

*A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of*

EUROPE  
**AND NATO**

**Special Studies,  
1989–1991**

**Supplement**

**UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA**

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# **EUROPE AND NATO**

**Special Studies,  
1989–1991**

**Supplement**

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# EDITORIAL NOTE

The executive branch of the U.S. government requires a massive amount of information to make policy decisions. The many departments, agencies, and commissions of the government devote much of their energies to gathering and analyzing information. However, even the resources of the U.S. government are not adequate to gather all the information that is needed. Therefore the government contracts universities, colleges, corporations, think tanks, and individuals to provide data and analyses. Because the great majority of these studies are difficult to find and obtain, University Publications of America (UPA) publishes some of the more important ones in its *Special Studies* series. The *Europe and NATO Supplement* consists of studies on Europe and NATO that became available during the period 1989–1991.

# ACRONYMS/INITIALISMS

The following acronyms and initialisms are used frequently in this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the researcher.

<b>CDI</b>	Conventional Defense Improvements
<b>CFE</b>	Conventional Forces in Europe
<b>CMEA</b>	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
<b>CSCE</b>	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>CSEs</b>	Consumer Subsidy Equivalent
<b>EC</b>	European Community
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>FRG</b>	Federal Republic of Germany
<b>GAO</b>	General Accounting Office
<b>GDR</b>	German Democratic Republic
<b>INF</b>	Intermediate-range Nuclear Force
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>PSOE</b>	Partido Socialista de Obreros Espanoles
<b>SLOCs</b>	Sea Lines of Communication
<b>SNF</b>	Short-range Nuclear Forces
<b>UCLA</b>	University of California, Los Angeles
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>WEU</b>	Western European Union
<b>WP</b>	Warsaw Pact
<b>WTO</b>	Warsaw Treaty Organization

# REEL INDEX

## Reel 1

Frame

### Western Europe and NATO (General)

- 0001 **Future of Conventional Defense Improvements in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Proceedings of the Tenth NATO Symposium, 1987. National Defense University, Washington, D.C. 1987. 333pp.**  
Contents: Conventional defense improvements-The strategic context (CDI and realistic deterrence to the year 2000 and beyond, Conventional defense improvement in NATO—Broader strategic implications, Conventional defense in a nuclear age—A perspective on strategic defenses, NATO, CDI, and grand strategy, Harmful myths and hopeful prospects—The future of NATO's conventional defense improvements); CDI—The operational context (CDI: An assessment of land force initiatives, The conventional air battle—Year 2000, *New opportunities for the initial defense of fixed borders*); CDI—The political, economic, and regional context (NATO conventional defense improvements—Economic constraints to the year 2000, European public opinion and conventional defense, Conventional defense and British strategy, The role of conventional forces in French security policy, CDI: A German view, CDI in NATO, the Southern flank, and alliance defense, The future of conventional arms control in NATO); Plenary addresses (conventional defense, improving the conventional balance in Europe, CDI, theater nuclear forces, and the fundamentals of European security).
- 0334 **In Pursuit of Strategic Stability in NATO.**  
*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Alvin Washington. July 1, 1988. 50pp.*  
The term strategic stability is surrounded by tremendous controversy. In the text of this monograph it is defined as a situation between adversaries in which they are deterred from war on a strategic level (involving attacks against industrial base, center of population, or strategic military forces). The purpose of this paper is to examine U.S. national military strategy and assess to what extent current military doctrine on the employment of conventional forces has kept pace with the realities of the nuclear age. The author examines the viability and role of conventional forces in NATO and gives an assessment of



their deterrence credibility and contribution to the NATO triad defense posture of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. This analysis should prove to be militarily significant by providing an in-depth look at current U.S. strategy concerning conventional forces deployed in NATO.

0384

**An Unfavorable Situation: NATO and the Conventional Balance.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. James A. Thomson. November 1988. 42pp.*

The view that NATO conventional military forces are inferior to WP forces is one of the most important factors shaping postwar history. It influenced the size and nature of the American military commitment to Europe. It is at the heart of the "extended deterrence" strategy, in which the U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe offsets the WP's perceived conventional superiority. The notion of Western inferiority runs through much of today's public debate on security policy—the INF Treaty, the future of nuclear and conventional arms control, U.S. and Allied defense programs, the burdensharing debate, and so forth. The debates have spawned a new round of discussions on the nature of the conventional military balance in Europe and will affect U.S. and Western policies. The term "balance" conjures up the image of a scale, with the WP's military power placed on one side and NATO's on the other. This reflects the normal "bean count" approach to the military balance; total number of tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, etc. is the surrogate for military power. The image of the scale conveys a deeper meaning, however; if the WP were military superior or the balance were unfavorable to NATO, NATO would, by implication, lose a military conflict in Central Europe fought with purely conventional weapons. The perception is the one that has shaped the broader Western policy debate.

0426

**Battlefield Nuclear Weapons and Tactical Gridlock in Europe.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Michael W. Cannon. November 17, 1988. 57pp.*

This paper addresses the issue of whether the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a war in Europe will bring about a tactical stalemate or gridlock. The TRADOC Common Teaching Scenario is used for a guide as to the area, forces employed, general situation, and nuclear weapons available to commanders on both sides. With these considerations, two iterations of a wargame were run, and the areas contaminated and rough levels of casualties were calculated. An analysis of how this may affect battlefield maneuver is made, and other issues that may affect the use of battlefield nuclear weapons are presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of areas that require additional research to further develop the answer to the research question.

0483 **The Role of Uncertainty In Assessing the NATO/Pact Central Region Balance.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Paul K. Davis. December 1988. 49pp.*

This report is a revised version of a paper developed originally for the Conventional Defense Study Group (CDSG) created by the Congress under the 1988 National Defense Authorization Act. The CDSG is chaired by the comptroller general and has representatives from the Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, Office of Technology Assessment, and General Accounting Office. The author was asked to develop, and present at a workshop, a paper on a net assessment of the NATO/Pact Central Region balance that would include issues of quality, combat readiness, mobilization, and sustainability. The original paper was published in April 1988 as Rand P-7427. The changes incorporated here include editorial improvements, clarification of NATO's sustainability problems, and a better description of the analytic differences among competing approaches to balance assessment. A basic question in any discussion of the military balance is which balance one is addressing: the balance of inputs such as defense expenditures and manpower under arms, the balance of combat equipment such as tanks, the balance of force readiness and mobilization potential, or the balance as measured by likely war outcomes if deterrence fails. This report is concerned primarily with the last of these, and with the challenge of addressing that warfighting balance in the face of massive uncertainty, rendering it meaningless to talk about allegedly best estimate scenarios.

0532 **NATO at 40 Years: A Critical Assessment.**

*U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. January 1989. 49pp.*

The contents of this paper include Alliance Theory/The Origins of NATO; The Military Balance: East and West; Cooperation and Conflict in the Alliance; NATO Strategy; Arms Control and the Alliance; and NATO's Future.

0581 **NATO Conventional Defense: Force Augmentation with European Reservists.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Roy F. Phillips. January 1989. 136pp.*

NATO maintains a triad of conventional, nonstrategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces for two purposes. First, NATO aims at deterring a potential aggressor from an attack by creating a perception that the costs of such an attack would outweigh any potential benefits gained. Second, should deterrence fail, NATO aims at using those forces, deliberately escalating if necessary up to the triad from conventional to nonstrategic nuclear and then

to strategic nuclear forces, to defeat the enemy. NATO's conventional defense would begin forward near the border with WP states. A successful forward defense would either slow the enemy's advance such that he would have to escalate the conflict to achieve his goals (or call off the attack); or provide NATO with a reasonable amount of time to deliberate the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (or to negotiate peace). According to General Bernard Rogers, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, NATO currently lacks a capability to conduct a successful forward defense. He has stated, "If attacked conventionally today, NATO would be forced fairly quickly to decide whether it should escalate to the non-strategic nuclear level...or to accept defeat." There are several ways by which NATO could enhance a capability for successful forward defense. One such way, summarily entitled the reserve option, would create additional NATO forces from the pool of un- or under-utilized European reservists. To assess the feasibility of the reserve option, this study addresses one technical and two policy questions: first, what factors are important to reserve unit effectiveness; second, how many and what type of reserve units would be required to provide NATO with a capability for successful forward defense; third, what would be the manpower and budgetary costs of acquiring that security? The analysis shows that approximately twelve division equivalents of reserve forces, costing \$50 billion over fifteen years (representing a 1.7 percent increase in the defense expenditures of those nations contributing to NATO's Central European defense), could mount the necessary defense.

0717

**Agricultural Statistics of the European Community, 1960–85.**

*Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. Michael Herlihy et al. January 1989. 132pp.*

The report presents a comprehensive database on the agricultural sector of the EC. It contains time-series data (1960–85) on prices and the supply and utilization of agricultural commodities for ten countries of the EC. The major grains, oilseeds, livestock, and dairy products are included as well as sugar, potatoes, and rice. Prices are provided at various stages of the marketing chain, including support prices set institutionally by the EC's Council of Ministers. Macroeconomic data, agricultural conversion (green) rates, import/export levies for grains, imports of selected nongrain feeds, agricultural input price indices, and EC financing and expenditures on agriculture are also included.

- 0849 **Foreign Policy Benefits from Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Benjamin Zycher. February 1989. 55pp.*

This study examines economic policy tools with which the United States or NATO collectively might reduce the prospective political/military reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP). The argument presented in the study is that growing long-term economic relations between the NSWP and the West could have just such an adverse effect on reliability from the Soviet viewpoint. Since a reduction in NSWP reliability is consistent with a strengthening of deterrence, promotion of growing economic ties with Eastern Europe may serve American and NATO interests.

- 0904 **The Employment of Maritime Operational Weapons in Support of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Ground Commander.**  
*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. David F. Young. February 14, 1989. 46pp.*

This monograph looks at the possibility of using the Navy's long-range weapons systems to support the NATO ground commander. In NATO, the doctrine of Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) has been developed as a means to defeat the numerically superior Soviet/WP forces. The ground-based systems currently available are extremely limited, and the allied air force may not survive the first few days of war. In a future environment of probable resource austerity caused by fiscal constraints, naval support may be critical in the execution of FOFA. The monograph first reviews what prominent naval strategists have written about the use of navies and in particular about the use of power projection. As one would anticipate, power projection becomes a more important part of naval strategy as weapons systems become more accurate and their ranges increase. For the most part, however, strategists agree that control of the sea is necessary before the ground commander is supported. The paper also looks at the Falkland Islands campaign, a modern missile war, to see if sea control was secured before power projection operations began. It also reviews general power projection capabilities and isolates an example of how power projection could support the ground war in both the central and southern regions of NATO. The conclusions are that the navy could support the ground war without first securing sea control and that this support might be vital to holding the central region.

## Frame

### 0950 **Application of the Operational Art to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Air Element.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Ronald E. Curry. February 15, 1989. 51pp.*

This study examines the applicability of the operational art practiced by a land commander to air campaign planning. It focuses on the role of U.S. Army Air Defense systems in operational maneuver and particularly seeks to determine if the same basic tenets used by land campaign planners are adaptable to the theory of integrating the air campaign into support of an operational maneuver by a U.S. corps in NATO. The "air element" is a phrase used to imply airspace as it is affected by both the air defense forces (including U.S. Army Air Defense systems) and offensive air forces. The author presents an example from World War II to emphasize the lessons history has already taught about integration of operational level land and air campaigns. He then reviews the NATO environment, describing the roles of the major commanders, the staff agencies, and the processes that are involved in air element planning. Future U.S. Army Air Defense systems are reviewed to establish the impact they may have on future air element planning. Investigation of the applicability of the operational art of warfare to planning a theater air campaign is then conducted. Using a hypothetical scenario, tenets of the operational art then are applied to objectives of the air campaign. Conclusions are drawn pertaining to the ability of existing NATO structures to plan for air element support of operational maneuver of a corps, the role of U.S. Army Air Defense systems in operational maneuver, and the applicability of the tenets of the operational art practiced by the land component operational commander to air campaign planning.

## Reel 2

### **Western Europe and NATO (General) cont.**

#### 0001 **At the Crossroads of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Burdensharing Debate—The U.S. Dilemma: Which Path to Choose?**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Laurence R. Sadoff. March 1, 1989. 65pp.*

This study focuses on the future of the U.S. burdensharing responsibilities within NATO. It examines an alliance in transition—assessing the future allocation of roles, risk, and responsibilities. The first segment concentrates on political, economic, social and technical impacts, concluding that: Europe must maintain primacy in U.S. defense planning; the Soviet Union will continue to be the United States' most formidable adversary; NATO must recognize its global

responsibilities; and the United States and its allies must strengthen cohesiveness through compromise. The second segment builds upon these judgments, proposing ten guidelines for use in allocating burden within NATO. The analysis demonstrates that while many factors impact upon the burden-sharing debate, economic assessments are the most contentious. Several economic assessments are conducted, each showing that the United States contributes a disproportionately high share of the financial support to the alliance. The author then identifies factors that dictate a redistribution of costs, demonstrating that failure to reallocate expenses will neutralize the remaining nine findings. Specific recommendations include selected implementation of role specialization; increased standardization; recognition of indirect costs; incorporation of nonquantitative commitments; better use of multilateral agreements; and a review of the current force structure within NATO. The study concludes by warning that although a redistribution of U.S. commitments is warranted, any reduction of U.S. responsibilities will bring with it a corresponding reduction in the United States' dominant leadership role within NATO.

0066 **After 40 Years, Does NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Have to Change (A European Perspective).**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Ruurd Reitsma. April 1989. 53pp.*

NATO has underwritten an unprecedented period of peace in Europe. Many developments, however, indicate that NATO should change to sustain its success. This study seeks to find an answer on the need for change. It explores the kind of possible changes and concentrates on issues such as NATO after the INF-Treaty, East-West relations, burdensharing, and political and economical developments in Europe. The role of Europe in relation to the interests and the position of the United States is studied in particular. The study also explores the more fundamental question of whether, in the long term, NATO itself will survive. The study concludes with a long term outlook on NATO's possible structure and internal relationships.

0119 **United States Strategic Mobility In Support of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Development of Airlift and Seallift.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Arch W. Shero. March 27, 1989. 23pp.*

The United States has made a commitment to provide NATO ten divisions in ten days as part of the initial American contribution for the defense of Western Europe. The United States currently has deployed four active divisions in the region and maintains enough prepositioned equipment sets to essentially fill out three more divisions. Short of procuring more equipment and prepositioning

it in Europe for the remaining three divisions, the United States would face some formidable difficulties in honoring its pledge to NATO should the WP nations launch an invasion. Simply stated, the U.S. capability to lift forces—especially heavy divisions—from the American continent to Europe is inadequate. In large part, the Western perception that the WP retains a realistic capability to initiate a short-warning attack of NATO has compelled U.S. defense planners to stress the development of airlift at the expense of sealift. An examination of the efficacy of these two basic means of lift clearly shows that sealift is much more cost effective. The small fleet of eight SL-7 transport ships, for instance, could move an entire U.S. mechanized division to Europe in four to six days, while it would take the entire inventory of over 350 C-5 and C-141 aircraft to lift the same division in six days. A comparison of the readiness levels of NATO and WP ground forces indicates that the WP leaders would prefer to take the time necessary to mobilize and prepare fully their forces before launching an invasion.

0142 **The U.S. Presence in the Mediterranean Sea as a Result of National Interests in the Area and NATO Involvement.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Rocco Viglietta. March 30, 1989. 68pp.*

In the Mediterranean area and its proximities (Middle East and North Africa) there are several contrasts and elements of tension due to different political regimes, religion, and cultural background; territorial claims; no uniform distribution of population; and inequities in economic resources (oil and other raw materials). The area has also seen a longstanding confrontation between NATO and the USSR, as Moscow has tried to establish and then expand its military presence and influence in the Mediterranean area and even more in the Middle East. In this troubled area, the United States has a significant military presence and declared political and economic interests. This essay analyzes the situation in the area, focusing on the elements of tension, and examines the possibility that a conflict could arise for the United States between NATO defense needs and U.S. national interests. The analysis concludes that, even with periodic disagreements with its allies, the United States can achieve its objectives while the NATO countries of the area will continue to receive full benefit from the U.S. presence and actions. The United States should work to improve its coordination and consultation with its partners, within the NATO organization, and on a bilateral basis. The European NATO countries, at the same time, are invited to cooperate more and coordinate their involvement to help the United States in resolving the various conflicts in the region.

- 0210 **Burdensharing and Mission Specialization in NATO.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. David E. Shaver and Samuel J. Newland. April 20, 1989. 60pp.*  
The burdensharing issue concerning NATO nations' contributions to the mutual defense is cyclic and has reappeared in the congressional arena with every U.S. budget crisis since NATO was formed in 1949. Throughout NATO's history, there have been efforts to develop a multilateral consensus on a formula for alliance member contributions; however, the efforts have resulted in a continuous debate on what contributions should be considered in finally reaching a financial equity of burdensharing. This study addresses the burdensharing debate by identifying the issues, assessing them, proposing options, and recommending creative solutions to the overall policymaking process, particularly in mission specialization of NATO forces. Study methodology includes a summary of historical background; development of burdensharing principles, assumptions, and facts; discussion and assessment of strategic, operational, and tactical issues; and design of a framework for realistic burdensharing resolution, with integrated alternatives presented throughout the study.
- 0270 **Moscow's Spring or NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Autumn: U.S. Policy and the Future of Europe.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Richard L. Kugler. May 1989. 54pp.*  
In view of the dramatic changes within the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, NATO faces the challenge of coordinating its defense planning with its diplomatic approaches to the Soviet Union. This note considers issues fundamental to NATO's strategic policy: what goals NATO should pursue in the years ahead; if containment and deterrence are less predominant concerns; what its priorities should be among competing political, economic, and diplomatic policies; how it should approach arms control negotiations; what its defense policy and military strategy should be; what force improvement measures it should pursue; and what its stance toward coalition planning and transatlantic relations should be. Finally, it considers the U.S. role in this context and concludes that the United States must continue its involvement in NATO and European security affairs.



- 0324 **European Roles for the F-15E.**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. James F. Boggan. May 1989. 33pp.*

Several preliminary documents have already addressed F-15E employment; however, this is the first to be based on direct experience with the weapons system. The study begins with a review of basic air force and NATO doctrine. It then analyzes F-15E capabilities and limitations, aircrew training, and European operational considerations. Finally, these criteria are assessed in terms of the doctrine to recommend one primary and two secondary role statements for the F-15E in Europe. Along the way, the study identifies employment considerations for those who will eventually develop European strategy and tactics for the F-15E.

- 0357 **NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Burdensharing: An Analysis of the Factors Used in Measuring the Burden.**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Henry M. Rendon. May 1989. 50pp.*

This paper analyzes the NATO burdensharing factors that are commonly used to measure the burden, defense expenditures, and those factors that are not normally visible but that should receive more weight in assessing allied contributions to defense. Properly considered, these factors may help to reflect a better picture of the relative defense contribution of the NATO allies. These factors pertain to perceptions of the threat, sacrifices due to the high foreign military presence on European soil, implications of conscription versus volunteer forces, and the costs to European allies of land, facilities, and support manpower. Current U.S. congressional actions concerning the proposed reduction of U.S. forces in Europe due to perceived unfairness in allied defense contributions threaten the U.S. ability to meet its NATO commitments and jeopardize the cohesiveness of the Alliance. It is the author's belief that U.S. force reductions in Europe should be based on assessments of U.S. military strategy and not on congressionally mandated force structure measures.

[Frames 0407–0463 have not been used; no material is missing.]

- 0464 **North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Collective Defense Effort: The Burden Sharing Controversy.**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Wolfgang von Kirschbaum. May 1989. 57pp.*

The paper is an analytical study of an issue that could severely disturb the cohesion of NATO. Burdensharing can be regarded as one of the fundamental principles of an alliance consisting of sovereign states. The members of NATO

repeatedly declared their willingness to share the risks, costs, and responsibilities as well as the benefits of the common defense. In the United States many people believe that the European Allies share an insufficient part of the common defense burden. In fact, this perception is true if burdensharing would be only a matter of comparing financial contributions. However, there are several other factors that are also analyzed and assessed. Despite the current controversy it should be emphasized that the basic common interest of NATO to counter the WP's military threat has not changed. The security and prosperity of Europe and North America still depends—and will depend—on a strong NATO. However, burdensharing is a prerequisite for maintaining solidarity and cohesion within NATO. Therefore, the recommendations offer at least a partial solution of the controversy.

0521

**Assessing the Conventional Balance in Europe, 1945–1975.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Richard A. Bitzinger. May 1989. 47pp.*

After years of languishing in the background, conventional arms control—and in conjunction, the state of the NATO–WP conventional balance—has lately become a topical policy issue. The growing attention being paid to the state of the conventional balance in Europe makes this an opportune time to examine past assessments of balance. This note provides a historical perspective on the state of the balance and examines how such assessments were arrived at. It should furnish the reader with the background to understand the current debate over the conventional balance. There are particular reasons for ending this note roughly around 1975. By the mid-1970s and the opening of the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, all the major actors—the various analyses, assessments, and arguments—to be found in the current debate over the conventional balance had largely been introduced. Although the debate has continued and become even more sophisticated, it has largely stabilized since that time.

0568

**EC (European Community) 1992: A Commerce Department Analysis of European Community Directives. Volume 1.**

*International Trade Administration, Washington, D.C. Debra L. Miller. May 1989. 170pp.*

The EC's 1992 program will fundamentally alter the regulatory and competitive environment of Europe. Based on the analysis and discussions with U.S. industry, the Commerce Department believes that the completion of the internal market should benefit U.S. companies doing business in Europe. However, there is a danger if the 1992 program is implemented in a less than open

fashion. The volume examines sixty-six of the earliest directives (principally in the areas of industrial products and services deregulation). Of these, our analysis uncovered only a few directives that are likely to disadvantage U.S. firms. It is also clear that the situation is quite fluid in many areas, and future developments will need to be monitored closely by business and government.

0738

**Competitive Strategies and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Central Region Air Operations.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Frank E. Metrusky. May 15, 1989. 64pp.*

Within the past few years, there have been a number of reports referring to the "competitive strategies." In one sense, competitive strategies is the defense buzzphrase of the late '80s. However, it is also more. Secretary Weinberger directed the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to institutionalize the concept in 1986. Recent secretary of defense reports to the Congress indicate that institutionalization is proceeding. DoD, services, and theater commanders-in-chief now widely participate in the process. If, as appears likely, the concept will be with us, it behooves the military to understand what it is and how it works. This paper seeks to add to the literature on competitive strategies. To do this, it covers three major areas. First, it reviews the concept and how the DoD has institutionalized it. Second, it covers possible enhancements to NATO's offensive and defensive counter air operations. Third, it explains possible Soviet counters to these improvements. Based on the author's analysis of these three areas, competitive strategies is a welcome addition to U.S. defense planning. It employs one of the oldest principles of strategy: focusing one's own strengths on enemy vulnerabilities. However, the concept appears to have a number of limitations that can limit that impact. These include further institutionalization, task force methodology, and including all required participants in the process.

0802

**Beyond Ten In Ten: Command and Control of Follow-on U.S. Divisions to AFCENT (Allied Forces Central Europe).**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. James F. Wolf. May 15, 1989. 46pp.*

This monograph discusses command and control arrangements for U.S. divisions deployed to Allied Forces, Central Europe after the initial rapid reinforcement, the so-called ten in ten requirement. Specifically, the paper addresses the type of headquarters needed and whether it should be forward-deployed or CONUS-based (based in the continental United States). The monograph first examines the operational level of war in theory and doctrine, in order to determine the level at which headquarters should operate. NATO

command and control structure is then examined to see where such a headquarters must interface with existing headquarters. A strawman deployment scenario is developed to show at what point in the development sequence such a headquarters is needed. Historical cases that illustrate the role of corps in major operations are cited. Finally, conclusions and a recommendation as to the type and number of headquarters, basing mode, and sequence of deployment are made. The monograph finds the corps headquarters most appropriate, but recommends decisions in this area be driven by campaign planning at the operational level, not by the number of divisions available.

0848

**Theater Campaign Planning: An Analysis of NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Northern Region.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Guy C. Swan, III. May 15, 1989. 52pp.*

For many years the Northern Region has been considered of secondary importance to NATO theater military operations. But with the buildup of Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula and within the Northern Fleet, Soviet regional Toxic Vapor Detector operations now have the potential to seriously threaten NATO's Atlantic SLOCs and even outflank allied forces in the Central Region itself. NATO continues to respond by partitioning the Northern Region among the three major NATO commanders, SACEUR (supreme allied commander, Europe), SACLANT (supreme allied commander, Atlantic), and CINCHAN (commander-in-chief, Atlantic), instead of unifying it into a viable theater of operations. The monograph examines the fundamental concepts of the maritime strategy to see if they have application in improving combined theater campaign plans in the Northern Region. The monograph is structured as a case study focusing on campaign planning from commander-in-chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe (CINCNORTH)'s perspective, looking at the Northern Region as a theater of operations and analyzing CINCNORTH's role in it. The criteria used for evaluation are the seven tenets of a campaign plan. The monograph concludes that in the present operational environment (geography, threat, coalition aspects, etc.) Allied Forces, Northern Europe (AFNORTH), as presently structured, is not capable of conducting viable theater campaign planning. Further, the author feels that the distinct maritime nature of the area warrants consideration of the maritime strategy as a theater strategy. A model is offered to show how planning in this maritime theater should proceed. The monograph ends with recommendations for restructuring the theater, both in geographical terms and in the command's design itself.

0900

**Can NATO Survive Perestroika?**

*U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. May 18, 1989. 114pp.*

This document analyzes the Soviet Union's economic program perestroika and its effects on the military alliance of NATO. The treatise questions the interpretation of perestroika as merely economic reform. The central issues addressed: is this purely an economic restructuring; does perestroika also enhance political *venzapnost* (surprise) and economic *maskirovka* (deception) in support of historical Soviet-national goals; and what is the potential impact of perestroika on NATO. This thesis concludes with the assessment that perestroika is, at its foundation, an economic program. However, it also argues that Soviet political ambitions and strategies have not been abandoned, but that the Soviets have adapted the means for achieving their ends through a required economic recovery plan. The research concludes with the theory that perestroika shifts Soviet aggression in Europe to a new plane—economic warfare.

## Reel 3

### Western Europe and NATO (General) cont.

0001

**Perceptions of NATO Burden-Sharing.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Charles A. Cooper and Benjamin Zycher. June 1989. 53pp.*

The allocation of burdens and responsibilities within NATO has been a contentious issue since the formation of the alliance. Deficits in the U.S. current account and the federal budget once again have moved the burdensharing issue to the front burner of American politics; many Americans believe that U.S. economic problems result from or are exacerbated by the spending burden assumed by the United States for the defense of Western Europe. Sentiment to cut back U.S. troop levels in Europe is growing in response to perceptions of inadequate European defense efforts on their own behalf. This sentiment is understandable but misjudges burdensharing realities. This report seeks to explore more fully the reasons that European defense spending is proportionately less than that of the United States and to contrast the European spending record with their more impressive record in supplying defense resources to the Atlantic Alliance. In the course of doing so it will become clear that there are no simple quantitative criteria for assessing burden-sharing performance.

0054

**The Reactivation of the Western European Union.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Patrick F.P. Nopens. June 2, 1989. 168pp.*

Founded in 1954, the WEU soon lapsed into obscurity in the shadow of NATO. In 1984 it was reactivated. The WEU is the only Western European organization mandated to treat security problems outside NATO. This study uses the U.S. Command and General Staff College's strategic analysis model. However, it supplements it in three ways: a historical overview of NATO and Europe between 1945 and 1988; an analysis of the tensions within NATO; and a study of possible strategies of reform of the transatlantic relationship. Among the conclusions drawn from this investigation are the tensions within NATO result from both American impatience about burdensharing and European frustration about power sharing; since 1984 the members of the WEU demonstrated a clear will to develop a real forum of security matters; potentially the members of the WEU can create a powerful basis for a European pillar within NATO; and integration of Western Europe will not be complete until it has drawn up a common defense policy. The thesis concludes that the WEU is fulfilling its role at present. However, it emphasizes that once all members of the EEC join the organization, the WEU will have outlived its utility as an independent institution.

0222

**NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Deterrence and Defense after the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Stephen A. Garrett. June 21, 1989. 109pp.*

The treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States eliminating a whole class of INF in Europe raises a number of questions about NATO's future ability to deter WP aggression. Future choices on Alliance strategy and doctrine will be influenced by a variety of factors, including the image of new thinking in Soviet security policy enunciated by General Secretary Gorbachev, changing West European opinion toward the use of nuclear weapons for NATO deterrence, the complications inherent in further nuclear and conventional arms control negotiations, assessments of the current conventional arms balance in Europe, and ongoing questions about NATO cohesion as well as the continued coupling of American security with that of her European allies. In the post-INF environment it may well be that U.S. Navy nuclear assets will assume an increasingly important role, particularly the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). The TLAM/N has many attractive attributes that can be supportive of NATO deterrence of the WTO,

but there are also a number of unresolved questions to be addressed concerning this particular weapons system. Modernization of NATO's land-based SNF, such as the Lance missile, is also seen by many as critical to the maintenance of Alliance security in the aftermath of INF.

- 0331 **Reconstructing NATO Strategy for the 1990s: A Conference Report.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Richard A. Bitzinger. August 1989. 48pp.*

On March 21–23, 1988, a conference on "Reconstructing NATO Strategy for the 1990s" was held in Ebenhausen, West Germany, bringing together government officials and defense analysts from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. This report summarizes the conference presentations and discussions, concentrating on the main issues raised at the conference concerning the future of NATO strategy.

- 0379 **Military Presence: U.S. Personnel In NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Europe.**  
*General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. October 6, 1989. 109pp.*

For the past few years, Congress has questioned whether the U.S. military presence in Europe can or should be reduced. Most recently, arms reduction talks and the possibility that some agreement will be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union have highlighted the need for information on U.S. forces in Europe. To this end, the Government Accounting Office addressed the following questions to assess the U.S. presence in NATO: (1) How many military and civilian personnel are assigned in NATO Europe, and how many dependents are residing with them; and (2) What military commands, defense agencies, and other defense-related U.S. government organizations are located in NATO Europe; what personnel are assigned to them; and what missions are they performing? The data in this report should provide a good baseline of historical information to illustrate trends in the numbers of U.S. military personnel, associated civilian personnel, and their dependents; their geographic distribution; and respective mission in NATO Europe.

- 0488 **U.S. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Policy: The Next Five Years.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Robert A. Levine. October 1989. 23pp.*

Using a number of scenarios, this note examines variables likely to affect U.S. NATO policy during the first term of President George Bush's administration. The variables include both those factors introduced by the administration and the Congress, and those stemming from the world in which policymakers find themselves. The administration and the congressional

leadership are dominated by pragmatic centrists who want to preserve NATO and who will not be anxious to initiate radical change. Therefore, major changes in NATO are not likely to be introduced by the United States.

- 0511 **Protracted Conflict in Central Europe: A Conceptual Analysis.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. John K. Setear. November 1989. 37pp.*

This note explores protracted war in Europe, defined as war lasting longer than thirty days; examines some possible pathways to such a war; hypothesizes the general phases that might constitute a protracted war; and discusses the political and military problems that national leaderships and military commanders might face in such a conflict.

- 0548 **Denmark, Norway, and NATO: Constraints and Challenges.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Richard A. Bitzinger. November 1989. 57pp.*

This note describes the unique domestic and regional environment in which Danish and Norwegian security policy is formulated and executed. It addresses the security policy structure, process, and politics of Denmark and Norway and how traditional security consensus and constraint, together with recent security policy developments, have affected the roles that these countries play within the NATO alliance. This note should be of interest to analysts and organizations concerned with Nordic security issues and the defense of NATO's northern flank.

- 0605 **Social Cohesion and Mobility in the European Community: A Forward Look.**  
*Oxford University, England. Laurie Pickup. November 1989. 121pp.*

The report is an exploratory study comprising an appraisal of selected literature, an outline of patterns and issues, and the general views of experts and other relevant parties; it is not based on primary research. The four aims are: (1) to present a general understanding of the level of mobility among workers and their families in the EC member states; (2) to assess the findings beyond the completion of the Internal Market in 1992; (3) to suggest a role for mobility issues in the European Foundation's current four year research program (1989–1992); and (4) to suggest a list of experts to assist with further work.



0726

**The Reshaping of Europe.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Hugh De Santis. January 1990. 48pp.*

This study, concluded in March 1989, explores the alternative shapes the European political landscape may take in the twenty-first century and discusses the effects of change on regional security stability and on U.S. interests. The author identifies five ways in which Europe may evolve: limited reform/limited devolution, retreat from reform/containment, reversal of reform/bipolar confrontation, Pax Europa, and nation confrontation. He then judges the effect of each alternative future on U.S. interests on the basis of the four criteria that have governed American foreign policy throughout this century—multilateral economic cooperation, political self-determination, the preservation of order, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

0774

**Conventional Forces in Europe: Effective Verification.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephenson W. Page. February 6, 1990. 82pp.*

With the start of negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe, the East and West will be able to reduce rather than increase forces in Central Europe for the first time in forty years. The unilateral withdrawal and reduction of conventional forces in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union and other WP nations has already started a shift in the military balance. When these changes are carried out as announced and then followed by more reductions as proposed in the initial rounds of the CFE talks, the change in the military balance will be dramatic and the threat to security and stability will be greatly reduced. An effective and reliable verification system to monitor these changes will be critical to strengthening security and stability in Central Europe. This study summarizes the verification evolution in arms control agreements; reviews NATO's initial proposal; discusses verification standards; and identifies verification technologies, methods, and lessons learned from the CFE accord and INF Treaty. It also analyzes the effectiveness of the proposed measures and identifies options for implementation. The study concludes that the proposed measure, if applied realistically and systematically within the region, can constrain threatening military activity and provide early warning of military significant actions. Automation and monitoring are identified as two stages of the verification process in which NATO can develop and coordinate an implementation strategy to ensure effective verification.

0856

**Arms Control Constraints for Conventional Forces in Europe.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Richard Darilek and John Setear. March 1990. 37pp.*

This study focuses on one aspect of potential arms control agreements involving conventional military forces: the use of constraints; defined as measures directly limiting or prohibiting current or future operations by military forces. The authors focus on constraints involving the conventional forces of the WP and NATO. Constraints may save money for all parties involved in a conventional arms control agreement. In addition, constraints have the potential to reduce the incentives for attack by increasing the amount and quality of warning time available to the defending side or by forcing an attacker to launch a constrained offensive. The authors develop and apply, with hypothetical examples, three criteria (defensive asymmetry, clarity, and economy) for determining whether a particular constraint is a good idea. Because of the difficulties of determining when constraint measures actually constrain an attacker's operations more extensively than a defender's operations, the nations of NATO and the WP should approach constraint measures cautiously lest they reach an agreement that reduces the prospects of a successful defense against large-scale offensives.

0893

**Verifying Conventional Stability In Europe: An Overview.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Thomas J. Hirschfield. April 1990. 40pp.*

Verifying the obligations in the prospective CFE treaty will be far harder and more expensive than verifying those in the INF treaty or in other previous arms control agreements. This note presents a qualitative overview of conventional arms control verification issues, including (1) monitoring force levels calibrated in major items of equipment and personnel, in a large production area that makes concealment possible; (2) watching force withdrawals, restructuring, or disbandments involving removal, re-export, or destruction of thousands of heavy equipment items; (3) monitoring the post-agreement stasis of the largest and most complex force concentration in peacetime history; and (4) meshing these observations with the concurrent need to monitor unilateral WP force reductions and force changes on a massive scale.

0933 **The Effects of the Common Agricultural Policy on the European Community Wheat-Washing Industry and Grain Trade.**

*Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. Dale J. Leuck. April 1990. 30pp.*

The wheat-washing industry in the EC, which increased the separation of wheat flour into vital wheat gluten and wheat starch from 360,000 tons (wheat equivalent) in 1980 to over one million tons in 1985, was enhanced by trends in relative grain prices in the EC, which are insulated from movements in world prices by a variable levy system and by the use of better fractionation techniques. The expansion of the wheat-washing industry was responsible for most of the two million ton decline in EC hard wheat imports between 1980 and 1985, and reduced EC wheat exports and corn imports by about 3.3 and 0.5 million tons, respectively. EC hard wheat imports could be totally eliminated and EC wheat exports could be further reduced by as much as 4.9 million tons annually by the mid-1990s, if EC agricultural policies favor the further expansion of the industry. In the absence of a further expansion, the latter trade effects for wheat would not occur and EC corn imports would increase by an additional two million tons.

0963 **Beyond Containment and Deterrence: A Security Framework for Europe in the 21st Century.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Ernest E. Bubb. April 2, 1990. 38pp.*

The revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe fundamentally changed the political, economic and military landscape of Europe and the world. The security framework that provided peace and security in Europe since the end of World War II appears to be collapsing. Europe is free falling toward the twenty-first century without a clear image of the security structure for the future. This paper examines the current security framework for Europe, including the historical context upon which it was built. The author then forecasts a vision of the initial decades of the twenty-first century in Europe and examines U.S. national security interests in that period. Based upon this vision of the future, the paper critically examines national security policies and strategies. The author recommends new policies to replace containment, deterrence, and flexible response, as well as a new security framework for Europe in the twenty-first century.

## Reel 4

### Western Europe and NATO (General) cont.

- 0001 **Conventional Forces In Europe: A New Approach to the Balance, Stability, and Arms Control.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Laurinda L. Rohn. May 1990. 135pp.*

There has recently been a resurgence of interest in the balance of conventional forces in the central European region. This increased concern is attributable to several factors, including the signing of the U.S.–Soviet INF treaty, the possibility of a “third zero” in Europe, increasing interest in a conventional arms control agreement, a perceived decrease in the credibility of the threat of nuclear use, and a trend away from considering escalation to nuclear use as the inevitable result of a conventional war. The debate surrounding the conventional balance is somewhat confused. There are many different balance assessment techniques used in analysis. Inadequate attention is given to the concept of stability in the conventional realm. Although conventional force planning, arms control policy, and defense objectives should be inextricably entwined, there appears to be very little connection between them. This report suggests a concept of conventional stability, which exists when there is a balance of conventional capabilities such that both sides believe that neither side can launch a successful attack against the other, and either side can successfully repel any attack launched by the other.

- 0136 **U.S. Forces in Europe: Maintain or Reduce.**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. David L. Chase. May 1990. 40pp.*

The author comments on the development of NATO and how the Alliance has responded to the threat over the past forty years. A comparison of NATO and WP forces offers the reader some insight into the relative capabilities of both sides including both conventional and nuclear forces. The author discusses the political and economic factors as they relate to force levels and the consequences that any reductions in U.S. force levels might forebode. Recommendations for dealing with the current realities of determining force levels for NATO are provided.

- 0176 **Trends in NATO Central Region Tactical Fighter Inventories: 1950–2005.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Christopher J. Bowie, Mark Lorrell, and John Lund. May 1990. 67pp.*

This note identifies major trends since 1950 in the evolution of the force structures of non–U.S. allied air forces in NATO’s central region. It also

examines the direction of these trends to the year 2005, assuming no arms control. The number of squadrons in NATO's central region airpower has remained remarkably stable since mid-1960s, as has the contribution of each nation. These nations have steadily increased the number of multirole and all-weather squadrons. Aircraft designed by multinational consortiums account for a growing percentage of NATO's aircraft; conversely, the share of aircraft designed by a single European nation has been steadily shrinking. Two disturbing trends also emerged: (1) despite the importance NATO places on equipment standardization, the variety of aircraft in the central region is higher now than it was in the 1950s, although it has declined slightly from its peak in the 1960s; and (2) the age of airframes in NATO's central region air forces has increased consistently, from roughly four years in 1950 to fifteen years in 1990, a reflection of the tendency to keep aircraft in national inventories longer. If current national plans were implemented, most of the trends would continue. The number of multirole and all-weather aircraft would increase. The variety of aircraft types would decrease. However, the average age of airframes would grow steadily, so that by 2005, average airframe ages would range from 18-29 years.

0243

**Perspectives on Agriculture.**

*Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. Walter H. Gardiner and David R. Kelch. May 1990. 51pp.*

Contents include: Europe 1992: Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform and world agricultural trade; Harmonization of the internal market and implications for intra- and extra-EC agricultural trade; CAP reform and 1992: A German perspective; The CAP and 1992: A French point of view; and EC 1992: What's in store for the United States.

0294

**Awaiting an Enemy: The Operational Significance of Politically Induced Force Reductions to Parity in Central Europe.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. James L. Moody. May 10, 1990. 60pp.*

History is replete with evidence of how change in political, economic, and social conditions forge alterations in a nation's military posture. Today, the forces of change are rampant, especially in NATO's central European theater. Recent CFE arms reduction proposals have rekindled disarmament debate and have caused the military leadership to reassess Alliance defense initiatives in view of vague changing conditions. This monograph examines how the CFE negotiations will impact on future military operations. The study's primary focus analyzes how post-CFE treaty limitations (e.g., geographic dispersion and parity between NATO and WP forces) will tend to influence two broad

operational concepts of warfare—war by maneuver or by attrition. Naturally, both concepts are important, interrelated, and situationally dependent; however, a shifting emphasis may be warranted to properly align military operations with the ends of national policy.

0354 **The Search for an Operational Warfighting Doctrine: What Are NATO's Options After CFE?**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. William H. Parry, III. May 11, 1990. 57pp.*

NATO's ground force doctrine is tactically oriented and attrition focused. Since its adoption in 1984, the body of military thought has grown substantially. Success on the modern battlefield will demand that military commanders synchronize the effects of tactical engagements to achieve operational/strategic goals in a theater of operations/war. If NATO succeeds in reaching an agreement in the CFE negotiations, it can reap significant benefits. Achieving numerical parity and perhaps gaining operational depth in which to maneuver may finally correct a forty-year strategic shortcoming. However, CFE will also reduce the numbers of ground forces available in NATO's critical central region. An even lower force-space ratio will force NATO to seriously examine its current military strategy and doctrine. The commander-in-chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT) has a vision of operational level warfighting to achieve strategic objectives in his theater, enunciated in his operational warfighting concept. This concept can serve as the foundation upon which NATO can build an operational and thus more effective military doctrine.

0411 **Who Will Stand the Nordic Guard? Determinants, Options, and Bilateral Canadian-US Responses to the Threat on NATO's North Flank.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Adolf Carlson. May 30, 1990. 186pp.*

As of November 1989, the government of Canada had deleted its commitment to deploy the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade to reinforce the Norwegian army in the event of a Soviet ground attack in the Arctic region in order to consolidate all Canadian ground forces committed to NATO in the defense of West Germany. Furthermore, this paper argues, the marginal benefits of the consolidation of Canadian commitments in West Germany are insufficient to justify the increased risk in the north and will be further diminished in the decade of the 1990s because of arms control and political developments. The paper concludes by recommending that the United States and Canada pursue a bilateral strategy regarding Norwegian reinforcement, consisting of coordinated plans to restructure Canadian forces and U.S. Army light infantry

units into robust, rapidly deployable formations; provide for a pooling of strategic military airlift, in essence including Canadian units in U.S. time-phased troop deployment plans; and redesigning NATO's military command structure in order to raise the north flank to its rightful strategic significance and to highlight the Canadian contribution.

0597 **Mutual Security and Arms Reductions in Europe: A Joint Soviet-American Simulation Exercise.**

*Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Carl R. Baxley. June 5, 1990. 75pp.*

Current negotiations on CFE use the principle that numerical parity should be sought in several major weapons categories. However, this may not guarantee stability in Europe. This project, scheduled to be completed in late 1991, tests ways to guarantee that stability by analyzing a method to reduce conventional arms in Europe following CFE. The method used is an approach based upon the metaphor of the child's game of "I cut, you choose." This paper provides an historical record of the project to date, provides the necessary background information to play the game, and projects, over the next twenty years, the strategic environment in which the arms reductions will take place.

0672 **Effect of Doctrinal Differences on NATO C2.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Kenneth P. Dzierzanowski. June 1990. 136pp.*

The warfighting doctrines of NATO's five national armies, which are deployed in central Europe against the WP, are examined with emphasis on coalition warfare. NATO's warfighting doctrine is explored with particular attention to the military and political aspects of coalition warfare. Selected NATO command, control, and consultation issues, including synchronization and coordination, are identified and examined. The doctrines of these five national armies are not fully compatible. Warfighting doctrines that are not compatible increase the vulnerability of multinational unit boundaries and do not contribute to the overall impression of deterrence. Concepts to improve NATO's deterrent and warfighting capabilities are presented. These concepts include approaching incompatible national doctrines as a coordination issue. If NATO strengthens its coordination mechanisms, both the coalition's peacetime deterrent efforts and wartime capabilities will be enhanced.

- 0808 **Implementing a Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty: Will NATO Be Ready?**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Bruce F. Bach. June 15, 1990. 61pp.*  
The ongoing CFE negotiations that may lead to the most significant conventional arms control agreement in European history are receiving the totality of attention and world focus. The ability of NATO to effectively verify this treaty has not been addressed. This study examines NATO's practical perspective and that of its member nations.
- 0869 **Conventional Armed Forces In Europe: Technology Scenario Development.**  
*Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois. G. Michael Houser. July 1990. 141pp.*  
In January 1986, the Soviet Union's Mikhail Gorbachev proposed elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. In April of that year, Mr. Gorbachev proposed substantial reductions of conventional weapons in Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, including reductions in operational-tactical nuclear weapons. In May 1986, NATO responded with the "Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control," which indicated readiness to open East/West discussions on establishing a mandate for negotiating conventional arms control throughout Europe. The "Group of 23," which met in Vienna beginning in February 1987, concluded the meeting in January 1989 with a mandate for the CFE negotiations. On March 6, 1989, CFE talks began, and these talks have continued through six rounds (as of April 1990). Although President George Bush, on May 30, 1989, called for agreement within six months to a year, and the Malta meeting of December 1989 called for completion of a CFE agreement by the end of 1990, much remains to be negotiated. This report provides three types of information. First, treaty provisions brought to the table by both sides are compared. Second, on the basis of these provisions, problem areas are postulated and possible scenarios for resolving these problem areas are developed. Third, scenarios are used as requirements for tasks assigned program elements for possible U.S. implementation of a CFE treaty. As progress is achieved during the negotiations, this report could be updated, as necessary, to provide a continuing systematic basis for program implementation and technology development.
- 1010 **Keeping U.S. Troops in Europe: The Real Reason Why.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Robert A. Levine. September 1990. 23pp.*  
The political capability to keep U.S. troops in Europe is suffering from the collapse of the explicit military rationale that has been used to support those



forces: the need to deter and defend against a massive Soviet attack against Western Europe. The likelihood of such an all-out attack has been decreasing steadily for a long time; it is clearly close to zero now. For many years, the real reasons for the U.S. presence have been far broader than this expressed rationale, and the U.S. troop presence remains important to American interests for the same reasons. This note explores this basic need for a continuing presence of U.S. troops in Europe to support continued U.S. interests, including (1) defense against military threats smaller than a massive Soviet attack, or stemming from a reversal of current favorable Soviet trends; (2) continuation of the favorable Soviet trends; (3) stability (rapid removal of U.S. troops could substitute revived suspicions and rivalries for hopes and cooperation); (4) continued democratization of Eastern Europe, which remains an American ideological as well as strategic interest; (5) U.S. prosperity, which is closely connected to European prosperity; and (6) the voice in many European economic, political, and security matters that the U.S. troop presence gives the United States.

1033

**The Basic Mechanisms of European Community (EC) Farm Policy. Illustrated by: Target, Intervention, and Threshold Prices, Plus Levies and Refunds. How They Work.**

*Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. Walter H. Gardiner. September 1990. 27pp.*

Highlights of EC farm policy include the EC is the world's second largest exporter of agricultural products behind the United States; the basic mechanisms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) include support prices, import levies, and export subsidies; the principles of common pricing and free trade among member countries were short-lived and have not been reestablished; healthy increases in support prices caused production to grow faster than consumption for most commodities; self-sufficiency has been achieved for many agricultural products; the EC has switched from being a net importer to a net exporter of many agricultural products; food expenditures are substantially higher than in the United States; and, in spite of reforms, budget expenditures are expected to reach a record 30.1 billion ECU (\$36.4 billion) in 1990.

1060

**NATO and Warsaw Pact Weapons Production Trends, 1975-1989.**

*Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C. October 1990. 62pp.*

The purpose of the report is to provide a comprehensive source of NATO and WP weapons production historical trends for the period 1975-1989. The data

contained in the report reflect the production quantities for each of the twenty-three NATO and WP nations by year in thirty-four categories. The data are current as of May 1990.

## Reel 5

### Western Europe and NATO (General) cont.

- 0001      **The New European Security Calculus: Implications for the U.S. Army.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Thomas D. Young. January 3, 1991. 72pp.*  
The purpose of the study is to assess the implications and outlook for the United States and the U.S. Army emanating from the new European security calculus as they relate to five key issues: the nature of the new regional security and political balance; arms control; institutional metamorphosis; NATO's strategy dilemma; and U.S. force structure options. It will be argued that the process of German unification necessitates a cold, calculated, and emotionless assessment of the new realities that will govern the future regional security order.
- 0073      **Should the United States Remain in NATO and If So, How Should We Be Committed?**  
*Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Billy D. Browers. February 11, 1991. 28pp.*  
The United States has been a charter member of NATO for the last four decades. With the recent collapse of the Soviet-led WP alliance and the CFE agreement, the very basis for U.S. membership in NATO is being questioned. The long-term future of Germany's participation in NATO is under serious scrutiny both within and outside Germany. The 1994 pullout of Soviet forces from what was previously East Germany will have severe implications on future basing of NATO soldiers in the now-united Germany. This paper explores the role of NATO in the future and what the level of U.S. commitment should be. The paper concludes with the recommendation that NATO shift from a military focus to a political one and that U.S. forces be pulled out of Germany and relocated in Belgium and the Netherlands. A recommended structure of U.S. forces to comply with the proposed reduction of unified commands is presented.

0101 **NATO "Out-of-Area": An Historical Perspective and Post-Cold War Potential.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Daniel A. Doherty. February 15, 1991. 93pp.*

This study examines NATO involvement in security interests outside the geographical boundaries of the Alliance, so-called "out-of-area" issues. Out-of-area issues have impacted on NATO since the inception of the treaty, either as a threat to the security interests of one or more members of the Alliance, a source of diversion of security assets earmarked for NATO, or as an indication of the intentions of Communist adversaries. This study traces the history of NATO member nations' attitudes toward the out-of-area question, beginning with the national motivations in joining the Alliance. Specific events, from the Korean War to the Gulf Crisis of 1990, are discussed to identify trends in NATO's approach to out-of-area issues and to provide insights into the national interests of the NATO members. The WP no longer poses the imminent military threat so often cited as rationale for noninvolvement in out-of-area issues. This study explores the potential for NATO, in light of the reduced threat in Europe, to expand its horizon to include out-of-area involvement and make a greater contribution to world order and peace.

0194 **Can NATO Transcend Its European Borders? NATO Out-of-Area Disputes.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Douglas T. Stuart. February 21, 1991. 26pp.*

The circumstances surrounding the ongoing crisis in the Persian Gulf are unprecedented in NATO's forty-two-year history, and for the first time in that history there is a real danger that intra-alliance disputes arising from an out-of-area challenge could destroy the alliance. Western policymakers must tread carefully if they are to avoid such an outcome. They must be guided by lessons of past attempts at out-of-area cooperation and be able to adapt these lessons to current circumstances. This monograph is an attempt to contribute to the evolving debate about the future of NATO out-of-area cooperation. It will look at the historical record and consider its relevance in a post-cold war era. It will also offer some recommendations for managing the intra-NATO debate about allied responsibilities in the Persian Gulf.

0220 **Reserve Forces of the NATO Armies.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Robert E. Tripp. March 5, 1991. 123pp.*

Reserve forces comprise over half of the wartime strength of the armies of NATO member nations. With so much of this strength in a mobilizable status,

it is important that commanders and staffs of NATO organizations know and understand the reserve systems on which they would depend in wartime. This study seeks to provide an overview of these systems in an unclassified format that can be used as a reference document. With the CFE Treaty, budget cuts, and manpower shortfalls, some NATO countries have proposed changes that will impact on their reserve systems. To the extent information was available, these proposals have been outlined in the applicable chapters. Descriptions of NATO-affiliated associations are also incorporated, as are some basic conclusions and recommendations.

0343 **Europe's Future Security Architecture: Building on the Past or a New Edifice.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Mark R. Perry. March 27, 1991. 72pp.*

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and subsequently of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe ended the cold war but also ended the predictability that East-West tensions brought for some forty-five years. The WP has been dissolved and the Soviet threat diminished dramatically, but a host of uncertainties have arisen. There is widespread agreement that a new European security architecture will be needed, but there also seems to be almost as many visions of that architecture as there are European political leaders. This study seeks to provide a prognosis of what that security architecture will look like over the next decade. The paper provides a forecast of political, military, and economic developments in Europe through the year 2001; an historical review of Western European defense cooperation that will be the heart of the new security framework; and a prognosis of the specific new architecture, as well as recommendations for U.S. policy towards Europe. It is concluded that the new architecture will be built on existing organizations especially NATO, the EC, and the WEU, and it will develop over a period far longer than the time frame of this paper.

0415 **Prospects for Nuclear Deterrence In a Changing Europe.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Vittorio Ghiotto. April 1, 1991. 34pp.*

The present study project consists of two parts. The first concerns the changes in the politico-strategic situation that occurred in recent times in Europe. It tries to explain how the nuclear strategy is closely linked to historic evolution. Since the situation is changed, it is necessary to rethink the role of nuclear weapons. The second part—after an appraisal of the still remarkable Soviet nuclear threat and after examination of recent changes in NATO nuclear strategy—is focused on future prospects for nuclear deterrence in Europe.

Among various solutions, the author favors a so-called essential deterrence, which has as its principal elements: (1) rely, in the foreseeable future, on U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe; (2) significantly reduce the amount of nuclear weapons in Europe; (3) use, as theater nuclear weapons, only those systems with longer ranges that can be launched by air or sea platforms; and (4) give these theater weapons a political deterrence role instead of a military warfighting role as in the past.

0449

**NATO After Iraq: Out of Sector, or Out of Business?**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Bruce K. Scott. April 5, 1991. 34pp.*

NATO has survived many cold-war crises over the past forty-one years, only to be faced with the most crucial test to Alliance solidarity: the dissolution of the WP and the effect of the war in the Gulf. This paper examines the future of NATO in light of these two cataclysmic events. It is the author's thesis that unless NATO accepts the out-of-area mission for its military forces, it will become a hollow shell and collapse upon itself. The method of analysis is simple and direct: first, demonstrate that there is historical precedent for NATO military forces being employed out-of-sector; second, review the basic NATO charter to ensure that it does not expressly prohibit NATO forces operating out of the Central Region; third, illustrate that Germany's Basic Law does not prohibit their military forces from being deployed out of the Central Region; and finally, persuade the reader that no European-only organization (WEU, EC, or CSCE) could handle this out-of-area mission.

0483

**NATO Strategy in a New World Order.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Gary L. Guertner. April 10, 1991. 31pp.*

This study examines the new strategy that is slowly taking shape within the alliance, and the role that NATO is most likely to play within a larger European security regime where responsibilities may be shared with other European multinational organizations—the EC, the WEU, and the CSCE, for example. These and other organizations, the author contends, may compete, evolve, engage in cooperative ventures, and even merge. Their collective challenge is to accommodate Europe's emergence from a U.S.-dominated security umbrella (NATO) while maintaining an American presence in a new political-economic-security order. The outcome will be determined through a slow, iterative process driven by either declining or resurgent threats and compromises among states over divergent domestic agendas, limited willingness to relinquish national sovereignty, suspicions between large and small states, and varying commitments to the American trans-Atlantic relationship.

- 0514      **European Security: Chances for a European Defense Entity.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Peter W. Strik. April 12, 1991. 39pp.*  
At the beginning of the 1950s, a European defense community proved to be beyond realization. In 1989 Ian Gambles discussed the matter anew and concluded that the prospects for a European pillar or defense entity lay in external developments. The turn of this decade showed breathtaking changes in the area of security and European integration. The study first analyzes the recent changes and how they influence the matter. Then it describes recent, current, and future activities within NATO, the EC, the WEU, and the CSCE. Based on the results, it describes a possible scenario and the part the armed forces can play.
- 0553      **A Shield of Blows or Rubber Dagger: An Analysis of an Operational Concept for NATO after Forward Defense.**  
*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Mark R. French. May 12, 1991. 56pp.*  
This monograph answers the following question: what is a viable operational concept for the conventional defense of NATO in the Central Region after forward defense? This monograph shows how forward defense made sense given the strategic situation, ends, means, ways, and risk of the cold-war era. Then, given the same criteria, this study identifies the need for a replacement operational concept. Next, requirements for NATO's new operational concept are drawn from the analysis and measured against a possible replacement concept, resilient defense. Resilient defense, offered as a possible replacement operational concept, is a term given to a concept characterized by its flexibility, concept of belts for force disposition, multinational corps, and attempts to address NATO's changing environment. This study concludes that resilient defense can provide NATO a viable operational concept in a time of great transition and uncertainty.
- 0609      **The Future Role of the United States in European Security: Determining Factors.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Harry J. Dolton, Jr. July 1, 1991. 169pp.*  
Events in Europe in recent years have shaken the world and made assumptions about the present and presumptions regarding the future irrelevant almost overnight. Within this torrent of change and climate of uncertainty, a dominating issue of debate has been the future of European security and, in particular, the role of the United States. This is not the first time, however, that these questions have been addressed. In the post-World War II era,

1945–1948, the same issues were the focus of American and European attention. That period of transition culminated in a common defense system and an American commitment that has lasted over four decades. In the current period of transition and reassessment, the answers to similar questions are not foreordained, and the decisions made are likely to shape the future of European security and the American role for years to come. This paper builds on an historical examination of events in 1945–1948, and then focuses on the determining factors in the current and near term, 1990–1993. Contrast and comparison of the two periods yields identification of common factors that will interact to influence how the United States participates in a future European security system.

0778

**Proliferation of Chemical Weapons and Ballistic Missiles: Risks to NATO's Southern Region.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. James R. King. July 1, 1991. 75pp.*

Proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in the Middle East and North Africa represents a growing risk to NATO's Southern Region. Several countries in the region possess chemical weapons, and others are seeking the capability to develop and employ them. Likewise, ballistic missile trends and emerging capabilities in the region give reason for concern, since the not-too-distant future may see missiles tipped with chemical warheads. The region faces explosive population growth, economic difficulties, and political turmoil. When you add the Arab/Israeli animosities and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism to this instability, the region becomes volatile. Thus, the heightened concern over the proliferation of weaponry in the region. This paper, after a brief background on chemical weapons use and negotiations and a discussion of the region's volatility, examines the proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in the Middle East and North Africa. The resulting future risks to NATO's Southern Region are discussed with the focus on chemical defense preparedness. Conclusions address the continued proliferation and the risks to NATO's Southern Region. Some brief thoughts are offered on security, confidence-building, and cooperation in the region, as well as on strengthening the chemical defense posture of the Southern Region.

0853

**The Economic Impact on Future European Security.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. David C. Elliott. July 1, 1991. 67pp.*

The end of the cold war and dissolution of the bipolar atmosphere present an organizational and security challenge for the "New World Order." Countries

and security organizations are focusing on political, economic, and social issues as well as military forces that they need to support diplomacy. The differences and perceptions between the have's and have not's are destined to grow and increase the challenges to European security. The significant impact of economic issues is evident in several currently developing scenarios as well as the obvious example in the Gulf war. The EC has significant economic challenges from monetary union, political union, monetary and trade policies, aid to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, inflation, recession, interest rates, and many others. With the threat and the size of military forces rapidly diminishing, economic issues and their influence on the political, social, and cultural realms of society will rise significantly in relative importance. This study focuses on the potential of the most significant economic factors to influence future European security structures and policies.

## Reel 6

### NATO Nations France

- 0001     **The French Rapid Action Force: A Key Element in European Conventional Defense.**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Jean-François Louvion. May 1988. 35pp.*  
Remarks on some historical aspects of the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure introduce a description of a drift that appeared in French attitude from 1970 to the early 80s till the birth of the French "Force d'Action Rapide" (FAR). An assessment of conventional balance of forces in Europe follows to show that the potential impact of the FAR is significant. After a description of the FAR itself, the author evokes the political aspect of that force in Europe and what it implies about French commitment in European defense.
- 0036     **The Franco-German Concordat: The Key to Future Western European Security and Stability.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Thomas D. Young and Samuel Newland. February 20, 1990. 40pp.*  
This study analyzes the bilateral security relationship between the FRG and France, with particular emphasis on the period from 1982 to 1989. The authors argue that the best means of keeping the FRG firmly entrenched in the Western Alliance is through Western European security integration, via the WEU. Yet



the key to the success of Western European security integration, particularly in light of the changes that took place in Eastern Europe in 1989, is a continued growth in bilateral West German and French security cooperation.

0076 **The Impact of the Franco-German Relationship on the Security of Western Europe.**

*Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia. Michael E. Travis. May 1990. 124pp.*

This graduate thesis covers the Franco-German relationship and its impact on the security of Western Europe from post-World War II to the present. A chapter is devoted to the relationships role as a catalyst in the organization of the Schuman Plan, Plevan Plan (EDC), and WEU. The thesis then concentrates on defense cooperation between the two countries since their 1982 Defense Initiative. The EC, NATO, and WEU are used as the principal vehicles by which the Franco-German relationship and its role in Western European security are presented.

0200 **French NATO Policy: The Next Five Years.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Gregory Flynn. June 1990. 42pp.*

France, having long proclaimed the need to change the European status quo, regards the potential for change in the structure of European relationships with more anxiety than do most of its allies. However, French security assumptions have not remained static. French policy has been adjusting for some time, but this movement is only partially related to the changes set loose by Soviet President Gorbachev and can be understood only in the broader context of the security perspectives that have guided French thinking since the end of World War II. This study traces the roots of Charles de Gaulle's policies and describes the nearly fifteen-year-long transition away from purist Gaullism toward a new compromise between independence and integration. The author describes the adjustments taken in response, including several important steps to improve the interaction between the French military and NATO, and ways that French diplomacy of the early 1980s began to emphasize common NATO positions. The author then examines the emerging policy environment and its effects on the basic assumptions underpinning French policy. He concludes that in the future, France will be easier to work with as an ally but will continue to seek autonomy in the East-West dialogue.

0242 **Franco-German Defense Cooperation: Outlook and Implications.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. William Boisseree. 1991. 47pp.*

Postwar military cooperation between France and Germany dates from the late 1950s, when the two began to pursue joint weapons development and

armaments production. The current state of intensified defense cooperation began in 1982, when French President Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Schmidt agreed to conduct thorough exchanges of views on security problems. This led to the October 1982 decision to implement the defense clauses of the 1963 Elysée Treaty of Friendship. Cooperation today includes increased consultation on the role of French nuclear forces if employed on German territory, cooperation within the joint Defense and Security Council and joint Franco-German Brigade, major training exercises at the brigade and division levels, and promotion of cooperative weapons production. Of the many accomplishments in Franco-German cooperation since 1982, three areas stand out: the institutionalization of high-level meetings at regular intervals, the improved preparations for possible French participation in the defense of Germany, and the agreement on consultations regarding the potential use of French tactical nuclear weapons on German soil. France and Germany are likely to continue pursuing closer military ties and, on balance, it is in the interests of the United States to encourage them.

0289

**The Franco-German Relationship In the Transatlantic Security Framework.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Thomas D. Young. July 15, 1991. 24pp.*

European affairs continue their rapid evolution in the new post-cold war era. Currently, many of our Western European allies are pressing toward greater economic, political, and military integration as they attempt to create a unified Europe. At the heart of this drive to achieve greater integration is the Franco-German bilateral relationship, upon which the eventual success in achieving a unified Europe is widely recognized as being dependent. The author argues that current difficulties in the relationship, albeit potentially serious, are not terminal. A healthy Paris-Bonn relationship is in U.S. interests and policy recommendations to U.S. officials are provided to encourage its repair.

## **Germany, Federal Republic of**

0313

**Perspectives on the Federal Republic of Germany: Past, Present, and Future.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Samuel J. Newland. September 1988. 55pp.*

This study examines the changing political spectrum in the FRG, a subject chosen because of the importance of the FRG to the U.S. defense effort and its key position in NATO. The report provides a brief survey of some issues

from the past that impact on current German attitudes, a review of the issues that appear to be affecting the relationship between Germany and the United States, and scenarios that foresee three different Germanies in the world of 2013. Some fissures have been developing between the United States and its strong ally of some forty years. However, the author of this report concludes that there is no immediate danger of a rupture in the close relationship. The study encourages readers to recognize these changes and, to illustrate their possible effects, the author constructs three different Germanies that could emerge by 2013, each based on the existent trends. To preserve the strong relationship between West Germany and the United States, it is necessary to not only understand that changes are occurring but to plan to manage changes in the future.

0368

**Department of Defense Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in the Federal Republic of Germany: Time for Tough Decisions.**

*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Christian H. Treutler. May 1989. 95pp.*

This paper is an analytical study of how U.S. noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) are currently envisioned to operate in the FRG based on (1) existing U.S. Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) policies and plans, (2) an assessment of whether or not the NEO objectives can be met, and (3) a presentation of alternative courses of actions that might be selected to improve the chances of U.S. DOD dependent noncombatant survivability, without seriously degrading the combat capability of U.S. and NATO forces, immediately prior to and after the start of a conventional war with the Soviet Union and its WP allies. Since the majority of U.S. noncombatants in Europe reside in the FRG and are the closest to the front, this study concentrates on noncombatant evacuation from the FRG. Furthermore, it focuses on DOD military and civilian dependents who are directly under DOD control and for whom DOD bears primary responsibility. Additionally, current NEO deficiencies, or detractors, are discussed, and specific alternatives to improve the process are analyzed. Repatriation, specifically the onward movement of noncombatants once at the Continental United States (CONUS) Port of Deportation (POD), are not addressed.

0463

**The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces In West Germany.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Ronald D. Asmus. September 1989. 69pp.*

This report examines the origins of changing West German attitudes toward nuclear modernization in the wake of the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear

forces signed in December 1987. It analyzes the factors shaping West German attitudes toward NATO's planned modernization of SNF, factors that led to an open dispute in the alliance over SNF modernization in the early months of 1989. On the basis of this analysis, the report then considers the implications of domestic political trends in the FRG for future alliance decisions on the modernization of NATO nuclear forces in Western Europe.

0532

**West German NATO Policy: The Next Five Years.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Ronald D. Asmus. November 1989. 69pp.*

This note assesses future West German attitudes toward NATO and the factors that are likely to shape them into the mid-1990s. As the 1980s come to a close, changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe confront the NATO alliance with a host of new challenges, while the Soviet threat appears to be dissipating. This note provides a guide for understanding the West German security debate. It also highlights and explains four changes that have taken place in the West German security debate in the 1980s. These changes have made it difficult to maintain the balance between preserving Bonn's strong Western ties and attenuating the costs of national partition and improving West Germany's ties with the East. Finally, it links domestic trends and their effect upon West German security thinking with the broader evolution in East-West relations in Europe.

0601

**Is Political Extremism within the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany a Threat That Can Be Managed?**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Alex Bergenthal. March 13, 1990. 38pp.*

In the armed forces of the FRG, both identified and unidentified members of extremist political parties perform their service. Most of them are draftees who join the armed forces in the same percentage as political extremists are found in the overall German population. However, some political groups send their members into the armed forces in order to corrupt their morale or to acquire specialized military knowledge. For that reason extremists also serve as temporary-career volunteers or regulars in the armed forces. Using authentic source material such as investigations conducted by the German military counterintelligence service, this study seeks to answer the following questions: Has the number of political extremists serving in the federal armed forces increased over the last years? Which movement is considered to be more dangerous—the left wing extremists, or the right wing? What are the objectives of the different groupings? What kind of legal rulings are available against the extremist soldiers? Does the problem require any immediate countermeasures? Focused on the situation in the FRG, the paper could serve as a study subject for other armed forces.

0639

**German Unification: Security Implications for Europe.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Salvatore M. Bruni. July 1, 1990. 227pp.*

A divided Germany has been the centerpiece of European security relations for the past forty-five years. With Europe in turmoil over the implosion of the Soviet Union, the revolutions rushing through Eastern Europe, and impending European economic integration, the current security architecture is teetering. This study begins with a brief explanation of the theory of alliances and why nation states seek them. The chapter ends with a brief look into the post-World War II division of Europe and Germany and ends with a short discourse on the founding of NATO. The following chapter examines the impact of German unification on existing multinational forums, stressing NATO. Also presented is how the other Europeans view unification and what the security ramifications are on the Germans themselves. The conclusion presents several options for the future security architecture of Europe. In addition to the traditional research methodologies, interviews of key European civilian and military leaders are included in the paper.

0866

**German Soldier and German Unity: Political Foundations of the German Armed Forces.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Donald Abenheim. January 1991. 37pp.*

The unification of Germany has transformed the political-military landscape of central Europe. Not the least of the issues raised by the union of the FRG and the GDR is the fate of the professional soldier in a united Germany. The present study analyzes the concept of military professionalism in the setting of the two former German states, placing emphasis on the political-ethical foundations of the West German armed forces and the political mechanisms of the integration of the soldier into society. The political problems of German soldiers in the past combined with the role of the East German armed forces as an instrument of the Socialist Unity Party in the GDR pose a major challenge to the future military of a united Germany.

0903

**U.S. Ground Forces In Germany: Missions for a Reduced Force.**

*Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. David A. Jones. June 21, 1991. 42pp.*

This research paper defines the operational mission and options available for employment of U.S. ground forces in the FRG in 1991. Since late 1989 geopolitical events in Central Europe and South-west Asia have reshaped and redefined the post-cold war world. Both conventional arms reductions and U.S. troop redeployments have forced a reassessment of U.S. ground

force employment in central Europe (CENTAG). This paper focuses on the current geopolitical environment of Germany and how the reduced number of U.S. ground combat units may be employed at the operational level. Three operational plans for troop employments in Germany are examined. The author concludes that even with the smaller number of available forces on hand, U.S. forces can still meet the defense requirements for NATO's central front.

## Reel 7

### NATO Nations cont. Greece

0001

**The Strategic Value of Aegean Islands and Today's NATO Policy.**

*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Evangelos P. Georgoussis. April 1988. 70pp.*

This study examines the strategic value of Greek Aegean Islands, and how they affect the defense of the Turkish Straits. It also examines the geographical, historical, and political background of the southern flank of NATO and how the Aegean Islands might form the basis of a NATO strategy in a future probable conventional war to defend against the WP threat. The study looks at the problems within the region between Turkey and Greece and the consequences of those problems, as well as the possibility of Turkish neutrality in future conventional war between western allies and WP forces. In that case, could the Aegean Islands replace the Turkish Straits as a barrier to prevent the Soviet Black Sea fleet from gaining control of the SLOC in the eastern Mediterranean? The study concludes with a look at the potential NATO strategic profit from the exploitation of Aegean Greek Islands and how much it could increase its defense ability toward the WP threat.

0071

**The Camp David Peace Accords: A Model for Greece and Turkey.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1989. 169pp.*

This study examines the ongoing Greece-Turkey conflict and the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords in an effort to determine whether or not the successful 1978 approach can be modified and adapted to bring peace to Greece and Turkey. The focus throughout the thesis is on the military perspective. The subsequent descriptive comparison and integration of the Camp David model with the Greece-Turkey conflict divides the hostile issues into three categories (security, territorial, and economic) and then compares the two cases to determine their likeness. After running this comparison, the study concludes

that the Greek-Turkish dispute is analogous to the situation that faced Egypt and Israel prior to the Camp David Summit. It further concludes that the Camp David approach will work in the Aegean if properly adapted to the situation.

0240

**Has the Strategic Value of Greece Changed Both in a Regional and Global Context?**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Panos Manolitsakis. March 1990. 41pp.*

This paper represents a review and strategic evaluation of the Hellenic space (land, sea, air) for NATO and the Western World. The following factors are discussed: (1) the new relations between the two Superpowers; (2) the new situation and changes in Eastern Europe and the Middle East; (3) the indisputable fact that today Europe could not survive without ensuring the free oil transportation from the Middle East to her Territory. The Hellenic land, sea, and air space constitutes a solid base of departure from which Allied forces could be channeled rapidly, if necessary, to the Middle East and furthermore to the north, west, or south. The paper concludes that the strategic value of the Hellenic space (land, sea, and air) has increased considerably.

## Italy

0281

**Evolving Arms Transfer Rationales: The Case of Italy.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Charles K. Pickar. June 1987. 130pp.*

Conventional wisdom about European arms suppliers holds that they are motivated primarily by financial considerations when faced with a decision to sell arms. This paper argues that the economic rationale is becoming less important in the Italian case. Evidence suggests that as Italy moves into the next decade, the political rationale will become more important. Italy is using arms transfers for reasons of policy rather than economics. There are three reasons for this change: (1) the Italian government has recently instituted a number of changes in the arms transfer mechanism designed to increase control over the export process; (2) the new and still developing defense policy offers Italy an opportunity to use arms sales to increase Italy's power in the Mediterranean; and (3) the Italian nation, long the object of scorn from its northern European neighbors, is gaining a sense of pride in its accomplishments. Italy's gross national product exceeds that of Great Britain and Italian technology is becoming increasingly in demand. These developments have resulted in Italy being treated as a serious middle-level power and this is reflected in the arms transfer area.

- 0411 **Italian NATO Policy: The Next Five Years.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Ian O. Lesser. November 1989. 42pp.*

Since the late 1970s, Italian policy toward NATO has been characterized by increasing assertiveness, but this has not threatened the basic national commitment to coalition defense and is unlikely to do so in the future. Nonetheless, Italian attitudes and policy toward NATO through the mid-1990s will be subject to strains arising from long-standing strategic dilemmas and competing strategic interests. Although Italy has placed greater emphasis on the Mediterranean dimension of its security policy, there can be little Italian interest in a predominantly Mediterranean approach that would contribute to the marginalization of the Italian role in NATO and focus attention away from the twin pillars of Italian postwar external relations—NATO and the EEC. Italy will almost certainly remain a loyal and cooperative ally, but increasing Italian activism on security questions will make the course of Italian policy more difficult to predict in detail and Italian support for Alliance, particularly U.S. initiatives, less automatic.

## Netherlands

- 0453 **Je Malntlendral: The Royal Netherlands Army within the Alliance.**  
*Indiana University, Department of West European Studies, Bloomington, Indiana. Vernon D. Sorrell. June 1989. 142pp.*

The lackluster performance of the Dutch Army in modern times has led some to believe that it is merely representative of a people traditionally inclined to pacifism and, therefore, lacking the discipline required of an effective military organization. While there is an element of truth in this assessment, it should not be overstated. The principal causes for the decline of the Dutch Army since 1748 were threefold: (1) a greater public and political pragmatism regarding the limited size of the country and its relatively small population, further exacerbated by the Belgian Succession in 1831; (2) the huge costs associated with maintaining a large, well-equipped standing army, which was thought to retard normal economic and social developments and resulted in consecutive cutbacks in military expenditures; and (3) an increasing anti-militarism fueled by conscription, which, after 1900, came to be represented by various labor and social organizations. The impact of these three considerations are examined in successive chapters.



0595

**The Low Countries' NATO Policy: The Next Five Years.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Richard A. Bitzinger. February 1990. 41pp.*

This is one of a series of seven Rand notes written as part of the project on theater nuclear deterrence after the INF Treaty, sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, Europe, analyzing the potential alternative short-run NATO policies of major member nations. This note explores the near-term future of Belgian and Dutch security policy, particularly as it affects the Western alliance. It examines the domestic environment in which the Low Countries' NATO policy is formulated and the reasons the security consensus in these countries is currently in transition. It also looks at the state of the Belgian and Dutch defense efforts. Finally, the note postulates on the Low Countries' NATO policies over the next five years, arguing that arms control, detente, and a declining defense capability should increasingly characterize Belgian and Dutch security policy over the short run. Furthermore, these characteristics of security will likely remain intact, no matter what changes occur in Soviet or other NATO countries' security policies or in the domestic political situation.

0636

**Short v. The Kingdom of the Netherlands: Is It Time to Renegotiate the NATO Status of Forces Agreement?**

*Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Steven J. Lepper. May 1, 1991. 77pp.*

Partial contents: Short and Soering—The background to the NATO SOFA problem; (*Short v. The Kingdom of the Netherlands* and the Soering case); The United States position—Reliance on “Black Letter” international law; A brief history of the NATO SOFA; The Netherlands violated the NATO SOFA's text: Some jurisdictional arguments; The NATO SOFA after Soering; The *Short* decision as a violation of international law, and United States policy; The Dutch position—The role of human rights in international law; Human rights generally: A background; Is the right not to face the death penalty normatively superior to the SOFA's duty to surrender? Is the right not to face the death penalty superior to the SOFA's duty to surrender as a matter of intertemporal law?; The relationship between domestic and international law; Arguments in international treaty law: The Vienna Convention on Treaties and Customary International Treaty Law; Conclusion—Resolving the arguments: Is the *Short* decision valid in international law?; Goals and possible solutions; and How the case-by-case solution should work.

## Norway

0713

### **Norway and the Northern Front: Wartime Prospects.**

*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Robert F. Kernan. May 1989. 45pp.*

Since 1949, NATO has relied on Norway to hold the northern flank against a Soviet invasion until allied reinforcements arrive. This paper assesses the ability of Norway to do this based on its military force structure and political climate. NATO strategy for war in the Norwegian Sea is reviewed, as are proposed Soviet plans for the invasion of Norway. Findings predict the outcome and assesses NATO's reliance on Norway. Several recommendations are made to improve U.S. and NATO strategy on the Northern Flank.

## Portugal

0758

### **U.S.-Portuguese Relations and Foreign Base Rights in Portugal.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Karl J. Van Deusen. June 1990. 191pp.*

This thesis examines the U.S. relationship with Portugal and its significance for past, present, and future U.S. use of basing facilities in the Azores. The U.S.-Portuguese relationship is grounded largely in U.S. geostrategic imperatives and Portuguese military needs. Several factors, including changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe and Portugal's economic revitalization and increasing ties with Europe, justify a reappraisal of certain aspects of Portugal's military relationship with the United States. It would be advantageous on many grounds to cultivate improved social, political, and economic ties between the United States and Portugal and thereby complement the security relationship, including U.S. access to Azorean bases. This thesis also analyzes Portuguese relations with France and the Federal Republic of Germany—the two other nations granted base rights in Portugal. This allows an extensive comparative analysis of French, West German, and American basing relations with Portugal. Finally, the thesis examines the Portuguese military's status in society and politics.

## Scandinavia

0949

### **Scandinavian NATO Policy: The Next Five Years.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. John Lund. May 1990. 47pp.*

Based on reports from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, this note assesses the future of Danish and Norwegian security policies and the probable internal and external factors that will influence them. In the next five

years, Danish politics will be marked by instability as rapid disarmament and tension reduction are pursued. The somewhat more stable Norwegian political environment is also entering a period of uncertainty. However, the weakening of centrism in Norwegian politics should not undermine a traditional concern for arms control and reduced tensions in Europe. While neither Scandinavian nation is expected to take a leading role in the NATO policy debate, they will make clear their opposition to the modernization or expansion of nuclear forces. Although both Norway and Denmark may turn their attention increasingly toward regional or Nordic solutions, the importance of their sealanes to U.S. maritime interests will ensure a continued U.S. commitment to maintaining some form of security relationship with them.

## Reel 8

### NATO Nations cont.

#### Spain

- 0001      **Should Foreign Military Sales to Spain Be Increased?**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Manuel G. Borra. March 23, 1989. 28pp.*  
Foreign military sales (FMS) is a popular topic and a common subject for magazines and newspapers, but people, at least in Spain, think about it as a business for buying and selling military equipment. This paper seeks to clarify the FMS concept as a broader component of security assistance and to analyze it from the Spanish point of view considering its political, military, economical, and industrial factors. It also tries to make recommendations for the Spanish and American sides and to define benefits for both countries if FMS can be increased.
- 0029      **NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 2000: The Role of the Spanish Air Force**  
*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Gonzalo de Cea-Maharro Cuenca. May 1989. 62pp.*  
Since Spain joined NATO in 1982, many things have happened. The Socialist government held a referendum in March 1986 to determine if Spaniards would like to continue in the Alliance. In spite of being a NATO member, Spain is not integrated in the military structure, in accordance with the government's view of cooperation without integration. Spain, also, entered in the WEU on December 1988. The paper covers some facts on the Spanish Air Force, analyzes the threat, NATO's air defense in Europe, and the Spanish strategic

concept. The author deals with some possible actions of control in the air space and how this control will be in Spanish strategic areas in the year 2000. The final conclusions are the significant role of the Spanish Air Force in NATO in the year 2000 and beyond.

0091 **Historical Analysis of Spain's Entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Its Lack of Full Integration Into the Military Force Structure.**

*Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Perry R. Oaks. September 1990. 124pp.*

This thesis examines factors surrounding Spain's entrance into NATO as well as its nonintegration into the alliance's military force structure. International relationships significant in the time preceding Spain's entrance into NATO are examined, focusing primarily on the United States. NATO's benefits from Spain's membership are discussed as are the advantages afforded to Spain by joining NATO. This research assesses the changing attitude of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) toward NATO. The PSOE initially opposed Spanish integration into NATO while the country was ruled by a centrist government. However, when the PSOE took control of the government, their NATO position became noncommittal and finally, by the 1986 referendum, switched to a pro-alliance stance. The final issue addressed deals with the bilateral defense agreement between Spain and the United States. Of considerable interest is the reduction of U.S. military forces in Spain, specifically the withdrawal of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing from Torrejon Air Base.

0215 **The Security Factors Involved in Spain's Entry Into NATO.**  
*Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Juan Gabriel Lobo Sanchez. September 1990. 94pp.*

The focus of this research effort was to determine if Spain's entry into NATO gave Spain substantial improvement in security terms, which served as justification of a defensive alliance from a strictly military perspective. First, a qualitative, in-depth literature review was conducted regarding the Spanish integration process into NATO and the U.S.-Spanish agreements. Then, to contrast critical viewpoints, the information sources were divided into three groups: Spanish, U.S., and NATO sources. The information was analyzed addressing those aspects closest related to Spain's security. The historical events since 1936 and the political process since 1975 served as the framework for a discussion of military issues in recent Spanish history. Finally, analysis of the information gathered led to the conclusion that the justification for Spain's entry into NATO has not adequately addressed her most pressing defense issues.

- 0309 **Spanish Defense Policy under the Socialist Government, 1982–1990.**  
*Indiana University, Department of West European Studies, Bloomington, Indiana. Ulises J. Soto. December 1990. 158pp.*  
This thesis attempts to examine Spanish defense policy since the beginning of the Socialist regime under Felipe Gonzalez (1982–1990). It seeks to show how domestic politics have shaped the course of Spanish defense policy under the Socialist administration. So important have been domestic political concerns that they have often overwhelmed the rational formulation of a defense structure based on security requirements. The result has been an ambiguous and often contradictory form of participation in Western defense. Clearing up some of the confusion that has arisen, particularly by external observers, is the goal of this thesis.
- 0467 **Spain's Present Role as a Crossroad.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Jose Lage. March 26, 1991. 27pp.*  
The location of the Iberian Peninsula as the most distant point from Asia within the European continent makes it the closest to Africa, from which it is separated by only 14 km., and to the Atlantic Ocean and thus the Americas. This gives Spain a special strategic value. This explains why the peninsula, and Spain in particular, has been an essential crossroad in world history, as an intersection of the routes where Europe meets Africa and that cross the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. These facts as well as the integration of Spain into the NATO alliance and some initiatives that Spain has backed, and occasionally sponsored, about security and cooperation in the Mediterranean are reviewed in this paper, as well as both the relationship between Spain and the Maghreb countries and between Spain and those in the Western Mediterranean.

## United Kingdom

- 0494 **British Defense Policy: A New Approach?**  
*Indiana University, Department of West European Studies, Bloomington, Indiana. William R. Applegate. December 14, 1988. 122pp.*  
This thesis traces the development of British defense policy and its component organizations from the fourteenth century until the present day. In-depth analysis of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, and Ministry of Defense is provided. Further, the record of the Thatcher governments concerning British defense policy is compared with those of previous governments and monarchs, concluding that Mrs. Thatcher's treatment of defense is more correctly described as "more of the same" rather than a "new approach."

0616 **A Case Study: The Effects of the British Army Against the Irish Republican Army.**

*Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Kenneth S. Hahn. September 1989. 81pp.*

The purpose of this study is to determine the effects British troops have had while countering the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The study involved the following research objectives: first, terrorism and the IRA as a terrorist organization were defined to form a basis for the research. Following these definitions, the Irish history, the IRA goals, and the British goals were discussed. After the British goals were defined, the significant events involving British troops or the IRA were reviewed to identify effects. Finally, the effects of the British Army and any contributing factors in the Northern Ireland situation were outlined. The study found that troops can have a wide variety of effects. In particular, this study found three major effects of troops: (1) troops can prevent a civil war; (2) the Army can contain the level of violence created by a terrorist group but not totally defeat the organization; and (3) by mishandling situations and implementing unpopular policies, troops can alienate the community.

## **Non-Aligned Nations Sweden**

0697 **Swedish Defense in the Future.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Yngve A. Johansson. February 25, 1990. 30pp.*

International relations are changing rapidly. Soviet perestroika has led to negotiations between the superpowers and to near revolutions in many non-Soviet WTO countries. The European Common Market develops toward more integration and more members. New military relations and capabilities may substantially change the threat. Sweden, for more than a century a nonaligned nation, has declared its intention of maintaining an armed neutrality in future conflicts. This article describes the more significant international and domestic changes and their impact on Sweden's defense. The upcoming new Defense Decision in 1991 was intended to be an important choice between spending more resources or reducing missions for the armed forces. The uncertainties in the environment may lead to a 'wait and see solution.'

## Yugoslavia

- 0727 **Trade Liberalization in Yugoslavia and Poland.**  
*Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. Nancy J. Cochrane. September 1990. 44pp.*  
The study presents the author's estimates of producer and consumer subsidy equivalents (PSEs and CSEs) for Yugoslavia and Poland and uses the Static World Policy Simulation (SWOPSIM) framework to model the effects of trade liberalization on agricultural production and trade in those two countries. PSE and CSE calculations for 1986, the base year used in the model, show that in that year both Yugoslavia and Poland subsidized producers on a level roughly equal to that in Western Europe. On the other hand, Poland also subsidized consumers quite heavily, while Yugoslavia taxed its consumers, generally to a greater extent than in Western Europe. SWOPSIM results suggest that the ongoing economic reforms in these countries, if successful, could dramatically alter current patterns of production and trade in both countries. Poland could become a significant net agricultural exporter, mainly the result of a large increase in pork exports. Yugoslavia could shift to a net importer of grains, but increased exports of meat and other products could bring it close to self-sufficiency in agricultural trade.
- 0771 **Directory of Yugoslav Officials: A Reference Aid.**  
*Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. March 1990. 149pp.*  
The directory of Yugoslav officials identifies individuals who hold positions in selected party, government, economic, scientific, and other organizations.

## Reel 9

### Eastern Europe (General)

- 0001 **East European Reliance on Technology Imports from the West.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Steven W. Popper. August 1988. 60pp.*  
This report, an overview of current East European reliance on technology imports from the West, assesses the importance to the East Europeans of these imports. The study develops a measure to provide a relative scale of reliance on Western imports for a sample of high-technology commodities for each of the six East European members of the CMEA, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, from 1980–1984. The analysis indicates that (1) there is a great diversity in the degree of reliance on Western imports between countries and across commodities; (2) the measure of Western import reliance generally declined during this period; (3) the countries of Eastern Europe tend to rely

on the West more for the less compressible higher-technology goods included in the sample than for general machinery imports, and they rely more on the CMEA than on the Soviet Union; and (4) U.S. ability to unilaterally affect Western technology deliveries to Eastern Europe is limited.

- 0061 **Agricultural Performance in Eastern Europe, 1987.**  
*Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. Nancy J. Cochrane and Miles J. Lambert. December 1988. 30pp.*

Growth in the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe has slowed during the 1980s and in 1987 was set back by declines in agricultural output. However, with the exception of 1987, the region's deficit in agricultural trade has been improving, primarily because of generally increased production and decreased imports of grain. Intentions to boost livestock product exports, as well as raise living standards by supplying more meat to domestic consumers, necessitate continued imports of protein feedstuffs (oilseeds and oilseed meals).

- 0091 **Eastern Europe's Reliance on Western Technology.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Steven W. Popper. March 1989. 34pp.*

This paper provides an assessment of East European reliance on high-technology imports from the West. In section II, a measure to provide a relative scale of reliance on Western imports for a sample of commodities is calculated for each of the six East European members of the CMEA as well as for the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia over the period 1980–1984. Section III provides a measure of overall reliance for each country by aggregating over the group of commodities discussed. This measure is then compared with a similar measure for all machinery to determine if reliance on these commodities is greater than on the general category of machinery imports. The section discusses the relative importance of these commodities to Western countries as exports. Section IV presents a brief case study on the importation of machine tools by Hungary. This use of additional data sources provides a check on the relation between the import reliance measures and the actual flow of imports to Eastern Europe. Section V offers the study's conclusions.

- 0125 **The Soviet Withdrawal from Eastern Europe: A Move In Crisis.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Dana F. Kwist. February 15, 1991. 79pp.*

Following the 1989–1990 political events in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is hastening to remove its armed forces from that region. That force of thirty-nine divisions, with all of its associated organizations and equipment, is currently the object of an enormous withdrawal that will be mostly complete



in 1994. Throughout 1990 the Soviet withdrawal was chronicled in the Communist Bloc with unprecedented candor, and those reports reveal alarming details about the difficulties being experienced by the Soviet military. Within the Soviet Union and the Soviet military a variety of problems adversely impact on the returning troops. A lack of adequate housing, catastrophic economic conditions, unfavorable attitudes about military service, and political struggles within the government are all studied in order to place the Soviet military withdrawal into proper perspective. There are both similarities and unique aspects in how the Soviet Union is ending its military involvements with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. The cascading accounts of the Soviet military withdrawal need to be studied in order to assess how U.S. foreign policy should be shaped to react in the post-cold war environment.

0204 **Western Threat Perception and the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.**

*U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Jacob W. Kipp. April 1990. 36pp.*

On May 29, 1987, the Political Consultative Committee of the WP issued an official communiqué, proclaiming that its "military doctrine is strictly defensive and proceeds from the fact that the application of military means to resolve any dispute is inadmissible under current conditions." This redefinition of military doctrine with its proclaimed goal of preventing war has engendered serious debate in the East and West over the role of military doctrine in international security arrangements and the relationship of military doctrine to threat perceptions. Yet, military doctrine does not mean the same thing when used by the WP and when discussed by NATO officials or Western security analysts. This essay attempts to address the core of this problem by employing those categories that Western authors and analysts have used to define Soviet/WTO military doctrine and to discuss changes within it, to appraise that doctrine as it has contributed to Western/NATO threat perception. The focus will be on Soviet/WTO categories and views as they have evolved historically.

0240 **Agricultural Trade and Policy In Eastern Europe: Country Summaries.**  
*Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. A. Avidor. June 1990. 23pp.*

The reports summarize developments in U.S. trade and trade policy concerning countries in Eastern Europe. The countries included in the trade policy are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the USSR.

- 0263     **Agricultural Performance in Eastern Europe, 1988.**  
*Economic Research Service, Washington, D.C. Nancy J. Cochrane and Miles J. Lambert. June 1990. 44pp.*  
The report includes a full analysis of the agricultural market in Eastern Europe up to 1988. The attached shorter articles update the analysis to include recent developments.
- 0307     **The Central and Eastern Europe Private and Voluntary Organization. Contact List, July 1990.**  
*Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. July 1990. 125pp.*  
The list gives names, addresses, and program descriptions of eighty-three private and voluntary organizations dealing with Eastern Europe. It includes summaries of the activities supported, including the number of personnel in the United States as well as host country.
- 0432     **Medical and Related Industries in Eastern Europe.**  
*International Trade Administration, Washington, D.C. 1991. 28pp.*  
This document contains information on the medical equipment and pharmaceuticals industry in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia. The information consists of the particular needs of each country, as well as business and scientific contacts for joint ventures and other business opportunities. In addition, the package contains information on whom to contact for the importation of drugs and medical equipment. Also included is information on trade promotion opportunities in these countries.
- 0460     **Germany, Russia, and Conditions for Stability in Central Europe.**  
*Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Keith A. Oatman. March 4, 1991. 66pp.*  
For all of the positive trends spurred on by recent changes in the politico-military and economic map of Europe, there are also powerful negative forces that threaten stability from the Atlantic to the Urals. If history provides any useful precedents, the main threats to regional stability will, in all likelihood, emanate from Central Europe. Disillusionment with the old in Central and Eastern Europe has continued as the new is proving unable to satisfy expectations. Gorbachev's "new thinking" seems to be losing out to a resurgence of the powers of reaction. German reunification, although potentially the main catalyst for bridging the postwar artificial division of Europe, is viewed by many in the East and West with suspicion, the age-old "Germany question" having once again come to the fore. In short, the dark clouds of authoritarianism, hypernationalism, and social and economic collapse are

never totally beyond the Central European horizon. One thing does, however, seem clear; the path to a stable and prosperous "common European home" will be long and difficult for all who travel it.

- 0526 **Survey of Financing Programs for Doing Business in Eastern Europe.**  
*Dewey Ballentine, Washington, D.C. L. Sostowski and J. A. Schottler. June 1991. 27pp.*

This is a financial survey summarizing a number of programs to support U.S. business activity in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The survey includes information on Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, U.S. Export-Import Bank, Private Export Funding Corporation, International Finance Corporation, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Trade and Development Program, and U.S. Department of Agriculture Export Programs.

- 0553 **Eastern Europe: The Impact of Geographic Forces on a Strategic Region. A Conference Report.**  
*Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. July 1991. 85pp.*

The report covers the proceedings of the conference on Eastern Europe, "The Impact of Geographic Forces on a Strategic Region" in May 1990. The report contains the texts of presentations and also excerpts from the wide-ranging discussions that involved the main speakers, other academics, and participants from the U.S. intelligence community and several U.S. policy-making departments. The talks presented were: Setting the Scene: The Historical and Human Geography of Eastern Europe; Eastern Europe in 1990: Politics, Policy, Performance, and Patterns in Space; Ethnic Nationalism in Eastern Europe; The Impact of Geographic Factors upon the Future Stability of Eastern Europe; The Military Geography of Eastern Europe; and A Geographic Perspective on Future U.S. Security Interests in Eastern Europe.

## **Warsaw Pact Nations**

### **Bulgaria**

- 0638 **Bulgarian Business Law of May 1991.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the General Counsel, Washington, D.C. 1991. 67pp.*

The report includes a detailed law dealing with business transactions of enterprises, business persons, companies, and partnerships. The law includes provisions on business agents, trade firms and seats, business companies, general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company, shares, and bonds.

## Czechoslovakia

- 0705 **Directory of Czechoslovak Officials: A Reference Aid.**  
*Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. May 1989. 152pp.*  
The report is a reference guide to leading officials in Czechoslovakia and its organizations. It may be used to find the incumbents of given positions within an organization or the positions of given individuals.
- 0857 **Czechoslovakia: Paving the Way to a Free Economy. A Guide to Legislation Governing Company Establishment and Investment in Czechoslovakia.**  
*Peat Marwick, Washington, D.C. May 1990. 24pp.*  
Summaries of several major legal amendments, such as Law Concerning Entrepreneurship by Individuals, Law Concerning Enterprises with Foreign Capital Participation, Law Dealing with Limited Companies, Law Dealing with Economic Relations with Foreign Companies, and other legislation.
- 0881 **Draft of Czechoslovak Federal Constitution of March 1991.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C. 1991. 28pp.*  
President Vaclav Havel's draft of a federal Constitution for Czechoslovakia is presented.

## Germany, Democratic Republic of

- 0909 **East Germany's Military Forces and Expenditures.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Keith Crane. October 1989. 91pp.*  
This report assesses the current and future contribution of the East German armed forces to the WP and attempts to determine whether their role has changed in recent years. The study assesses the veracity of East German military spending figures and estimates costs of personnel, procurement of military durables, and arms trade. It compares East German military capabilities with those of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Group of Soviet Forces Germany, and finds that with the exception of the East German navy, rates of modernization in these forces have exceeded or kept pace with those in East Germany. The report also estimates military manpower needs and compares them with demographic projections of eighteen-year-old cohorts. The study finds that East Germany will be unable to sustain current force levels with present terms of enlistment. The study also assesses East Germany's ability to sustain or increase current military expenditure levels in the late 1990s and finds that the East Germans will have difficulty in increasing expenditure levels at past rates. The study concludes with a set of policy recommendations for conventional arms negotiations.

1000

**Reform in the German Democratic Republic (GDR): What Should the U.S. Do?**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Hasko K.W. Eckel. March 23, 1990. 36pp.*

Socialist command economies have relied on centrally planned rigid economic systems that have performed poorly and need the introduction of market mechanisms. While the GDR command economy has been manipulated to achieve the highest standard of living among the WP countries, living conditions trail those in the industrialized free-market countries by a huge margin. Economic stagnation frustrates large segments of the population. These conditions and historic socio-political events in the WP nations, initiated largely as a result of glasnost and perestroika introduced by the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, caused movement toward democratization and reform of economic systems in all East European countries during 1989. Continuation of these reforms seems inevitable. Economic conditions in the GDR and the difficult actions required to achieve economic improvements and stabilize its demonstrating and emigrating population are highlighted in this paper. Actions the United States should pursue to help preserve peace and inter-state stability in Europe, to provide assistance that will further successful reform in the GDR, and to enhance U.S. chances to be a meaningful player on the greater European scene in the future are outlined in the final chapter of the paper.

## Reel 10

### Warsaw Pact Nations cont. Hungary

0001

**Hungarian Cooperatives: Information on Industrial Co-operatives Interested in the Formation of Joint Ventures and in the Collaboration with Foreign Partners.**

*International Trade Administration, Washington, D.C. 1990. 473pp.*

The two-volume edition consists of the names of 3,000 cooperatives from various industries throughout Hungary. The information details the type of venture, the number of employees, and what type of venture is being sought. Each entry has an address, the name of a contact person, a phone number, and a telex number. Fax numbers are not available. The industrial cooperatives listed look for new technology, modernization, market organization and commercialization, possibilities in the foreign market, capital, and machinery. They are able to offer manpower, premises, existing machinery, and limited capital.

- 0474 **Investing in Human Capital: Hungary's Transition to a Market Economy.** *Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington, D.C. Kenneth J. Angell and Jerry VanSant. July 1990. 81pp.*

In the wake of the political and economic upheaval in Eastern Europe, Hungary is at a critical juncture of both challenge and opportunity as it shifts by choice from a command to a market economy. To help facilitate this transition, the U.S. government is committed to providing assistance to support Hungarian economic self-sufficiency. The basic framework for U.S. assistance to Hungary is the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act, which has two broad objectives: fostering free market-oriented economies and private enterprise, and supporting political pluralism through assistance to democratic institutions. The management training needs of Hungarian enterprises fall into three categories: entrepreneurs and small businesses; the financial sector; and medium and large enterprises in the agribusiness, industrial, and commercial sectors. Entrepreneurs and small business owners need information support and assistance with contacts, networking, and representation as a group in legislative and other policy arenas. The financial sector requires management training and technical assistance to cope with the rapidly changing environment in financial and capital markets. Managers in medium and larger enterprises in agribusiness and the industrial and commercial sectors need management training in the priority fields of financial management, business planning, international marketing, human resource management, and production control.

- 0555 **Hungarian Rules of Law In Force (September 1, 1990) Including Decrees Acts, and Orders on Foreign Trade from 1974 through 1990.** *U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C. September 1, 1990. 87pp.*

The report, in English, Hungarian, and German, is of Hungarian Rules of Law in Force (September 1, 1990) issue, including Foreign Trade Act III/ 1974; Resolution 1053/1974 (X.17) of Council of Ministers on Execution of 1974 Foreign Trade Act; Decree No. 7/1974 (X.27) KkM on Execution of Some Provisions of Foreign Trade Act II/1974; Law Decree No. 8/1978 on Application of Civil Code to External Economic Relations; Decree No. 3/1989 (II.26) KeM on Business Representation of Foreigners and on Their Information and Service Offices in Hungary; Order No. 9/1989 (VI.15) KeM on Enforcement of Financial Claims Incurring from Foreign Trade Activity; Order No. 3/1977 (VII.23) KkM on Licensing Foreign Trade of Goods, Services and Rights Representing Material Value; and Decree No. 1/1987 (XII.29) KeM on Qualification System of persons employed in foreign trade.

## Poland

- 0642 **Polish Economic Policy and Western Economic Leverage.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Keith Crane. July 1987. 32pp.*  
This document considers ways in which Western policy can influence the Polish economic debate. Western leverage in Poland is limited, as that country lies in the overwhelming political, economic, and military shadow of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, economic policy instruments have some potential for influencing economic and other policies in Poland. Two Western economic policy goals stand out: the eventual servicing of the Polish hard-currency debt and the implementation of a more efficient, market-based economic system within the country. The latter would make it easier for Poland to service its debt and could lead to increased trade and, possibly, a more open political system. Western economic leverage appears to lie in its willingness to ease Polish debt repayment and to lower barriers to Polish exports, accomplished perhaps by trading concessions and for concessions. International institutions not representing national policy interests would be best situated to provide pressure in the desired direction.
- 0674 **An Assessment of the Economic Reform in Poland's State-Owned Industry.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Keith Crane. May 1988. 46pp.*  
This note provides an empirical assessment of the economic reforms introduced in Poland's state-owned industry since 1982. Much of the current literature on the Polish reform is of a theoretical nature; this study is intended to contribute to the empirical foundations of the debate on the effects of the reforms. It is part of a continuing research program in international economic policy, the principal focus of which is the interface between international economics and national security issues, in Rand's National Security Research Division.
- 0720 **Poland Since Martial Law.**  
*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. J.F. Brown. December 1988. 39pp.*  
The coup carried out on December 13, 1981, by General Jaruzelski and the Polish military had one immediate aim: to destroy the free trade union, Solidarity. In the immediate sense, this aim was quickly achieved. By the end of the year, Solidarity as a functioning public organization was shattered; most of its leaders were in detention, and the remaining few had gone underground. Active worker resistance was forcibly put down, not by the army but by special riot police, the ZOMO (Zmotoryzowane Odwoły Milicji

Obywatelskiej, or Motorized Detachment of the Citizen's Militia), with surprisingly few casualties. The whole operation was a highly effective one, by Poles against Poles, under Soviet pressure but without the active intervention of a single Soviet combatant. Solidarity had begun in August 1980 as a trade union and had swiftly become a national movement, implicitly rejecting Communist rule. In a period of just fifteen months, Solidarity eroded much of the Communist power structure that had taken thirty-five years to build. But Solidarity, as it turned out, made little impression on the underpinnings of Communist rule. The forces of coercion—the military and the police—remained intact and loyal to Communist authority and, in the events of 1981, preserved that authority. Behind these forces lay the external pillar of Soviet strength and determination, but on December 13, 1981, Soviet action was not needed. General Jaruzelski was able to do the job himself—and with unexpected speed and efficiency. Within two weeks, he had pacified Poland. But he must have harbored few illusions about the difficulties of normalizing Poland, and even fewer about the difficulties of activating it. Seven years after the coup, he seems as far away as ever from doing either.

0759

**Directory of Polish Officials: A Reference Aid.**

*Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. April 1989. 177pp.*

This edition of the Directory of Polish Officials supersedes LDA 87-10997, produced in April 1987. It identifies individuals who hold positions in selected party, government, economic, scientific, and other public organizations. It also provides a guide to the internal structure of some of these organizations.

0936

**Polish Foreign Policy under a Non-Communist Government: Prospects and Problems.**

*Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Thomas S. Szayna. April 1990. 66pp.*

This Rand note analyzes Polish foreign policy directions following the establishment of a government led by non-Communists. It is based both on trends within Polish opposition circles before the government was set up and on actions and foreign policy statements made as of December 1989 by government officials. It also surveys the internal political situation in Poland in an attempt to judge support for new foreign policy moves. This note was prepared as part of a larger project describing Soviet dilemmas in Eastern Europe that was undertaken for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Rand's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is part of Rand's International Security and Defense Policy Program. Some of the research was also supported by the Rand/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies.



Frame

- 1002     **Agriculture and Food Processing In Poland: Trade and Market Information.**  
*Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. June 1990. 34pp.*  
The collection contains several articles on the current status of the agricultural market in Poland. Prospects for increased U.S. food exports and opportunities for the food processing market are discussed.
- 1036     **Polish Government Program for Privatization of Polish Economy.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C. 1990. 31pp.*  
This document contains the English text of a Polish government document outlining, premises of the privatization program, including privatization of large, small, and medium size enterprises, privatization through liquidation, transformation of cooperatives, corporate structures, and the stock exchange. An appendix notes anticipated problems and approaches to particular sectors of the economy.
- 1067     **The Environmental Sector In Poland: Overview and Business Contacts.**  
*International Trade Administration, Washington, D.C. 1991. 20pp.*  
Environmental pollution clean-up and control is considered Poland's top priority. Poland's movement toward privatizing its economy and cleaning and protecting its environment offers U.S. companies unprecedented business opportunities. U.S. expertise in environmental technology and in energy management will contribute to solving Poland's problems in several ways: pollution control equipment and expertise to help monitor and minimize the environmental impact of the continued reliance on brown coal; clean-coal technology and pollution control equipment to retrofit existing lignite-fired coal plants in priority pollution-distressed areas of southern Poland; and expertise in water and soil clean-up and in waste management to improve public health conditions. U.S. businesses interested in investment opportunities in these three areas are eligible for lower taxes and low-cost financing. Firms that invest in these preferred areas are exempt from deposit requirements. Exemptions from the state turnover sales tax are granted to those firms that use waste or recycled materials. Under the new law on joint ventures of December 24, 1989, special treatment is granted to U.S. firms in obtaining operating permits and tax holidays.

*Frame*

- 1087 **Polish Law on Foreign Investment (Joint Ventures Act) of June 1991.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C. 1991. 26pp.*

The report includes the law dealing with conditions for admitting foreign parties to participate in income from operating enterprises in Poland. The text includes two translations of the act.

**Romania**

- 1113 **Romanian Law #58 on Privatization of Commercial Companies of August 1991.**  
*U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C. 1991. 10pp.*

This document is the law setting up conditions for transfer by the state to private ownership of commercial companies through sale of shares or assets.

# SUBJECT INDEX

The following index is a guide to the major subjects of this collection. The first arabic number refers to the reel, and the arabic number after the colon refers to the frame number at which a particular file containing the subject begins. Therefore, 3: 0448 directs the researcher to the file that begins at Frame 0448 of Reel 3. By referring to the Reel Index located in the initial part of this guide, the researcher can find the main entry for the document in which the subject appears.

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