**

4: 0808

**Mexico**

petroleum products in 7: 0461

**Mineral Industry**

development in 1: 0536  
general 4: 0808  
maps of 1: 0536  
structure of 1: 0536  
supply and trade 1: 0536

**Morocco**

agriculture 3: 0570; 6: 0573  
economy 3: 0570; 6: 0573  
foreign trade 6: 0573  
leadership of 6: 0742  
Iran—comparison to 6: 0742  
Western Sahara—war in 6: 0742

**Mubarak, Hosni**

politics 3: 0426

**Nasser, Gamal Abdel**

Six-Day War—military assessment  
of 3: 0263

**National Nutrition Monitoring  
Bureau (NNMB)**

food consumption data in India  
4: 0299

**National Sample Survey  
Organization (NSSO)**

food consumption data in India  
4: 0299

**NATO**

Cyprus's importance to 2: 0340  
European stability—role in 8: 0450  
forces in Southern region 8: 0450  
Greece's views against 8: 0450  
power balance 8: 0450  
Turkey—relations with 8: 0401  
Turkey's defense of 8: 0421–0450

**Nekuda**

6: 0001

**Nepal**

India—relations with 4: 0244

**"No Peace, No War" period**

3: 0263

**North Africa**

Tunisia—importance of 8: 0268

**October War (1973)**

see Ramadan War

**Oman**

oil exporting 6: 0550  
raw materials—import of 6: 0550  
role in Persian Gulf 6: 0550  
Soviet Union operations in 6: 0550  
U.S. interests in 6: 0550

**Organization for Economic  
Cooperation and Development**

Middle Eastern trade 2: 0125

**Pacific Ocean**

4: 0808

**Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, Shah of  
Iran**

Army 5: 0199

fall of regime 6: 0742

foreign policy 5: 0128

**Pakistan**

agricultural economy 7: 0001

food aid programs 7: 0093

India—relations with 4: 0080

irrigation water pricing policy  
7: 0001

naval weapon systems 7: 0392

self-help programs 7: 0093

U.S.—relations with 7: 0071, 0215

**Palestinians**

refugee problem 3: 0001

role in Arab-Israeli conflict 1: 0163,  
0606; 4: 0808

self-determination 8: 0093

state—implications for Israel  
5: 0664

**Persia**

see Iran

**Persian Gulf**

Iranian foreign policy to region  
5: 0128

Iran-Iraq War's effect on 5: 0199

petroleum delivery 5: 0001, 0199

Soviet Union in 2: 0305; 5: 0001

states—response to Iran-Iraq War  
5: 0098

U.S. in 2: 0305; 5: 0001, 0199;  
7: 0461, 0576

U.S. policy in 7: 0601, 0749

U.S. protection of Kuwaiti ships in  
6: 0450

**Petroleum Industry**

general 4: 0808

Iran-Iraq War's effect on world  
supply 5: 0166

maps of 1: 0536

prices 7: 0461

in Persian Gulf 7: 0576

in South America 7: 0461

in Southwest Asia 7: 0215

structure of 1: 0536

U.S. dependence on exports  
7: 0461

**PLO**

in Jerusalem 5: 0746

in Lebanon 2: 0060

Syria—relations with 8: 0093

**Pratt and Whitney**

sale of helicopter engine parts to  
Iran 5: 0485

**Qaddafi, Muammar**

6: 0519

**Qatar**

hydrocarbon resources of 1: 0536

**Ramadan War (October 1973 War)**

2: 0840; 3: 0263

**Reagan, Ronald**

foreign policy in Middle East  
1: 0355

**Romans**

history 4: 0808

**Sadat, Anwar**

politics 3: 0426

war policies 3: 0263

**Sandler, Shmuel**

West Bank, Israel, Palestinians—  
paper on 5: 0664

**Satellite technology**

Landsat—land use data in Yemen  
8: 0651

**Saudi Arabia**

Airborne warning and control  
system (AWACS)—sale of  
7: 0749

demography 7: 0638

foreign military sales 7: 0694

geopolitics 7: 0638

hydrocarbon resources of 1: 0536

influence on West 7: 0638

military 1: 0001

- National Guard—modernization of 7: 0694
- oil industry's benefits to 7: 0638
- Persian Gulf affairs—role in 5: 0098
- position in Arab world 7: 0638
- royal family of 7: 0638
- Soviet policy toward 7: 0788
- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 7: 0723
- U.S. relations with 7: 0638
- Schlesinger, James**
  - U.S. airlift to Israel 6: 0285
- Shalev, Aryeh**
  - West Bank defense 5: 0664
- Sinal Campaign (1973)**
  - 3: 0657
- Six-Day War**
  - 3: 0263
- South Africa**
  - apartheid 4: 0808
- South America**
  - petroleum industry in 7: 0461
- Southwest Asia**
  - European interests in 7: 0215
  - events in 7: 0071
  - Japanese interests in 7: 0215
  - petroleum resources of 7: 0215
  - Soviet interests in 1: 0639; 7: 0215
  - U.S. interests in 1: 0639; 7: 0215
- South Yemen**
  - Cuban operations in 6: 0550
  - Soviet operations in 6: 0550
- Soviet Union**
  - Afghanistan—invasion of 1: 0639; 2: 0305; 4: 0808; 6: 0550
  - Arab relations with 8: 0715
  - arms sales to Arab countries 2: 0001
  - border instability 2: 0305
  - Egyptian relations with 1: 0001
  - expansionism 7: 0576
  - foreign policy in Middle East 1: 0105, 0355, 0443, 0606; 3: 0001
  - India—relations with 4: 0080
  - Indian Ocean region—involvement in 4: 0808
  - Iran—interests in 1: 0639; 5: 0311
  - Iran—policy toward 7: 0788
  - Iran-Iraq War—response to 5: 0001, 0166
  - limited wars—involvement in 3: 0657
  - Oman—interests in 6: 0550
  - Persian Gulf—involvement in 2: 0305; 5: 0001, 0199
  - Saudi Arabia—policy to 7: 0788
  - Six-Day War—role in 3: 0263
  - Southwest Asia—interests in 1: 0639; 7: 0215
  - South Yemen—military operations in 6: 0550
  - Suez Crisis—role in 3: 0537
  - Syrian relations with 1: 0443
  - Third World relations with 8: 0715
  - U.S. and—detente 6: 0285
  - Yemen—security assistance to 8: 0751
  - Yemeni Civil War—involvement in 8: 0715
- Sri Lanka**
  - ethnic conflict in 8: 0030
  - Ministry of Finance and Planning—agricultural development strategy 8: 0001
  - U.S. policy toward 8: 0030
  - U.S. relations with 8: 0030
- Suez Canal**
  - Israeli defense along—Ramadan War 3: 0263
- Suez Crisis of 1956**
  - 3: 0537
- Syria**
  - Arab-Israel peace process—role in 8: 0093
  - Golan Heights 8: 0093
  - history of 3: 0001
  - international terrorism 7: 0576
  - Israel—war with 6: 0487; 8: 0093
  - Palestinians—policy toward 8: 0093

## **Syria cont.**

- PLO—relations with 8: 0093
- policy in Lebanon 8: 0093
- Soviet relations with 1: 0443
- U.S.—military conflict with 8: 0093

## **Tel Aviv, Israel**

- U.S. embassy in 5: 0746

## **Third World**

- Soviet relations with 8: 0715

## **Tunisia**

- economy—growth of 8: 0160
- export policies 8: 0160
- North Africa/Middle East area—  
importance to 8: 0268
- political instability in 8: 0268
- private sector—development of  
8: 0160
- Union of Industry, Commerce, and  
Small Business 8: 0160
- U.S. policy toward 8: 0268
- U.S. relations with 8: 0268
- Westernization and modernization  
of 8: 0268

## **Turkey**

- allies of 8: 0401
- armed forces—leadership of  
8: 0361
- armed forces—modernization of  
7: 0421–0450
- assistance to 8: 0401
- civil government 8: 0361
- Cyprus—occupation of 2: 0340
- economy—development of 8: 0421
- foreign relations 8: 0421
- foreign trade agreements 8: 0421
- Greece—conflict with 8: 0401
- Middle East—role in 8: 0450
- military capability in opposition to  
Warsaw Pact 2: 0340
- mineral resources of 1: 0536
- modernization of 8: 0510
- NATO—defense of 8: 0421
- NATO forces 8: 0450
- NATO relations with 8: 0401
- Navy—cost-benefit analysis of  
8: 0578

- policy in Middle East 8: 0401
- political murders in 8: 0361
- political policy 8: 0401
- politics in 8: 0421
- state economic enterprises 8: 0510
- state's role in economy 8: 0510
- Turkish Straits—defense of 8: 0450

## **Turkish Straits**

- Bosporus 8: 0450
- Dardanelles 8: 0450
- Sea of Marmara 8: 0450

## **Tzaban, Haim**

- settlement of Samaria and Judea  
5: 0664

## **United Kingdom**

- arms sales to Arab countries  
2: 0001
- Falkland Islands—military  
deployment in 1: 0844

## **United Nations**

- resolutions on Arab-Israeli conflict  
1: 0163
- Resolution 242 5: 0746
- Six-Day War—role in 3: 0263
- Suez Crisis—role in 3: 0537

## **United States**

- Afghanistan—interests in 1: 0639
- Arab and—military operations  
1: 0001
- arms sales diplomacy 7: 0749
- arms sales to Iran 7: 0576
- Army Corps of Engineers—in  
Saudi Arabia 7: 0723
- Army Light Infantry Divisions  
7: 0694
- Army Project Management—  
modernization of Saudi Arabian  
National Guard 7: 0694
- Army War College 3: 0537
- behavior—comparison to Arab  
1: 0001
- Bureau of Mines—report on Middle  
Eastern minerals 1: 0536
- businesses in India 4: 0200
- Commerce Department—control of  
exports to Iran 5: 0485

Congress's control of arms sales to  
     Arabs 2: 0001  
 culture—comparison to Arab  
     1: 0001  
 Defense Department—role in airlift  
     6: 0285  
 Defense Department—weapon  
     systems 7: 0392  
 Egypt  
     agricultural exports to 2: 0493–  
         0594  
     economic aid to 2: 0419  
     relations with 3: 0001  
 foreign policy 7: 0723  
 foreign policy in Middle East  
     1: 0355–0405, 0606; 2: 0680;  
     3: 0001  
 foreign policy in Persian Gulf  
     7: 0601  
 General Accounting Office—  
     recommendations to AID on  
     Egyptian economy 2: 0419  
 Grenada—deployment in 1: 0844  
 helicopter engine parts sale to Iran  
     5: 0485  
 India—relations with 4: 0080, 0200  
 Indian Ocean region—involvement  
     in 4: 0808  
 Iran—interests in 1: 0639; 5: 0060,  
     0311, 0493  
 Iran-Iraq War—response to  
     5: 0001, 0166  
 Israel  
     airlift to 6: 0285  
     assistance to 6: 0109  
     interests in 5: 0664  
     support of 2: 0840  
 Jerusalem—view of 5: 0746  
 Kuwaiti ships—protection of  
     6: 0450; 7: 0601  
 Lebanon—deployment in 1: 0844  
 Lebanon—withdrawal from 8: 0093  
 limited wars—involvement in  
     3: 0657

military aircraft 6: 0109  
 military deployment in Middle East  
     1: 0844  
 Navy—weapons systems of 7: 0392  
 Normandy invasion—role in 1: 0844  
 Office of Military Cooperation  
     8: 0751  
 oil exports—dependence on 7: 0461  
 Oman—interests in 6: 0550  
 Pakistan—relations with 7: 0071,  
     0215  
 in Persian Gulf area 2: 0305;  
     5: 0001, 0199; 7: 0461, 0576  
 Saudi Arabian relations with 7: 0638  
 Security Assistance—modernization  
     of Saudi Arabian National Guard  
     7: 0694  
 Senate proposal—moving of  
     embassy 5: 0746  
 Six-Day War—role in 3: 0263  
 Soviet Union and—detente 6: 0285  
 Sri Lanka—policy toward 8: 0030  
 Sri Lanka—relations with 8: 0030  
 State Department—role in airlift  
     6: 0285  
 Suez Crisis—role in 3: 0537  
 Syria—conflict with 8: 0093  
 Treasury Department—restrictions  
     on trade with Libya 6: 0530  
 trade with Middle East 2: 0125  
 Tunisia—policy toward 8: 0268  
 Yemen—security assistance to  
     8: 0751

## **USAID**

health in India 4: 0001  
 Morocco country development  
     strategy statement 6: 0573  
 Rice Research and Training Project  
     in Egypt 2: 0723  
 self-help programs 7: 0093  
 small-scale enterprise in Egypt  
     2: 0366

## **Van Creveld, Martin**

analysis of Iranian Army 5: 0199



**Venezuela**

petroleum products from 7: 0461

**Von Clausewitz, Carl**

analysis of Iranian Army 5: 0199

**Warfare**

evolution in 3: 0657

**War of Attrition**

3: 0263

**Weaponry**

Egyptian surface-to-air missile  
system 3: 0263

**West**

influence in Middle East—Soviet

goal to exclude 1: 0443

Iran—views of leadership 5: 0493

Iran-Iraq War—implications of  
5: 0001

Tunisia—influence on 8: 0268

**West Bank**

defense in 5: 0664

economic consequences of unity  
with Israel 5: 0664

future of 5: 0664

Israeli annexation of 5: 0664

Likud policies toward 8: 0664

Palestinians in 5: 0746

**World Bank**

6: 0573

**World War II**

Normandy invasion 1: 0844

**Yemen**

Arabian Peninsula 8: 0715

Civil War—Soviet involvement in  
8: 0715

history 8: 0751

land use in 8: 0651

Soviet security assistance to  
8: 0751

U.S. security assistance to 8: 0751

***Zionist Revolution, The***

6: 0001

## **THE SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES**

**Africa, 1962–1988**

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